MISCELLANIES:

PHILOSOPHICAL,

MEDICAL AND MORAL.

VOL. I.

CONTAINING,

I. Obſervations on the Literature of the Primitive Chriſtian Writers.

II. Reflections ſuggeſted by the Character of Pamphilus of Cæſarea.

III. Hints reſpecting the State and Education of the People.

IV. Thoughts on the Origin of Human Knowledge, and on the Antiquity of the World.

V. Remarks on Profeſſor Meiners' Hiſtory of Antient Opinions reſpecting the Deity.

VI. Account of Dr. Ellis's Work on the Origin of Sacred Knowledge.

Si quid minus recte juvenilia noſtra proferrent?
Nos fere tirones meminerit candidus lector.

HEINSIUS de juvenil. opp. ſuis.

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ADVERTISEMENT.

THE Author intended to have added a ſecond volume, but his other engagements having put it out of his power to accompliſh this at preſent, he has thought it proper to publiſh the firſt volume by itſelf, which was printed ſome years ago, and which, as it conſiſts of independent tracts, forms a complete work of itſelf.

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I.

OBSERVATIONS

ON THE

LITERATURE

OF THE

PRIMITIVE CHRISTIAN WRITERS.

BEING AN ATTEMPT TO VINDICATE THEM

FROM AN IMPUTATION

OF M. ROUSSEAU AND MR. GIBBON,

(THAT THEY WERE ENEMIES TO PHILOSOPHY AND HUMAN LEARNING).

Originally read to the Antiquarian Society of Scotland.

ENLARGED AND ILLUSTRATED WITH NOTES.

I

TO

THOMAS PERCIVAL,

OF MANCHESTER,

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DEAR SIR,

IT is with much satisfaction that I accept your permission, to address these papers to you, as confident that you will feel yourself interested in the

 subject,

ſubject, and that from you they will not fail to meet with a candid reception. The materials that compoſe them were originally compiled ſeveral years ago, when my ſtudies were of a different nature from what they have been of late. At preſent I have done little more than put them together, and add ſome notes; and even this, my profeſſional ſtudies have not allowed me to do with all the care I could have wiſhed.

Such as they are, I hope they will not be found altogether unworthy of the notice of the public; and whatever attention may be paid to them by others, I ſhall be happy if you accept them as a ſincere, though ſmall mark of *eſteem* and *friendſhip*.

Amidſt the viciſſitudes and afflictions which all experience at ſome time in human life, how great a ſolace is found

in virtuous friendſhip! To pleaſe all men is impoſſible; to pleaſe the many is dangerous: according to a maxim of ancient wiſdom, it could not be done without a ſevere ſacrifice [*a*]. But happy is he who has been lucky enough to obtain, and, by conſiſtency of character, to *preſerve* the friendſhip of the diſcerniug few. In proſperity this will add new luſtre to his fortunes; and in adverſity it will afford him inexpreſſible ſupport and conſolation.

The judicious will diſcover, with what propriety a performance of this kind is inſcribed to a phyſician, who is not only diſtinguiſhed by profeſſional knowledge, but alſo by an elegant taſte for the cultivation of claſſical and ſacred literature.

[*a*] "Το τοις πολλοις αρεσκειν, τοις σοφοις εστιν απαρεσκειν." Plutarch. To pleaſe the many is to diſpleaſe the wiſe.

It is by ſuch characters that the dignity of the medical profeſſion is ſuſtained. It is by ſuch that it is prevented from degenerating into a mere trade, or craft, by which ignorant and needy men, deſtitute of genius and of principle, may impoſe upon the public. It is the glory of medicine, that, more than all others, it is the *profeſſion of literature*, as well as *of benevolence*. No kind of knowledge is indifferent or uſeleſs to a phyſician, becauſe man, the object of his care, is connected with, and influenced by, almoſt every thing in nature. With ſingular propriety our language has appropriated to the medical practitioner, the term PHYSICIAN, that is, φυσικος, a *ſtudent of nature*; whoſe ſcience may be defined "Univerſal Philoſophy, or, the con-templation of univerſal nature, di-

" rected to the preſervation and relief
" of man [*a*]."

Accordingly we find, that in every period, there have been phyſicians who have ſupported this high and intereſting part of their character; and have appeared as the *friends of philoſophy*, and the *guardians of literature*. HIP-

[*a*] We are not, however, the firſt, nor the only people who have been ſtruck with the juſtice of this idea, as I learn from a paſſage in the Adverſaria, or Common Place Book, of a learned and induſtrious writer. " Et cum *phyſice* ſit ſcientia naturalium re-
" rum, phyſici ſunt talium gnari." Prudentius II. Symb.

" Ne vos ò miſeri phyſicorum dogmata fallant."

" Et quia hæc ipſa ſcientia neceſſaria iis, medici
" cœperunt ad extremum hoc nomine cenſeri: An-
" nales Dominicanorum Colmarenſium: 'in Unger-
" ſheim fuit mulier tabernaria, de qua phyſicus
" ejecit infrà decennium tres cattas.' Hinc hodieque
" mos manet ut medici civitatum medicos-phyſicos
" ſeſe nominent." Caſp. Barthii Adverſaria, L. II. C. 21.

POCRATES was instructed in all the knowledge of his times [a].

The

[a] It has been a commonly received opinion, that Hippocrates ſeparated *medicine* from *philoſophy*, and firſt made a diſtinct branch of it. This idea, which is founded upon the authority of Celſus (Præfat. l. 1.) and ſupported by David le Clerc (Hiſtoire de la Med. 4to. à la Haye, 1729, p. 112.) has been controverted lately by Dr. Riollay (Doct. and Practice of Hippocrates, 8vo, Lond. 1783, p. 37); and I think not without grounds. To his obſervations I ſhall add, that Celſus himſelf ſpeaks of it with heſitation; for he ſays, "ut quidam tradiderunt, as "ſome have ſaid;" and farther, "primus quidem "ex omnibus memoria dignis, the firſt worthy of "note;" from which it may be inferred, that others before Hippocrates had ſeparated medicine from philoſophy; but they were too obſcure to be remembered, and that he was only the firſt illuſtrious perſon who had done ſo.

But if we ſhould grant the common opinion to be juſt, it is however certain, that Hippocrates ſeparated the two only in this way. As he perceived the vaſtneſs of medical ſcience, and the narrowneſs of the human mind, he contended, that the followers of the healing art ſhould lay aſide the *general* name of *philoſopher*, to aſſume the *particular* one of phyſician,

The learning of GALEN was immenſe,

cian, and ſhould devote their attention principally to the ſtudy of the ſtructure and diſeaſes of the human frame. But no one has more ſtrongly aſſerted the neceſſity of philoſophical knowledge to a phyſician than the FATHER OF PHYSIC. Moſt admirable are the obſervations he has left us, ſcattered in various parts of his works, particularly in the treatiſes *Lex*, *De Arte*, *De Priſca Medicina*, *De Medico*, & *De decenti habitu*, on this ſubject, and on other matters relative to the medical profeſſion. At preſent I ſhall offer to the conſideration of the reader only two very remarkable paſſages.

I.

" ΙΗΤΡΙΚΗ, τεχνεων μεν πασεων εστιν επιφανεστατη.
" δια δεαμαθιην των τε χρεωμενων αυτη, και των εικη τας
" τοιασδεκρινοντων, πολυ τι πασεων ηδη των τεχνεων απο-
" λειπεται."

" MEDICINE is the moſt noble of all the arts.
" But from the ignorance of thoſe who practiſe it,
" and of others who judge too raſhly of them, it
" has long been reckoned inferior to all." Lex, P. I. l. 34. edit. Fœſii, Fol. Francof. 1624.

He ſays, one principal cauſe of the evil is, that there is no puniſhment for the ignorance of phyſicians but ſhame, which little affects ſuch men; and he adds, that, as on the theatre many appear in characters not their own, ſo on the great theatre of life

we

menſe, and extended to every ſub-
ject.

we have "many phyſicians in name, but few in "reality."

II.

"Διο δει αναλαμβανοντα τουτεων των προειρημενων "εκαστα, μεταγειν την σοφιην ες την ιητρικην, και την ιητρι- "κην ες την σοφιην. ιητρος γαρ φιλοσοφος, ισοθεος."

"Wherefore, a phyſician, collecting every obſer- "vation (or prognoſtic), ought to connect philoſo- "phy with medicine, and medicine with philoſophy: "a philoſophical phyſician reſembles God." De decenti habitu, p. 23. l. 29.

On this laſt expreſſion, there cannot be a better commentary than that of Frederic Hoffman: "Quin "imo ipſe Deus in ſacris literis ſe medicum profi- "tetur, &c. Moreover God himſelf, in the ſacred "books, aſſumes the character of a phyſician; and "Jeſus Chriſt, the benevolent Saviour of the human "race, during his reſidence on earth, exerciſed the "medical art more than all others, being at once a "moſt ſucceſsful phyſician to the ſoul and to the "body. And indeed, if, according to the univerſal "maxim of antiquity, man never approaches ſo near "to the Divine Nature, as by DOING GOOD; I cer- "tainly do not perceive, that, if we except Divine "Revelation, ſo much advantage reſults to man- "mankind, from any kind of knowledge, as from "the healing art. For what can be better or more

"deſireable,

ject [*a*]. ORIBASIUS was one of the

" defireable, than to preferve found and entire the
" human body, that noble manfion of the immortal
" foul ; and not only to prevent pain and difeafes,
" equally hoftile to the mind and body, but alfo to
" retard the approach of death itfelf? Wherefore,
" the ancients had the moft weighty reafons for
" placing the inventors of medicine among the num-
" ber of the Gods, &c." De ftatu artis medicæ, &c. in Præf. ad. Op. p. xvii.

[*a*] In this, as in other matters, he adhered fteadily to the fentiments of Hippocrates. In his works there is a fmall tract, entitled, " Siquis opti-
" mus medicus eft, eundem effe philofophum."—
" That an excellent phyfician muft be a philofopher." He aflerts that philofophy is neceffary to enable a phyfician both to underftand and practife his art ; and that this will not be denied by any, except thofe whofe eager thirft of gain has made them abufe the defign of their profeffion, and who are really " ve-
" nefici, non medici ;" *not phyficians, but poifoners.* He concludes, " certe nos primum ftudium debemus
" in philofophia confumere, fi veri Hippocratis
" æmuli effe volumus—Doubtlefs we ought to de-
" dicate our early years to the ftudy of philofophy,
" if we are truly defirous of walking in the fteps of
" Hippocrates." Vid. GALENI Opp. tom. I. fol. 6. Venet. apud Juntas, 1625.

To

the beſt ſcholars of his *age*. Nor ought we to omit mentioning with honour the names of ÆTIUS, ARETÆUS, and PAULUS EGINETA. Quintilian informs us that CELSUS wrote on a variety of ſubjects beſides phyſic. Among the Arabians we find many learned

To theſe ancient teſtimonies I ſhall take the liberty of annexing an animated paſſage of a truly reſpectable modern phyſician. "Profecto quotieſcunque "hæc deſunt adjumenta, quibus profeſſoribus deho-"neſtetur ars, pudet dicere. Iis gratulor ego per-"fictæ frontis præmia; mirorque facundiam præ-"cipitem, herbarum vires, et medicamenta crepan-"tem mera; iploſque vulgi ſtupentis credulitate "factos nobiles: cum ſacræ medicinæ illotas manus "admoventes; nec philoſophiâ vel in primo limine "ſalutatâ; invitâ etiam ac repugnante naturâ; ſibi-"met egregie videntur ad morbi genus omne prof-"ligandum armari. Nimirum hi ſunt, qui divini "Hippocratis filii audire geſtiunt; nec ingenio, nec "dignitate, nec rerum cognitione tanto nomine "pares; quibus denique medicinam exercentibus, "adeo contempta jacet hæc artium preſtantiſſima, ut "in priſtinam ſuam ſervitutem jam jam relapſura "eſſe videatur." BAKER, de affectibus animi & morbis inde oriundis, 4to. Cantab. 1755, p. 33.

characters.

characters. AVICENNA was a profound and univerſal philoſopher: the memorable ſaying of AVERROES, "Sit anima "mea cum philoſophis," proves unqueſtionably his attachment to literature; but, I think, does not prove what Mr. Bayle and the ſceptics would draw out of it. RHAZES ſhould have been previouſly noticed; and to theſe we may add ABDOLLATIPH, whoſe curious travels into Egypt, a learned Profeſſor is at preſent printing at Oxford.

During the darkneſs of the middle ages, it cannot be ſuppoſed that phyſicians ſhould have eſcaped from the depreſſing influence of the times. Yet there is reaſon to believe, that they were leſs affected by it than other claſſes of men; and that even then, as on other occaſions, they ſtood up the advocates of reaſon and nature, and formed, in ſome degree, a barrier againſt

againſt the abſurdities of weak and bigotted theologians.

If from theſe we deſcend to modern times, many reſpectable vouchers might be produced. Latter ages have given us BOERHAAVE and HALLER, HOFFMAN, MEAD, PRINGLE, and GREGORY [*a*]. To them might be added ſeveral

[*a*] Theſe eminent men all diſtinguiſhed themſelves by the variety and extent of their knowledge. They were not only phyſicians, but alſo philoſophers, poets, moraliſts, claſſical ſcholars, and theologians. Haller in particular deſerves to be noticed, as one of the moſt extraordinary of mankind. Phyſicians have reaſon to glory in his name; for he exhibited the moſt wonderful union of genius and induſtry that perhaps the world ever ſaw. What kind of knowledge did he not attempt, and wherein did he not excell? He had ſtudied with inceſſant diligence from his infancy. When only 9 years of age, he is ſaid to have compoſed for his own uſe a Chaldee Grammar, a Greek and Hebrew Dictionary, and a Hiſtorical Dictionary, containing an abridgement of more than 2000 articles from Bayle and Moreri. As a proof of his activity, we learn, that when he had

ſeveral living characters, too well known to need enumeration, who are worthy ſucceſſors of thoſe illuſtrious men, and in due time will have their names joined, by poſterity, with theirs. Medical ſyſtems will change; they *muſt* change; becauſe human knowledge is progreſſive; and the works of

had the misfortune to break his right arm, his ſurgeon was ſurprized, on viſiting him one day, to find him writing with his left, which he had never ceaſed to try till he acquired that uſe of it.

Such efforts, indeed, exceed the powers of ordinary men. But though we cannot accompliſh the ſame vaſt journey that theſe illuſtrious perſons did, it is both a noble and an uſeful exerciſe to ſee how far we can follow their ſteps. Men, even of the moſt moderate abilities, will find great advantage in adopting the advice of Mr. Locke, who recommends to *all* to lay a good foundation in *general learning*, in early life as the beſt way of beginning the ſtudy of any particular ſcience; and, when this is done, to confine their attention chiefly, or if needful altogether, to that particular branch which is connected with their own profeſſion. This was exactly the plan of Hippocrates.

God are paſt finding out; but amidſt their revolutions, honour will continue to be paid to the memory of ſuch as theſe, as long as learning and genius are eſteemed among men.

It only remains that I ſubſcribe myſelf, with reſpect and eſteem,

DEAR SIR,

Your obliged friend,

THE AUTHOR.

London,
Oct. 1, 1788.

APPENDIX,

CONTAINING

MISCELLANY V.

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IN the year 1750, the Academy of Dijon propoſed, for the ſubject of a Prize Diſſertation, this queſtion:

"HAS THE REVIVAL OF LETTERS IN
"EUROPE CONTRIBUTED TO IMPROVE
"OUR MORALS?"

On this occaſion Mr. Rouſſeau wrote his celebrated "Diſcours ſur les Sciences, &c." in which he attempted to prove, not only the negative of the queſtion, *that the revival of Learning had not improved Morality*, but, ſtill farther, that Literature, in general, was hoſtile to Morals; and, that in proportion as the light of Science aroſe to illuminate a people, that of Virtue would become dim, and fade away.

Such an opinion may well be eſteemed one of the worſt paradoxes of this para-

doxical Writer. However, if his ſentiments were not juſt, his defence of them was ingenious. His diſcourſe abounded with a ſpecious appearance of learning, and a deluſive eloquence, which impoſed upon many Readers[*a*]; while the ſingularity of his opinions attracted the notice of mankind at large, and rendered his performance famous in every part of Europe.

Various replies have been made to him, in which it appears to me that his inconſiſtencies and errors have been fully proved; and the abſurdities, to which his doctrine leads, clearly manifeſted [*b*]. It is not my deſign,

[*a*] He excelled, as the Biſhop of London well obſerves, in "giving an air of ſpeciouſneſs to the "wildeſt ſingularities, by the moſt exquiſite graces "of compoſition." Dr. Porteus, Serm. II. p. 27.

[*b*] Some of theſe have been printed together with Mr. Rouſſeau's own pieces. In an edition of his works, publiſhed at Neufchatel (1764), a whole volume is dedicated to this controverſy. The moſt elaborate anſwers that I have met with, are thoſe of *M. Borde*. The King of Poland [*Staniſlaus*] has alſo publiſhed an anſwer to Mr. Rouſſeau, which breathes the

design, at present, to enter into the general

the benevolent spirit of its *Royal Author*. Besides these and other replies, many excellent thoughts have been, incidentally, thrown out in other works on this subject; as by *M. D'Alembert* "Discours Pre-" lim. de l'Encyclopedie, Essai sur la Societé de Gens " de Lettres & des Grands," and in his elegant " Apologie de l'Etude," published in the 5th tome of his " *Melanges*, &ca.;" by the *Bishop of Carlisle*, in his admirable work on the *Theory of Religion*, Camb. 1765, p. 228. 230, et alibi; by Mr. *Mickle*, in his Introduction and Notes to the Lusiad; by Dr. *Parr*, in his excellent Tract on Education; and by many others. Mr. *Formey* adopted a middle plan, and in a Memoire, entitled, " Examen Philoso-" phique de la Liaison réelle qu'il y a entre les Sci-" ences et les Mœurs," published in the Berlin Transactions of 1753, p. 397, undertakes to prove, that Science neither improves nor injures morals; that the sole effect of it is, to raise men into a more exalted and extensive sphere of action, and hence, that it will equally tend to make them more virtuous, or more vicious, according to their previous character. This scheme is vastly preferable to Rousseau's; but, I think, it may be shewn to be defective. The Rev. *Mr. B. Newton*, in a Sermon preached before the Univerfity of Cambridge (January 30th, 1758), adopted an opinion very different

 from

ral queſtion. I mean to confine myſelf to one of his arguments, *the Teſtimony of the Primitive Chriſtian Writers*, which, I think, deſerves to be more fully diſcuſſed, and which has been leſs attended to than the reſt.

In his firſt reply, which is addreſſed to an anonymous Writer (I believe the King of Poland) who had anſwered his diſcourſe, Mr. Rouſſeau obſerves, that Juſtin Martyr has ridiculed all the Philoſophers; and that we may ſee, in Tertullian's Apology, how much the firſt Chriſtians were offended at being reckoned of that claſs of men. Hence, he concludes, that the early Chriſtian Writers were on his ſide: "Les

from either of theſe; but time not allowing me to give an account of it at preſent, I ſhall content myſelf with referring to Dr. Law's Theory of Religion, Part III. 8vo. Camb. 1765, p. 251. I ſhould wiſh much to ſee all the pieces that have been publiſhed relative to this Controverſy collected into one volume; for I do not know, that I ever derived more advantage from the proſecution of any inquiry, than from this; nor do I think there is, in the whole extent of Literature, a queſtion which comprehends a greater variety of curious and intereſting diſcuſſion.

" premiers

" premiers Ecrivains ſoutenoient préciſé-
" ment le meme ſentiment que moi.—
" Theſe ancient Writers maintained pre-
" ciſely the ſame ſentiments with me."

The elegant Hiſtorian of the Decline of the Roman Empire has, partly, given his ſanction to the ſame opinion; for he has repreſented the primitive Chriſtian Writers as enemies to every innocent and chearful enjoyment; and has aſſerted, that they " deſpiſed all knowledge that was not uſe-
" ful to Salvation *."

To ſome it may appear a matter of little importance, what opinion the primitive Fathers entertained on this ſubject. And, if we conſider them ſimply as *Writers*, it no doubt would be ſo. But there is another light in which they are to be regarded: which is that of the immediate Succeſſors of Jeſus Chriſt and the Apoſtles. It is in this view, that the aſſertions of Mr. Rouſſeau and Mr. Gibbon, will give pain to thoſe who are at once friends to litera-

* Chap. XV. p. 321. (8vo.) Vol. II. Lond. 1783.

ture and to revelation. For, if it ſhould be found, that the early Chriſtian Writers generally agreed in condemning philoſophy and human learning, as hoſtile to virtue, a ſtrong preſumption would ariſe, that they had imbibed theſe ſentiments from the Apoſtles themſelves, who again had learned them from their Maſter, and, then, it would appear, that Mr. Rouſſeau had the higheſt authority for the truth of his doctrine.

We ſhall, therefore, proceed to inveſtigate the real ſtate of this matter, by taking a view of the opinions of the early Chriſtian Writers [*a*]. And, firſt of thoſe called

[*a*] There is a greater neceſſity for attending, at preſent, to the ſubject of this controverſy, becauſe, if I am rightly informed, a learned man means to revive the doctrine of Mr. Rouſſeau, and to prove, as he attempts to do, that Science and Philoſophy have been the ſources of moral corruption from the beginning of time unto the preſent day. It is to be hoped, however, that this Writer will lay aſide thoughts of engaging in ſo hopeleſs and ungracious an undertaking. We would remind him of the ill

ſucceſs

called *Apoſtolical Fathers*, becauſe they had either converſed with the Apoſtles themſelves, or had been educated by ſuch as had ſeen them.

It was a part of the myſterious œconomy of divine Providence, that the Chriſtian Religion ſhould ſpring up in obſcurity, and be firſt publiſhed to mankind, in a manner little calculated to attract the attention either of great or learned men. Some important reaſons have been ſuggeſted to account for this fact, and, probably, there are others with which we are ſtill unacquainted. But we know, that, among the firſt Converts to the Religion of Jeſus, there were few ſcientific men, and,

ſucceſs of his Predeceſſor, who, after attacking the *Sciences*, was forced to abandon the *Arts*, and at length to maintain the ſhocking paradox, that all civilization was ruinous to human nature, and that the virtuous and happy ſtate of man was only then, when he wandered in the woods, a naked ſavage, hunting after his prey! Is this Writer prepared for ſuch a concluſion? Or, does he ſee that, on his principles, it is impoſſible to ſtop till he arrive at this?

therefore, we cannot expect to find, in their writings (especially if we consider how few of them are come down to us), encomiums on literature, or recommendations of Philosophy. The Fathers of the first age, wholly occupied in the more important office of teaching and propagating the doctrines of the Gospel, had no time for the pursuit of literary and scientific enquiries. They were called forth to publish the laws of the Deity to a darkened world; and this great Commission must have wholly engrossed their attention, and superseded every inferior care in their minds. But, so far as human learning was requisite for that important purpose, as they were cut off from the ordinary opportunities of acquiring it, they were copiously supplied from the Source of all Wisdom; being miraculously instructed by the Divine Spirit, endowed with the gift of tongues, and the power of working miracles, in such a degree as rendered human science an unnecessary acquisition.

If

If we reflect on thoſe circumſtances, we ſhall not be ſurpriſed to find nothing relative to human learning in that noble monument of Chriſtian Antiquity, the *Epiſtle of* ST. CLEMENT *of Rome to the Corinthians*. If that amiable Writer had been himſelf a man of letters, he would not have had any opportunity of diſplaying his talents; for he wrote to the ἀγράμματοι καὶ ἰδιῶται: the *ſimplices & idiotæ*: unlearned and ſimple men; who, even in the days of Tertullian, formed "*major pars credentium*——the "greater number of Believers."

The ſame obſervations may be applied to the *Epiſtle of* ST. POLYCARP *to the Epheſians*; the various *Epiſtles of* IGNATIUS; and the remains (if they be found authentic) of BARNABAS and HERMAS. All theſe writers were either unacquainted with human ſcience [*a*], or occupied with ſubjects of

[*a*] "We may here remark, in general," ſays Moſheim, "that theſe Apoſtolic Fathers, and the "other Writers, who, in the infancy of the "Church, employed their pens in the cauſe of "Chriſtianity,

of infinitely greater importance; or, laſtly, though neither of theſe objections had exiſted, and though they had been philoſophic men, yet they would have had no opportunity of diſplaying it, becauſe they wrote to the illiterate, and becauſe the great object of their writing was, to mend the hearts, and change the lives of thoſe to whom their Epiſtles were addreſſed [*a*].

To

" Chriſtianity, were neither remarkable for their " learning, nor for their eloquence. On the con- " trary, they expreſs the moſt pious and admirable " ſentiments in the plaineſt and moſt illiterate ſtyle. " This, indeed, is rather a matter of honour, than " of reproach, to the Chriſtian cauſe; ſince we ſee " from the converſion of a great part of mankind " to the Goſpel, by the miniſtry of weak and illi- " terate men, that the progreſs of Chriſtianity is " *not to be attributed to human means, but to divine* " *power.*" Eccleſ. Hiſt. Vol. I. 8vo. p 114.

[*a*] If the learned Mr. Brucker had attended ſufficiently to this, he would have given himſelf leſs trouble in proving againſt Hornius and others, that the firſt Chriſtians were not Philoſophers. (Hiſt. Crit. Philoſ. Tom. III. paſſim.) In treating this ſubject, I think he does not diſplay much judgment;

for

To proceed now to later writers. It is eaſy to ſee, that it was chiefly againſt the errors of the Philoſophers in Theology,

for he writes confuſedly and contradictorily, and fails to make thoſe diſtinctions which are abſolutely neceſſary to clear up the queſtion. That his work is greatly ſuperior to Stanley's, every one will agree with Moſheim in determining; but, I believe, it muſt alſo be allowed, that ſomething farther is wanted in this way. I wiſh ſome perſon would undertake a new Hiſtory of Philoſophy in our own language. It would not be ſo arduous a taſk, as may at firſt be thought. Much has been done already. I do not heſitate to own that Mr. Brucker has done much, notwithſtanding the remark I have juſt made on one part of his book. Other learned Germans, Meiners, Heyne, Tiedemann Wahl, Eberhard, &c. have admirably illuſtrated particular points, or given general abſtracts of the whole. The ingenious Author of the *Enquiry into the Wealth of Nations* has long employed his thoughts on certain branches of Philoſophic Hiſtory, and whatever he gives us will doubtleſs be excellent. From all theſe and his own reſearches, might not ſome man of genius, who has leiſure, compile a new, complete and intereſting work? Even a good Tranſlation of Brucker, with notes and corrections from later Authors, would be very deſirable, and, I think, would meet with encouragement from the public.

that Juſtin Martyr declaimed. Thus he ſpeaks of them to Trypho *, as generally holding, that God took care of the Univerſe and great events, but paid no attention to Individuals, a doctrine moſt pernicious to good morals. He, indeed, points out faults in the ſyſtems of all the Sects; and this, chiefly, that they delivered nothing which was fully ſatisfactory relative to the Divine Being: yet, he ſays nothing againſt *Philoſophy itſelf*, nor any thing equivalent to Mr. Rouſſeau's ſentiments. On the contrary, he beſtows a juſt and noble encomium on Philoſophy, declaring (p. 5.), that it is the greateſt bleſſing, and moſt agreeable to God; and that they are truly happy who employ it to cultivate their minds.

And that he threw out ſome ſatirical remarks on the foibles of ſeveral Sects of Philoſophers, is of no conſequence to Mr. Rouſſeau's arguments. For theſe faults being removed, and ſcience improved by

* P. 4. Ed. S. Jebb. 8vo. Lond. 1719.

the light of Revelation, which was now graciouſly afforded to facilitate our inquiries, Juſtin was ready to own, and did own himſelf a Philoſopher: "Etant Chre-
"tien il ne quitta ni ſon habit, ni ſa pro-
"feſſion de Philoſophe, et il joignit à la
"connoiſſance de la Philoſophie Paienne,
"une profonde ſcience de l'Ecriture ſainte:
"—When he became a Chriſtian, he did
"not quit either the dreſs or the profeſſion
"of a Philoſopher; and he joined to the
"Pagan Philoſophy a profound knowledge
"of the ſacred Writings*."

We feel not ourſelves therefore at all hurt by ſuch remarks as he has made on the different Sects; but chearfully ſay with *St. Clement*, "It is not the Stoic doctrine
"that I call *Philoſophy*, nor the Platonic,
"nor the Epicurean, nor the Ariſtotelian;
"but whatever things are rightly ſpoken
"by any of theſe Sects, who teach recti-

* M. du Pin, Nouvelle Biblioth. des Auteurs Eccleſiaſtiques. Tom. I. (4to.) Paris, 1693. p. 57. col. 1.

" tude with pious wiſdom, all theſe ſe-
" lected, I call PHILOSOPHY. Φιλοσοφίαν
" δὲ ἁ τὴν Στωϊκὴν λέγω, ἁδὲ τὴν Πλατωνικὴν,
" ἢ τὴν Ἐπικούρειόν τε καὶ Ἀριςοτελικήν· ἀλλ' ὅσα
" εἴρηται ωαρ' ἑκαίςη τῶν αἱρέσεων τούτων καλῶς
" δικαιοσύνην μετὰ εὐσεβοῦς ἐπιςήμης ενδιδάσ-
" κουσα, τοῦτο συμπὰν τὸ ἑκλεκτικὸν Φιλοσοφίαν
" φημί *."

In the time of Juſtin Martyr, there were ſo many Impoſtors who had aſſumed the name of Philoſophers, that the term began to be uſed in a bad ſenſe, and to denote a character quite oppoſite to what it originally deſigned. The ſenſe of it was as much perverted as that of Patriot in our times; and Juſtin declaimed againſt Philoſophers, in much the ſame way, as many good men now do againſt thoſe who call themſelves Patriots. Not that there were no true Philoſophers then, or no true Patriots now; not that Philoſophy or Patriotiſm are things to be decried and diſap-

* Clemens Alexandrinus, Stromata, Lib. I. p. 228. B. ed. Sylburgii, Fol. Colon. 1668.

proved;

proved; but that they have been much abuſed and corrupted, and that moſt of thoſe have no right to them who aſſume to themſelves ſuch honourable names.

" I expect," ſays Juſtin in his firſt Apo-
logy, " that thoſe who *falſely* call them-
" ſelves *Philoſophers*, will lay ſnares for me,
" &c." And, in his ſecond Apology, he ſays, " that it was chiefly the virtues of
" the firſt Chriſtians, and the vices of
" thoſe who called themſelves Philoſophers,
" that induced him to embrace Chriſti-
" anity." Of *true Philoſophy*, and *true Philoſophers*, we ſhall ſee that Juſtin, and the wiſeſt of the Primitive Fathers, had a very different opinion.

Theſe were the men whom Clemens Alexandrinus, in his Stromata, calls " the
" true Gnoſtics;" that is, the men of true ſcience, the true Philoſophers; in oppoſition to thoſe numerous pretenders, who, though they were both ignorant and vicious, had arrogated to themſelves the title of *wiſe*. It is true, St. Clement defined theſe true Gnoſtics to be *Chriſtians*; and

juſtly,

juſtly, for he would not beſtow the appellation of *wiſe*, upon men who rejected heavenly wiſdom; who, though light was come into the world, choſe rather to remain in ancient darkneſs, and obſtinately refuſed to enlarge the narrow ſphere of their natural knowledge, by the glorious diſcoveries of the Chriſtian Revelation [*a*].

Lactantius himſelf, in the midſt of his ſeverity, ſeems willing to admit of a ſimilar diſtinction; and only decries Philoſophy, when, without the aid of Revelation, it pretended to be the rule of life, and a ſufficient guide to the knowledge of God and immortal happineſs.

That Juſtin allowed the diſtinction ſeems already clear; but, were farther proofs wanted, we have it in his Apology. There he owns that ſome Chriſtians did not live up to their profeſſion, and, by that circum-

[*a*] Gregory of Nazianzum uſes the ſame ſtyle: "οἵ γε ἀληθῶς Φιλόσοφοι καὶ Φιλόθεοι: thoſe who are "true Philoſophers and real lovers of God." Adv. Julian. Orat. tertia, p. 73. §. 56. Tom. I. Coloniæ, 1690.

ſtance,

ſtance, gave occaſion to the ignorant to ſpeak ill of Chriſtianity itſelf. But he argues, that this is as wrong, as it would be to condemn Philoſophy, on account of the miſconduct of ſome Philoſophers. For many among you, ſays he, who aſſume this name, live very unſuitably to their profeſſion; and ſome of them are Atheiſts.

In his exhortations to the Gentiles, which Mr. Rouſſeau has not mentioned, Juſtin appears to me to bear harder on the Philoſophers, than in his Dialogue with Trypho. And yet, though I will not juſtify every thing he has ſaid there, it is evident, that his grand aim was only to prove, that men could not, by their natural powers, without the aid of Divine Revelation, attain to right notions of God and Religion. For he aſcribes all the errors of Philoſophers to this ſource, that they would not ſubmit to be taught by thoſe who knew theſe things, that is, the Prophets and Apoſtles.

IRENÆUS acknowledges that he was unaccuſtomed to compoſition, and ignorant of

the rules of Rhetoric. He declares, that affection for his Fellow-chriſtians alone had moved him to take up his pen; and he hopes, that what he had written with a benevolent deſign, would be candidly received, although the ſtyle ſhould be plain and vulgar *.

His Books are entitled, "Contra Hæreſes," or a Confutation of the Hereſies of the times; that is, of the abſurd Syſtems of Valentine, Marcian, Baſilides, and the various tribes of Gnoſtics. Euſebius and others have quoted this work of Irenæus under a different title; and he himſelf ſeems to refer to it as being named "A cenſure and Confutation of Science "*falſely ſo called* †. It is of ſome conſequence to take notice, that both of theſe titles have been given to this work; becauſe we are thereby enabled to form a conjecture, with reſpect to that kind of learning which is cenſured and prohibited

* Præfat. ad Lib. prim. adv. Hæreſes.

† Vid. Irenæi opp. Paris, 1675, p. 5. in not. Feuardentii.

in the New Teſtament. St. Paul deſires the Coloſſians to beware of Philoſophy and vain deceit; giving indeed, at the ſame time, an intimation what kind of Philoſophy he meant, by adding, that it was adverſe to the doctrines of Chriſt, which true Philoſophy never was at any period of time. That ſpurious Philoſophy, which he warns the Coloſſians againſt, is the ſame with what he mentions to Timothy as *Science falſely ſo called*; and this, again, we ſee from Irenæus, is nothing elſe but the hereſies and frantic ſyſtems of the Gnoſtics, who aſſumed to themſelves the excluſive title of "Men of Science;" and employed their talents in the moſt extravagant, uſeleſs, and impious ſpeculations relative to ſubjects out of the reach of the human underſtanding. Dr. Maclaine, the learned Tranſlator of the great work of Chancellor Moſheim, obſerves, that it is highly probable, that St. Paul alluded to the fantaſtic ideas theſe people had formed, relative to the production of inferior Deities from the Supreme God, when he exhorts Timothy

" not to give heed to *fables* and endleſs " *genealogies*." Which is confirmed in the ſtrongeſt manner by Irenæus. This ancient Writer, the Diſciple of Polycarp, informs us in his Preface, that he deſigned to write againſt theſe enemies of the truth, whom St. Paul characterizes, as the Inventors of endleſs Genealogies, which miniſter queſtions, &c. And thoſe whom he wrote againſt were no other than the various Sects of Gnoſtics. In the 45th Chapter of his ſecond Book, he comments on a paſſage of St. Paul *, " Knowledge puffeth up, but charity edi- " fieth;" where, inſtead of ſuppoſing, as thoſe do, who bring their own modern ideas, to explain the writings of antient ages, that the Apoſtle meant to ſtate a compariſon between Learning and Virtue, he rightly apprehends, that he meant only to check thoſe, who, becauſe they poſſeſſed a higher degree of *religious* knowledge than their Brethren, were not ſo careful to maintain the amiable virtue of *Chriſtian Charity*.

* 1 Cor. viii, 1.

So that *human Science* had no concern in the queſtion. He was cenſuring thoſe, who, becauſe they knew that an Idol was a mere non-entity, made no ſcruple publicly to eat meat offered to Idols, to the great ſcandal of their weaker Brethren, whoſe minds were ſtill enthralled by ſuperſtitious ideas, which made them regard this practice as highly criminal. The Apoſtle aſſents to the principle, that an Idol was nothing in the world; but he contends, that great condeſcenſion was due to the prejudices of their Fellow-chriſtians; and that it was better to cultivate Charity towards them, which would improve their own hearts, than to value themſelves on ſuperior knowledge, which, too often, had no effect but to puff up their imaginations. Not that he blamed the true knowledge of God, or divine things, adds Irenæus; but that he knew ſome who were ſo elated with their knowledge, as to have fallen from the love of God, and afterwards to have introduced numerous and fatal errors into Religion. " Melius itaque eſt, ſicuti

" prædixi, nihil omnino ſcientem quem-
" piam ne quidem unam cauſam cujuſ-
" libet eorum quæ facta ſunt, cur factum
" ſit, credere Deo, et perſeverare in ejus
" dilectione, quæ hominem vivificat: nec
" aliud inquirere ad ſcientiam, niſi Jeſum
" Chriſtum, Filium Dei, qui pro nobis
" crucifixus eſt; quam per queſtionum
" ſubtilitates et multiloquium in impietatem
" cadere *."

His Commentator [Feu Ardentius] obſerves on this paſſage: " Not that St. Irenæus deſigned to patronize illiterate indolence, but that he meant to oppoſe the pride and vain-glory of the Gnoſtics; who, being elated with a falſe perſuaſion of their poſſeſſing univerſal ſcience, moſt readily inſulted their ſimple Brethren.

But again, that neither the original Teachers of Chriſtianity, nor their immediate Succeſſors, were enemies to ſcience, we may conjecture from this circumſtance, that, beſides the ordinary Schools for

* Iren. Op. p. 126. (Fol.) Paris, 1675.

Children,

Children, there exiſted among the primitive Chriſtians GYMNASIA, or *Academies*, where youth were inſtructed, both in ſacred knowledge and in human learning. "We "may undoubtedly," ſays the learned Moſheim, "attribute to the Apoſtles them-"ſelves, and their injunctions to their Diſ-"ciples, thoſe excellent eſtabliſhments in "which the youth deſtined to the holy "Miniſtry received an education ſuitable "to the ſolemn office they were to under-"take. St. John erected a School of this "kind at Epheſus; and one of the ſame "nature was founded by Polycarp at "Smyrna. But none of theſe were in "greater repute than that which was eſta-"bliſhed at Alexandria, which was com-"monly called the *Catechetical School*; and "is generally ſuppoſed to have been "erected by St. Mark *." Dr. Maclaine obſerves, that this School was rendered famous by a ſucceſſion of learned Doctors: St. Mark, Pantænus, Clemens Alexandri-

* Hiſt. Eccleſ. (8vo) Vol. I. p. 118.

nus, and Origen. And he adds, that there were ſimilar Schools at Rome, Antioch, Cæſarea, Edeſſa, &c.; but not of equal reputation.

Nor had they only *Schools*, but (probably at a very early period) LIBRARIES alſo; and theſe, not the collections of private and curious perſons, but public repoſitories, belonging to various churches; containing copies of the ſacred Writings, the works of the Chriſtian Teachers, and alſo the Profane Authors. *Alexander*, who was elected Biſhop of Jeruſalem, about the beginning of the third Century, erected a noble Library at that place for the uſe of the faithful. Euſebius rejoiced to find preſerved in it, the letters of ſeveral learned men, who had lived in former times; and he tells us, that it furniſhed him with many of the materials of his Hiſtory *. A ſimilar collection is mentioned to have exiſted at Hippo in Africa. And there was a moſt remarkable one at Cæſarea, which the care of *Pamphilus*, an

* Hiſt. Eccleſ. c. 20.

eminent

eminent and excellent citizen, had enriched with a vaſt ſtore of ſacred and literary treaſures. Indeed, he was ſo zealous for its improvement, that he wrote out for it the greateſt part of Origen's works with his own hand *. Jerome compares it to the libraries of *Demetrius Phalereus* and *Piſiſtratus*, and tells us that Pamphilus ſought all over the world for curious books and works of genius, to depoſit in it †.

Of this Library ſome traces remain even to the preſent day. In the Jeſuits' College at Paris, there is a beautiful MS. of the Prophets, in which, according to Montfaucon, there occurs a note, ſignifying, that it was tranſcribed from the very copy made by Pamphilus, in which were written theſe words: "Tranſcribed from the "Hexapla, containing the Tranſlations; "and corrected by Origen's own Tetrapla, "which alſo had emendations and ſcholia "in his own hand writing. I. Euſebius

* Hieron. de Viris Illuſt. c. 75.

† Vid. Lardner Credib. P. II. ch 59.

"added

" added the Scholia; Pamphilus and Eu-
" ſebius corrected *." The ſame learned Writer informs us, that there is a very ancient Manuſcript of ſome of St. Paul's Epiſtles, preſerved in the French King's Library, which contains the following note: " Αντεβληθη δε ἡ βιβλος προς το εν
" Καισαρεια αντιγραφον της βιβλιοθηκης τȣ αγιȣ
" Παμφιλȣ χειρι γεγραμμενον. This book
" was compared with the copy in the li-
" brary at Cæſarea, in the hand writing of
" St. Pamphilus †."

Leſt any one ſhould imagine that the founders of theſe celebrated libraries, *Alexander* and *Pamphilus*, might be merely philoſophical men, in name and by profeſſion Chriſtians, but who gave themſelves little trouble about religious matters, and only wiſhed to indulge their taſte for literature and ſcience, I think it fit to mention, that the very contrary was the caſe, and that both of them were diſtinguiſhed by their

* Montfauc. Præf. in Hex. Orig. p. 4, cited by Lardner Credib. P. II. ch. 59.

† Montfaucon Bib. Coiſlin. p. 262.

virtue

virtue and piety, as well as their adherence to, and ſufferings for, the Religion of Jeſus Chriſt. *Alexander* was rendered illuſtrious by an union of virtues ſeemingly oppoſite, or at leaſt which we very rarely find in one and the ſame man; for while he was remarkable for the mildneſs and gentleneſs of his general manners, he was at the ſame time reſolute, magnanimous, and inflexible, wherever the great intereſts of truth were concerned. He was twice brought before Heathen Magiſtrates, in whoſe preſence he avowed his ſentiments with undaunted freedom, for which he was at laſt thrown into priſon, and died there.

The character of *Pamphilus* was adorned by every virtue that enobles human nature. And I cannot but reflect with triumph, that the perſon who ſo eminently diſtinguiſhed himſelf by his love of ſcience, and by erecting the greateſt library in the Chriſtian world, ſhould have been ſuch a Man. In Pamphilus I ſee my theory illuſtrated; his example illuminates my argu-

ments, and ſtamps conviction on my reaſoning *.

Sr. Clement, of Alexandria, is ſo clearly on our ſide, that Mr. Rouſſeau has noticed it himſelf. This learned Father quotes, with high approbation, the celebrated paſſage of Epicurus, in his Letter to Menœceus, that both old and young people ought to cultivate Philoſophy. "Μήτε νέος "τὶς ὢν, μελλέτω φιλοσοφεῖν μήτε γέρων ὑπάρ- "χων κοπιάτω φιλοσοφῶν †, &c." He had inculcated the ſame truth himſelf a little before; and in various parts of his works had endeavoured to prove the excellence of Philoſophy, and its uſefulneſs in preparing the mind for the reception of divine truth. "Φιλοσοφία δὲ ἡ Ἑλληνικὴ οἷον προκα- "θαίρει καὶ προεθίζει τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς παραδοκὴν "πίσεως ἐφ' ἣν τὴν γνῶσιν επoικοδομεῖ ἡ ἀλή- "θεια ‡."

The Writer of an ancient Book, enti-

* Of this amiable man the reader will find ſome farther particulars in another article.

† Strom. L. 4. p. 501. C. ed. Sylburgii.

‡ P. 710. A. See alſo 309. D.

tled,

tled, " Κηρυμα Πετρε," [The Preaching of Peter], having ſaid, that the ſame God who gave the two Teſtaments to the Jews and Chriſtians, had given Philoſophy to the Greeks, that he might be glorified by them alſo: St. Clement approves this ſentiment, than which nothing can be more honourable to true Philoſophy *.

Le Clerc juſtly obſerves, that all the books of Clemens are full of the ſame ſentiments; and that it appears, from ſeveral circumſtances, that they were not regarded as improper at that time †.

Du Pin, ſpeaking of the Stromata of St. Clement, ſays, " In the firſt book, after " having ſhewn, that it is very advantage- " ous that good men ſhould compoſe " books, he propoſes the ſubject of his " own: Thence he takes occaſion to re- " fute thoſe who blame Philoſophy, to " ſhew the uſefulneſs of it, and to ſpeak

* See the paſſage in the ſixth book of his Stromata, p. 636. B.

† Bib. Univerſelle, Tom. X. p. 204.

" of

" of the uſes that ſhould be made of it *."
" In the ſixth book, he again ſpeaks fa-
" vourably of Philoſophers. He begins
" then to deſcribe the true Sage; that is,
" to give the idea of a Chriſtian, perfectly
" good, and perfectly wiſe." Among other characteriſtics, this is one: " He applies
" himſelf to know all the things of God,
" without neglecting human learning †."
So that Sir Peter King juſtly obſerves,
" Should I produce all the paſſages in this
" Father, concerning the utility and excel-
" lence of human learning, I muſt tran-
" ſcribe ſeveral pages in folio ‡."

Of TERTULLIAN's ſentiments I cannot ſpeak with ſo much certainty, having read his Apology only; and had little occaſion to conſult his other writings [*a*]. Yet I am

* Tom. I. p. 82. col. 1.

† P. 83. col. 1.

‡ Inquiry into the Conſtitution, &c. of the Primitive Church, 8vo. p. 91.

[*a*] There is the leſs neceſſity for a particular inveſtigation of the opinions of Tertullian; becauſe he

am led to think, that, until he fell into the enthuſiaſm

he was at all times a man of warm and over-heated imagination, who was apt to carry every thing too far. And after he became a Montaniſt, and believed that Enthuſiaſt to be divinely inſpired, it is not wonderful, that he deſpiſed Philoſophy and human learning, which, in his ſyſtem, were no longer uſeful. Now his authority is rendered very precarious by this circumſtance, that we do not know, with accuracy, which of his books were written before, and which after, he eſpouſed Montaniſm. Whiſton and others have attempted to diſtinguiſh them; but I do not find that their ideas have been univerſally ſubmitted to by the learned.

Having mentioned the Montaniſts, I muſt obſerve, that Mr. Gibbon's deſcription of the Primitive Fathers, though not true of them, conveys a very juſt idea of ſome of the early Heretics, eſpecially of this ſect, who did indeed contend for all that rigour and auſterity which he alludes to, and did indeed "deſpiſe all knowledge that was not uſeful to ſal-"vation." The reader may compare the paſſage quoted from him with Moſheim's account of theſe Heretics: "They," the Sects he had been ſpeaking of, "were ſucceeded," ſays he, "by one in which "ignorance reigned, and which was the mortal "enemy of philoſophy and letters. It was formed "by Montanus, &c. The exceſſive auſterity of this

"ignorant

enthuſiaſm of Montanus, he had no quarrel with true Philoſophy. He ſays, indeed, "Nobis curioſitate opus non eſt, poſt "Chriſtum Jeſum; nec inquiſitione, poſt "Evangelium:—We find no uſe for cu- "rioſity, after Jeſus Chriſt; nor of in- "quiry, after the Goſpel." But this relates *ſolely* to ſuch matters as are taught in the Goſpel; and which, therefore, he judges, ought not to be enquired after elſewhere: becauſe Chriſtians were not at liberty to believe any thing about them different from what was there taught. The paſſage occurs in his *Preſcriptions againſt Heretics*; and that this is the ſenſe

"ignorant fanatic did not ſtop here; he ſhewed the "ſame averſion to the nobleſt employments of the "mind, that he did to the innocent enjoyments of life; "and gave it as his opinion, that Philoſophy, Arts, "and whatever ſavoured of polite literature, ſhould "be mercileſsly baniſhed from the Chriſtian "church." Hiſt. Eccleſ. vol. I. p. 236 and 238.—Surely the Fathers, who have laboured ſo much to confute the abſurd opinions of theſe Montaniſts, cannot be ſuppoſed to have cheriſhed the ſame abſurdities themſelves.

is certain; becauſe, when his opponents objected theſe words, *Seek, and ye ſhall find*, he replies, that we are not permitted to ſeek when we have already found.

The great abuſe of Philoſophy by thoſe vain pretenders to it among the Heathens, who endeavoured to draw arguments from it againſt the Goſpel; and by thoſe Chriſtians, who, from love of ſingularity, had invented many abſurd and impious opinions, which they defended by metaphyſical ſophiſtry; did indeed occaſion Tertullian to be very ſevere upon *ſuch* Philoſophers; and, even to entertain a prejudice againſt ſome parts of Philoſophy itſelf, ſuch as Logic, &c.

But this is no more than we have ſeen happen in our own times; where ſome branches of Science having been very much abuſed, certain warm writers have entirely decried them. St. Clement of Alexandria, with ſuperior judgment, obſerves, that if any man has been deceived by Philoſophy, it muſt have been from his own abuſe of it; that no man condemned more than he that

ſpecies of logic, which was uſed only for wrangling and inventing ſophiſms: "Τὰς "σκίας τῶν λόγων: ſhadows of reaſon." But, as to the more ſolid part, he eſteemed it highly; becauſe it aſſiſts us to diſcover the truth, to underſtand the Scriptures, and to refute the artful arguments of Heretics.

With reſpect to the ſevere remarks, which Tertullian, in his Apologetic, has made on the Philoſophers, I do not think them always judicious; and, in general, his cenſures are too indiſcriminate. Yet, upon the whole, when I conſider the great provocation he met with, the natural warmth of his temper, and the weighty reaſons he had to diſapprove the conduct of moſt of the Philoſophers, I am not ſurprized at the manner in which he has treated them.

AS it is a matter of curioſity to know, what the antient Philoſphers were chiefly cenſured for by the Chriſtians; and what it was that finally brought them and their Philoſophy into contempt; I ſhall mention Tertullian's charges againſt them. This I am the more inclined to do, becauſe, I apprehend, it may not be altogether uſeleſs to modern Philoſophers, if any ſuch ſhall happen to peruſe this work.

The ſubſtance of his accuſations may be reduced to two heads:

1ſt. That their actions did not correſpond with their words; their moral conduct came not up to the ſtandard of their doctrine. They talked of virtue; but they left it to others to practiſe it. And while they harangued learnedly of Beauty, Order, Heroiſm, and Excellence, many of them were deſtitute even of a common ſhare of theſe qualities; and many were chargeable, in the higheſt degree, with

vice, exceſs, diſorder, and irregularity. " If I ſpeak of Chaſtity," ſays he, " Novi " et Phrynen meretricem Diogenìs ſupra " recubantis ardori ſubantem. Audio et " quendam Speuſippum, de Platonis " Schola, in adulterio periiſſe. Chriſtianus " uxori ſuæ ſoli maſculus naſcitur. I find " alſo that Diogenes could not lie con- " tentedly in his tub without his miſtreſs " Phryne; and I hear of one Speuſippus, " of Plato's School, ſlain in the very act of " adultery; but a Chriſtian is a man only " to his own wife *."

He then proceeds to compare the Philoſophers with the Chriſtians in other reſpects: " Si de ſimplicitate conſiſtam, " Ariſtoteles familiarem ſuum Hermiam " turpiter loco excedere fecit, Chriſtianus " nec inimicum ſuum lædit. Idem Ariſ- " toteles tam indecore Alexandro regendo " potius adulatur, quam Plato Dionyſio [a] " ventris

* Reeves's Verſion. Apologet. c. 46. p. 388. Ed. Havercampi, 8vo. Lug. Bat. 1718.

[a] Moſt copies read " a Dionyſio," which makes the

" ventris gratia, venditatur. Ariſtippus in
" purpura, ſub magna gravitatis ſuperficie,
" nepotatur, et Hippias, dum civitati inſi-
" dias diſponit, occiditur. Hoc pro ſuis,
" omni atrocitate diſſipatis, nemo unquam
" tentavit Chriſtianus. If I argue about
" gentleneſs, Ariſtotle ſhamefully made his
" friend Hermias quit his place, while a
" Chriſtian would not injure even his ene-
" my. The ſame Ariſtotle flattered Alex-
" ander as groſsly, in order to govern him,
" as Plato did Dionyſius, for the ſake of

the paſſage nonſenſe. " Itaque recte," ſays Haver-
camp, " La Cerda et Rigaltius jugulaverunt vete-
" rem lectionem, *licet in omnibus ſit MSS. et editis.*
" Plato a Dionyſio." Not. 76. p. 393. Le Clerc mentions a paſſage of Cæſar, corrected in a ſimilar manner, againſt the authority of the MSS. and ancient editions, adding, " Ce n'eſt pas aſſez que
" d'avoir des MSS. et d'anciennes editions, il faut
" encore avoir du goût, pour en ſavoir profiter; car
" il y a des paſſages, qui ſont viſiblement fautifs,
" quoi qu'on les trouve dans *tous* les MSS. et *toutes*
" les anciennes editions." Bib. Choiſie XI. 169.—
Thus much in favour of *conjectural criticiſm*; which, if it has ſometimes been unwarily employed, has of late, I think, been too ſeverely run down.

" his belly. Ariſtippus in purple, under
" the greateſt appearance of gravity, was
" a Debauchee; and Hippias was ſlain
" while he lay in ambuſh againſt the city.
" This no Chriſtian ever was guilty of, in
" favour of his own people, ſcattered
" about by every kind of cruel treatment."

To theſe add the words of the eloquent Lactantius: " Quis eſt tandem qui non
" videat, eos homines virtutis, qua ipſi
" egent, eſſe doctores. Nam ſi quis mores
" eorum diligenter inquirat, inveniet ira-
" cundos, cupidos, libidinoſos, arrogantes,
" protervos, et ſub obtentu ſapientiæ ſua
" vitia celantes; domi facientes ea, quæ in
" ſcholis arguiſſent. Fortaſſe mentior ac-
" cuſandi gratia. Nonne id ipſam Tullius
" et fatetur et queritur? Quotuſquiſque
" inquit, &c. Who is there, in ſhort, that
" does not ſee that theſe men are teachers
" of virtues which they do not themſelves
" poſſeſs. Let any one examine their
" manners, and he will find them paſſi-
" onate, covetous, laſcivious, arrogant, in-
" ſolent; and, under the veil of wiſdom,

" con-

" concealing their own vices, and practiſing
" at home what they have been reproving
" in their Schools. Perhaps I miſrepre-
" ſent them, for the ſake of accuſing them.
" But does not Cicero himſelf confeſs and
" complain of the ſame thing? Whoever,
" ſays he," &c. &c. *

He proceeds to quote Nepos, Seneca, and others, in proof of the depraved lives of the Philoſophers. But I muſt refer my Readers to the place.

I ſhall cloſe this article with a ſtrong paſſage of Minutius Felix, near the end of his Octavius: " Philoſophorum ſuper-
" cilia contemnimus, quos corruptores et
" adulteros novimus, et tyrannos, et ſem-
" per adverſus ſua vitia facundos. Nos
" non habitu ſapientiam, ſed mente præ-
" ferimus: NON ELOQUIMUR MAGNA, SED
" VIVIMUS. We deſpiſe the pride of your
" Philoſophers, whom we know to be cor-
" rupters of truth, adulterers, and tyrants,
" always eloquent againſt their own vices.

* Divinar. Inſtit. Lib. 3. §. 15. p. 256. Ed. Spark. 8vo. Oxon. 1684.

 " We

" We do not carry about our wiſdom in " our dreſs, but in our minds; *We do not* " *ſpeak great things, but we live them* [a]."

2d. The ſecond charge, brought by Tertullian, and the antient Fathers, againſt the Philoſophers, was, that they betrayed

[a] St. *Cyprian*, in the beginning of his book (De bono patientiæ), obſerves, that the Philoſophers pretended to excell in patience, as they did in wiſdom, but that their pretenſions to both were falſe and ill-founded: " Hanc ſe ſectari philoſophi quoque pro-" fitentur, ſed tam illic patientia falſa eſt quam et " falſa ſapientia eſt. Nam ſi patiens ille eſt, qui eſt " humilis et mitis; philoſophos autem nec humiles " videmus eſſe nec mites, ſed ſibi multum placentes, " et hoc ipſo quod ſibi placeant Deo diſplicentes: " apparet illic veram non eſſe patientiam ubi ſit in-" ſolens affectatæ libertatis audacia, et exerti ac " feminudi pectoris inverecunda jactantia. Nos " autem, fratres dilectiſſimi, qui philoſophi non " verbis ſed factis ſumus; nec veſtitu ſapientiam " ſed veritate præferimus; qui virtutem conſcientiam " magis quam jactantiam novimus; *qui non loquimur* " *magna, ſed vivimus*; quaſi ſervi et cultores Dei " patientiam, quam magiſteriis cœleſtibus diſcimus " obſequiis ſpiritalibus præbeamus, &c." Cypriani Op. ed. Fell. Fol. Oxon. 1682. Pars prima, p. 210. et 211.

truth.

truth. They knew it, but they did not dare to ſupport it; and, by this meanneſs, they ſuffered it to be loſt in the world. Their rule was, *to think with the wiſe, and ſpeak with the vulgar*; a noble maxim, in matters of indifference, of faſhion, of ceremony, and common life; but a moſt pernicious and deteſtable maxim in every caſe where the ſacred intereſts of truth and virtue are concerned [*a*]. The Philoſophers were

[*a*] In all caſes of the firſt kind, the lines of Dr. Young may be eſteemed an excellent rule of conduct:

" ——— More ſenſe is ſhewn
" In wearing others follies than our own."

On the ſame principle, Mr. Pope gives a judicious advice relative to the uſe of new words:

" Be not the laſt to lay the old aſide,
" Nor yet the firſt by whom the new are try'd."

How far compliance with common cuſtom in *greater matters* is to be carried, and at what point we ought to ſtop, and refuſe to proceed farther, is often a queſtion of great difficulty. High virtue and great depravity are eaſily aſcertained, and referred to the claſs to which they belong; but there are a numerous ſet of actions, placed near the dim boundaries that ſeparate right and wrong, caſes where one virtue ſeems

were generally convinced in their own minds of the Unity of God, and of the abſurdity

ſeems to contradict another, or cautious prudence oppoſes dangerous duty; in all which it requires great nicety to form a deciſion, and men run great hazard of deciding wrong, becauſe the *ſpecious ſemblance of rectitude* conſpires to ſtrengthen the temptation of acting according to their inclinations.

The pious Dr. Watts argues ſomewhere in his works, that if a traveller ſhould meet a madman, armed with a drawn ſword, purſuing an innocent and defenceleſs perſon, he ought not to direct him wrong, if he enquire which way the other went, but ſhould either riſk the conſequences of refuſing to anſwer him, or, if he give an anſwer, ſhould ſpeak the truth, and truſt the conſequences to providence. If this advice be regarded as the extreme of *unneceſſary ſcrupuloſity*, we may oppoſe to it, on the other ſide, the *relaxed morals* of ſome modern caſuiſts, particularly the Spaniſh Jeſuits, whoſe great object, as Sir Thomas More ſatyrically obſerves, ſeemed to be not to deter men from vice, but to teach them how near they might go to ſin without ſinning.

Thus, in the caſe juſt ſtated, they would have felt no difficulty at all; for, without having recourſe to the peculiar circumſtances which would certainly have juſtified what was in itſelf unlawful, their common and general rule would have been quite ſufficient,

abſurdity of the popular religion; but they concealed theſe convictions, conformed

ſufficient. For they taught that it was lawful to uſe equivocation and mental reſervation, to apply words in one ſenſe that they might be underſtood in another; to ſay YES, and to mean No. Filliucius, a celebrated writer amongſt them, teaches the method of framing equivocations in a ſyſtematic manner. Quæſt. Mor. tom. II. tract 25. c. 12. p. 328. And Sanchez, another great Doctor, vindicates this practice, by the example of St. Francis: "Deducitur "licitam fuiſſe Amphibologiam qua uſus fertur "D. Franciſcus, qui a judicis miniſtris interrogatus, "an illuc quidam reus tranſiiſſit, manus in veſtis "manicas introducens, dixit ſic: Non tranſiit hac, "intelligendo de loco in quo manus habebat." Op. Mor. c. 6. n. 42. p. 30.

"Hence we may deduce the lawfulneſs of that "equivocation, which St. Francis is ſaid to have "uſed, who being queſtioned by the officers of "juſtice, whether a criminal had paſſed that way, "putting his hands into the ſleeves of his cloak, "anſwered, He did not paſs this way; meaning the "place in which he held his hands."

On principles of a ſimilar kind, *Eſcobar*, who formed a complete ſyſtem of moral Theology out of the works of twenty-four of the principal writers of his

formed diſhonourably with the worſt of the vulgar ſuperſtitions, and went meanly every

his Society *, admits, that if a vintner hath better wine than common, and the law hath regulated the price of wine at a fixed rate, he may, to recompence himſelf, ſecretly mix water with his wine, (Tract. 3. Exam. 6. n. 70.) ; and he maintains, that a merchant, if he believe that the price ſet upon his merchandize is unjuſt and too low, may recompence himſelf by uſing falſe weights, or by any other way in his power; and, if interrogated by a judge on oath, relative to theſe matters, may deny the whole. (Tract. 1. Exam. 3. num. 34.) Leſſius allows a man to ſteal from his friend, that which he believes his friend would have given him if he had aſked it, or what he thinks his friend would not have been diſpleaſed to loſe. (De Juſt. et Jur. lib. 2. c. 41. d. 9. n. 79.)

It would have been vain to have argued with theſe men, for they were maſters of every ſubtilty that human language knows; and their ſophiſms were

* Liber Theologiæ Moralis XXIV. Soc. Jeſu Doctoribus referatus, &c. 8vo. My edit. Lugduni ſine anno, pp. 896. This extraordinary work is inſcribed, Ad Virginem Mariam Deiparam : To the Virgin Mary mother of God : and contains an authentic and accurate ſyſtem of Jeſuitical Morality, extracted from Suarez, Vaſquez, Molina, Sanchez, Leſſius, Saa, the two Hurtado's, Filliucius, and all the reſt of their capital Doctors.

endleſs

every day to make an appearance of paying divine worſhip to ſenſeleſs Idols, and to endleſs and unanſwerable. PASCAL ridiculed them, and it was the beſt plan; yet his raillery would have been of little effect, if it had not been founded on the baſis of a ſyſtem of morals of higher authority than HUMAN. It is in ſuch circumſtances as theſe that we perceive the true value of Divine Revelation. It was on ſuch an occaſion that this Revelation was firſt delivered: when the world was diſtracted amidſt the contradictory theories of philoſophers, when every thing was ſet afloat, every thing was doubted, and there was no end nor anſwer to metaphyſic quibbles, then came the meſſenger of the Moſt High, and taught the children of men in ſuch language as this:

"Ye have heard that it hath been ſaid by them of old
"time, love thy neighbour, and hate thine enemy;
"but I ſay unto you, love your enemies; bleſs them
"that curſe you; do good to them that hate you;
"pray for them that deſpitefully uſe and perſecute
"you." This was the teaching which mankind wanted; it was the teaching of one who ſpoke with *authority* and with *power*."

But to return to our ſubject, *the difficulty of judging in many caſes what is right and what is wrong.*

This darkneſs, which obſcures the boundaries of vice and virtue, probably ariſes from the imperfection of our faculties, and attends not us alone, but

to rob the true God of that glory and honour, which is due to him alone.

Hence Tertullian ſays, " Mimice Philo-
" ſophi affectant veritatem : Philoſophers
" only make a pretence of loving truth."
And, hence, the ſevere cenſures of their conduct by other Primitive Chriſtians. Accuſtomed to contemplate the character of their Maſter Jeſus Chriſt, who declared

but perhaps all created beings. However, it anſwers an important end in the ſyſtem of Nature, and a very intereſting one to all of us. It gives room to the humble and well diſpoſed to manifeſt their regard to virtue, by denying themſelves indulgences, which are innocent, becauſe they are doubtful; and it allows the preſumptuous and ill inclined to go far —often too far; preſuming that they are ſtill ſafe, and have not reached the limits of guilt. Thus men exhibit their true characters—habits of revering the laws of God on the one hand, and trifling with them on the other, are formed and *fixed*. The ſheep are ſeparated from the goats: men are adapted naturally to enter into that ſtate in a future ſcene of things, for which they have prepared themſelves in the preſent; and ground is laid for vindicating to all his creatures, the wiſdom and juſtice of the Governor of the Univerſe.

that he came into the world to bear witneſs to the truth; and having before their eyes the illuſtrious examples of Apoſtles and Martyrs, who had braved the loſs of all worldly goods, torture, and death itſelf, and in the faces of Princes and Kings avowed the honeſt dictates of their minds; theſe early writers, of whom many were themſelves ſuch ſufferers, could not but look with the greateſt contempt on thoſe pitiful pretenders to philoſophy, who deſerted the cauſe of truth in the time of need; and were, in reality, the thieves and corrupters of it, while they ſtyled themſelves its followers and patrons [*a*].

Lac-

[*a*] "Πᾶς ὁ δυνάμενος λέγειν τὴν ἀλήθειαν, καὶ μὴ λέγων "κριθήσεται ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ. Whoever, ſays Juſtin Mar- "tyr, CAN declare the truth, and declareth it not, "he ſhall be condemned of God." Fragment. "Dialog. cum Tryphone, p. 407. Ed. S. Jebb.

"Qui veritatem occultat, et qui prodit menda- "cium, uterque reus: ille quia prodeſſe non vult, "ipſe quia nocere deſiderat: Both are guilty, he "who conceals truth, and he who utters falſehood; "the former becauſe he will not do the good in his "power,

Lactantius, who has juſtly been called

" power, the other becauſe he wiſhes to do harm." Auguſtin de Agon. Chriſti.

" Non ſolum proditor eſt veritatis, qui menda-
" cium pro veritate loquitur: ſed qui non libere
" pronunciat veritatem quam pronunciare oportet,
" aut non libere defendat veritatem quam defendere
" oportet: He is not the only traitor to truth, who,
" inſtead of it, ſpeaks falſehood, but he is ſo who
" does not openly declare and defend that truth
" which it is his duty to declare and defend." Chryſoſtom in Matt.

Such is truly the doctrine of *Jeſus Chriſt:* (Matt. XII. 30.) " He that is not with me, is againſt me;
" and he that gathereth not with me, ſcattereth
" abroad." And of the *Apoſtles:*

James iv. 17. " Therefore, to him that knoweth
" to do good, and doth it not, to him it is ſin."

With whom agree all ſenſible and honeſt men.

Le Clerc: " Tous les Chrêtiens ſont obligez de
" chercher et d'aimer la verité, d'en faire profeſſion,
" lors qu'ils l'ont decouverte, et de tâcher de la
" repandre par de bonnes voies." Bib. Choiſie, iv. p. 317.

Lavater: " If you ſupport not the meaſure you
" approve of by your voice, you decide againſt it
" by ſilence." Aphoriſm 598.

Thus too the ancient Philoſophers reaſoned; but the prevalence of Epicureaniſm had baniſhed principle and practice together.

the

the Chriſtian Cicero, has addreſſed the Roman Philoſopher with ſuch ſenſe and energy on this important ſubject, that I cannot forbear tranſcribing a pretty long paſſage from him : " Sed quid prodeſt ad " vulgus, et ad homines imperitos hoc " modo concionari ? cum videamus etiam " doctos et prudentes viros, cum religio- " num intelligant vanitatem, nihilominus " tamen in iis ipſis, quæ damnant, colendis " neſcio qua pravitate perſtare. Intellige- " bat Cicero falſa eſſe, quæ homines ado- " rarent. Nam cum multa dixiſſet, quæ " ad everſionem religionum valerent : ait " tamen non eſſe illa vulgo diſputanda, ne " ſuſceptas publice religiones diſputatio " talis extinguat. Quid ei facies, qui, " cum errare ſe ſentiat, ultro ipſe in lapi- " des impingat, ut populus omnis offen- " dat : ipſe ſibi oculos eruat, ut omnes " cæci ſint ? qui nec de aliis bene mere- " atur, quos patitur errare ; nec de ſeipſo " qui alienis accidit erroribus ; nec utitur " tandem ſapientiæ ſuæ bono, ut factis im- " pleat ; quod mente percepit ; ſed pru-

" dens, et ſciens pedem laqueo inſerit, ut
" ſimul cum cæteris, quos liberare ut pru-
" dentior debuit, et ipſe capiatur ? Quin
" potius, ſi quid tibi Cicero virtutis eſt ;
" experire, populum facere ſapientem.
" Digna res eſt, ubi omnes eloquentiæ tuæ
" vires exeras. Non enim verendum eſt,
" ne te in tam bona cauſa deficiat oratio,
" qui ſæpe etiam malas copioſe, ac fortiter
" defendiſti. Sed nimirum Socratis car-
" cerem times ; ideoque patrocinium veri-
" tatis ſuſcipere non audes. At mortem,
" ut ſapiens, contemnere debuiſti. Et erat
" quidem multo pulchrius, ut ob bene
" potius dicta, quam ob maledicta more-
" reris. Nec tibi laudis plus Philippicæ
" afferre potuerunt, quam diſcuſſus error
" humani generis, et mentes hominum ad
" ſanitatem tua diſputatione revocatæ. Sed
" concedamus timiditati ; quæ in ſapiente
" eſſe non debet. Quid ergo ipſe in eo-
" dem verſaris errore ? Video te terrena,
" et manufacta venerari. Vana eſſe intel-
" ligis, et tamen eadem facis, quæ faciunt
" ipſi, quos ipſe ſtultiſſimos confiteris.

" Quid

" Quid igitur profuit, vidiſſe te veritatem,
" quam nec defenſurus eſſes, nec ſecutu-
" rus? Si libenter errant etiam ii, qui
" errare ſe ſentiunt: quanto magis vulgus
" indoctum? quod pompis inanibus gau-
" det, animiſque puerilibus ſpectat omnia,
" oblectatur frivolis; et ſpecie ſimulacro-
" rum capitur; nec ponderare ſecum
" unamquamque rem poteſt, ut intelligat,
" nihil colendum eſſe, quod oculis morta-
" libus cernitur; quia neceſſe eſt, mortale
" ſit. But what ſignifies it to harangue
" thus to the vulgar, and to unlearned
" men, when we ſee even the learned and
" wiſe, although they are ſenſible of the
" folly of the popular religions, yet perſe-
" vering, with unaccountable obſtinacy, in
" countenancing thoſe things which they
" condemn? Cicero was very ſenſible that
" theſe were vanities which the people
" reverenced. And when he had ſaid
" many things which might have over-
" thrown the popular Religion, yet he
" adds, that theſe were not to be ſpoken
" before the people, for fear of unhinging

" the Religions eſtabliſhed by the State.
" Now what ſhall be done with a man,
" who, when he perceives himſelf in an
" error, voluntarily throws himſelf upon
" the rocks, that all the people may be
" daſhed againſt them alſo; who pulls out
" his own eyes, in order that others may
" be blind; who neither deſerves well of
" others, whom he permits to wander in
" error, nor of himſelf, who partakes in
" the errors of others, not uſing his own
" wiſdom rightly, to follow in practice the
" dictates of his mind; but wilfully, and,
" when perfectly aware, entangling his
" feet in the ſnare, that he may be made
" captive with all the reſt, whom, as a
" wiſer man, it was his duty to have deli-
" vered. But why not rather, O Cicero,
" if you have any regard for virtue, en-
" deavour to make the people wiſe? It
" is a noble undertaking, worthy of all the
" powers of your eloquence [*a*]. You
" cannot fear that your Oratory ſhould

[*a*] See ſome farther reflections on this ſubject afterwards.

" fail

" fail you in ſo good a cauſe, who have ſo
" often, ſo fully, and ſo boldly defended
" bad ones. But the truth is, you fear the
" priſon of Socrates, and therefore you
" dare not undertake the patronage of
" truth. However, as a Philoſopher, you
" ought to contemn death. And it would
" have been much more glorious, that
" you had died for ſpeaking well (in the
" cauſe of truth), than for ſpeaking ill (of
" Anthony). Nor can your Philippics
" bring you more praiſe, than to have re-
" moved the errors of the human race,
" and, by your arguments, to have recalled
" the minds of men from folly to wiſdom.
" But, ſuppoſe we excuſe your timidity,
" which a Philoſopher ſhould be free from,
" why did you yourſelf run into ſuch an
" error? I behold you adoring terreſtrial
" things, the work of men's hands. You
" know theſe things are vanities, and yet
" you act in the ſame manner as thoſe do
" whom you account moſt fooliſh. What,
" then, does it profit you to have diſco-
" vered truth, which you neither defend

" nor act up to? If thoſe wilfully err,
" who know that they are erring, how
" much more will the illiterate common
" people do it, who rejoice in empty ſhew;
" who view all things with childiſh minds;
" who are delighted with trifles, and cap-
" tivated with the beauty of the images;
" nor are able to weigh any matter in their
" thoughts, ſo as to perceive that nothing
" ought to be worſhiped which is ſeen
" with mortal eyes, becauſe it muſt of
" neceſſity be itſelf mortal, &c.?" [a]

After

[a] Div. Inſtit. 1. 2 §. 3. p. 122. ed. Spark. 8vo. Oxon 1684.

Lactantius has good reaſon to addreſs Cicero in the manner we have ſeen him do. For let us hear the Roman Philoſopher's own words: " Eſſe præ-
" ſtantem aliquam æternamque naturam, et eam
" ſuſpiciendam admirandamque hominum generi,
" pulchritudo mundi, ordoque rerum cœleſtium
" cogit confiteri. Quamobrem ut religio propa-
" ganda etiam eſt, quæ eſt juncta cum cognitione
" naturæ, ſic ſuperſtitionis ſtirpes omnes ejiciendæ.
" Inſtat enim et urget, et quo tecunque verteris per-
" ſequitur; ſive immolaris, ſive avem aſpexeris; ſi
" Chaldeum, ſi Haruſpicem videris, &c. &c. The
" beauty of the Univerſe, and the order of the Hea-

" venly

After conſidering theſe, we ſhall not be ſurprized to find one of Tertullian's ardent temper crying out, " Adeo quid ſimile " Philoſophus et Chriſtianus? Græciæ " diſcipulus et cœli? famæ negoti- " ator et ſalutis? Verborum et factorum " operator? et rerum ædificator et de- " ſtructor? Amicus et inimicus erroris? " interpolator erroris, et integrator veri-

" venly bodies, compell us to confeſs, that there is " ſome ſupremely excellent and eternal Being, who " ought to be revered and adored by all the human " race. Wherefore, as *true religion* (which is inti- " mately connected with the knowledge of nature) " *ought to be propagated*, ſo *every root of ſuperſtition* " *ſhould be pulled up*. For it preſents itſelf, and " preſſes on you wherever you turn yourſelf: Whe- " ther you liſten to a ſoothſayer or an omen; whe- " ther you ſacrifice, or attend to a bird; whether " you meet a Chaldean or an Augur, &c. &c." De Divinat. II. 72.

Good ſenſe and *common honeſty* here direct Cicero to the very doctrine of the Goſpel: " True religion " is to be propagated, ſuperſtition eradicated, and " the popular religion is ſuperſtitious." How did Cicero follow theſe principles in his practice?

" Video meliora, proboque,
" Deteriora ſequor"——

" tatis; furator ejus et cuſtos [a]? What
" now is the likeneſs between a Philoſo-
" pher and a Chriſtian? between a diſciple
" of Greece, and of Heaven? a trader in
" fame, and a ſeeker of eternal life? a
" man of words, and a man of deeds; a
" builder-up and a deſtroyer? a friend
" of error, and an enemy of it; a cor-
" rupter, and a reſtorer of truth? between
" a thief and guardian of it *?"

But, after all, theſe ſevere cenſures of the ill conduct of certain Philoſophers do not amount to a condemnation of Philoſophy itſelf, of which Tertullian appears to have been a zealous cultivator, and in which he had made no inconſiderable progreſs. " Il avoit beaucoup de ſcience et
" d'erudition, dont il ſavoit ſe ſervir fort a
" propos: He poſſeſſed a great deal of
" knowledge and erudition, which he

[a] Rigaltius, and after him Havercamp, leave out the words amicus et inimicus erroris; but as they do not injure the ſenſe, and are juſtified by ſeveral MSS. I have retained them.

* Apologet. c. 46. ap. fin. p. 395. ed. Havercamp.

" knew

" knew how to uſe to the beſt purpoſe [*a*]. Certainly to the beſt purpoſe, for he employed it not a little in the defence of Chriſtianity.

But we muſt proceed to make ſome farther remarks on the ſentiments of others of the moſt illuſtrious of the Primitive Writers [*b*], to ſhow how little reaſon Mr. Rouſſeau has to claim their ſuffrage.

[*a*] Du Pin, Tome I. p. 104. col. 2.

Vincentius Lirinenſis ſays of Tertullian, " Quid " enim hoc viro doctius? quid in divinis atque hu- " manis rebus exercitatius, &c.?" High encomiums; but Vincentius was a writer of little judgment, and extremely prejudiced. More regard is due to the opinion of Joſeph Scaliger, who calls him, " Doctor *omniſcius* et argutus;" and to that of Juſtus Lipſius, who ſays he is an author, " plenum anti- " quæ et reconditæ doctrinæ."

[*b*] I ſhould have been happy to have introduced here the teſtimony of *St. Cyprian*, Biſhop of Carthage, who was nearly of the ſame period as Tertullian. But I have met with nothing in his writings ſuitable to our purpoſe, except the ſingle paſſage quoted very lately. He ſeems to have been too much engaged in active life, not to ſay in the purſuits of ambition, to have had time to attend to the peaceful ſtudies of ſcience and philoſophy.

Celſus,

Celſus, that acute adverſary of the Chriſtian Faith, has brought a charge againſt it, which will throw light on our ſubject. I ſhall give it in the words of ORIGEN; and the reply to it will enable me to exhibit the opinion of this illuſtrious Father. "Celſus," ſays he, "proceeds to "object theſe things, which are ſpoken by "a few, and not the wiſeſt of thoſe "reckoned Chriſtians, as he himſelf al- "lows: he ſays, it is the doctrine of our "people; let no learned man, no wiſe "man, no prudent man, approach, for "theſe qualities are ill eſteemed among "us; but if any one is illiterate, weak, "and childiſh, let him come boldly *, &c."

Now, how does Origen anſwer this charge? Does he admit the truth of it, that the Chriſtians wiſhed to have nothing to do with learned and wiſe men? By no means. He ſays (p. 138) that there were ſome Chriſtians who lived in a wicked manner, who might be juſtly reproached

* Orig. contra Celſum, l. 3. p. 137. Ed. Spenceri, 4to. Cant. 1677.

for

for this hypocriſy; but that it would be very unjuſt to impute their crimes to the doctrine of Chriſt. In like manner, as it was certain that the doctrine of Chriſtians invited us to wiſdom, "ὅτως ἐὰν εὑρίσκηται "ἀδενὸς ἦτον ὁ Χριστιανῶν λόγος ἐπὶ σοφίαν "προκαλέμενος," thoſe ought to be reproved who juſtified their ignorance, by ſaying, not indeed what Celſus pretended, which nobody but a fool could ſay, but by attempting by reaſonable arguments to diſſuade us from the ſtudy of wiſdom. He then aſſerts, that both the antient books of the Jews, and the Sacred Writings, which had been publiſhed ſince the death of Chriſt, agreed in exhorting us to acquire wiſdom. Solomon, ſays he, becauſe he ſought wiſdom, obtained it; the marks of it may be ſeen through all his writings, which comprize the nobleſt ſentiments in very few words; and among which the praiſes of wiſdom, and exhortations to the acquiſition of it, frequently occur. P. 139, he quotes ſundry paſſages; and, p. 140, explains ſome of thoſe texts

of

of St. Paul, which ſeem to decry Philoſophy. P. 141, "How, with any ſhew of "reaſon, can Celſus accuſe us of being "accuſtomed to ſay, let no learned man, "no wiſe man, no prudent man, approach: "yes, let every learned, every wiſe, every "prudent man come; but, at the ſame "time, do not hinder even the illiterate, "the weak, the rude, the childiſh: For to "ſuch alſo, if they come, the word of "God promiſes a remedy. Wherefore, "true learning is not a bad thing, for it "conducts us to virtue: Τὸ μὲν ἓν ἀληθῶς "πεπαιδεῦσθαι, ϗ κακὸν, ὁδὸς γὰρ ἐπ' ἀρετὴν "ἐστιν ἡ παιδεύσις. And ſo learning and "the ſtudy of excellent arts and prudence "are not repugnant to the knowledge of "God, they rather aid it, and it becomes "us to ſay ſo, rather than Celſus, eſpe-"cially if he be found to be an Epicu-"rean."

In Book I. p. 8, Celſus charges the Chriſtians with refuſing to give a reaſon for their faith, always bawling out, "Don't "examine, but believe, and thy faith will

"ſave

" ſave thee. Worldly wiſdom is a bad " thing; but fooliſhneſs is good." Something of the ſame accuſation occurs, l. 6. p. 282. The anſwers of Origen are not here quite ſo clear; and it has been alledged, that he ſeems to juſtify the practice of believing without examination. But it ought to be obſerved, that he was ſpeaking of the caſe of the common people, who, having neither opportunity nor abilities to examine many points, muſt receive a good deal of their faith from authotity; and further, his arguments ſeem to me to ſuppoſe, that the people knew of the miracles that had been wrought to prove the truth of Chriſtianity, and therefore had good reaſon to believe, in conſequence of them, without needing to trouble themſelves about the objections of artful ſophiſts and pretended philoſophers. And thus does this great Ancient refute the charge of ignorance brought againſt the Chriſtians, in his " Apology " for Chriſtianity in anſwer to Celſus," a noble monument of Chriſtian antiquity,

and

and one of the few works of the Primitive Fathers, with which no learned man, even of this age, ought to be entirely unacquainted.

And his practice confirmed his precepts. "His learning," fays Du Pin, "was pro-"found. He had ſtudied the Belles Let-"tres with much aſſiduity. He was nei-"ther ignorant of Hiſtory nor Mythology. "In ſhort, he had as much knowledge of "all the Sciences, as thoſe who had de-"voted their whole lives to the ſtudy of "them *." The immenſe number of his writings proved at once his vaſt learning and amazing induſtry. From the account we have of them, they muſt, upon the moſt moderate computation, have occupied three hundred volumes; ſo that it was ſcarcely an hyperbole, what Jerome ſaid on the occaſion: "Quis noſtrum tanta "poteſt legere, quanta ille conſcripſit? "Who of us can read ſo much as he has "written?"

* Tom. I. p. 141. col. 2.

It is true, his attachment to the Platonic Philoſophy led him into a chimerical method of expounding the Scriptures, and into other miſtakes; but this is nothing to our argument. The errors derived from falſe Philoſophy prove nothing againſt the true. In other reſpects he applied his ſkill in ſciences and human learning to the moſt valuable purpoſes. He eradicated many abſurd opinions which had begun to ſpring up; he maintained the cauſe of Chriſtianity againſt its ableſt enemies; and rendered himſelf ſo reſpectable in the eyes of the Pagan Sages, that many of them dedicated their writings to him, and made him the model of their conduct.

" Chriſtianum Philoſophum vere dix-
" iſſes, ſays Huetius, cujus tanta fuit
" inter Gentiles Philoſophos et Chriſtianos
" admirabilitas, ut ad ejus imitationem
" totos ſe componerent *."

And when the fame of Origen's knowledge made a number of perſons reſort to

* Origeniana ad calcem Opp. Origenis ed. Bened. to IV. p. 85. col. 1.

him for instruction in polite literature, he received them readily in that line [*a*], in order that he might afterwards take an opportunity, of leading them into the knowledge of the Christian Revelation [*b*].

Lac-

[*a*] "Illud de immortali ejus ingenio non tacens, "quod dialecticam quoque et geometriam, arithmeticam, musicam, grammaticam, et rhetoricam, "omniumque philosophorum sectas, ita didicit, ut "studiosos quoque sæcularium literarum sectatores, "haberet, et interpretaretur quotidie; concursusque "ad eum mirifici fierent, quos ille propterea reci-"piebat, ut sub occasione sæcularis literaturæ, in "fide Christi eos institueret." S. Hieron. de Vir. Illust. cap. 34. Consult also Eusеb. Hist. Eccles. lib. vi. cap. 18.

[*b*] The character of this illustrious man is appreciated with equal justness and elegance bv Mosheim. "The most eminent of these [Writers of the third "century], whether we consider the extent of his "fame, or the multiplicity of his labours, was Ori-"gen, a Presbyter and catechist of Alexandria, a "man of vast and uncommon abilities, and the "greatest luminary of the Christian world that this "age exhibited to view. Had the justness of his "judgment been equal to the *immensity* of his *genius*, "the fervour of his piety, his indefatigable pa-

"tience,

LACTANTIUS allows, that if any one could collect all the portions of truth, ſcattered about in the writings of Philoſophers, and in the tenets of different Sects, he would produce a ſyſtem perfectly ſimilar to the Chriſtian: "Quod ſi extitiſſet ali-
" quis qui veritatem ſparſam per ſingulos,
" per ſectaſque diffuſam, colligeret in unum,
" ac redigeret in corpus, is profecto non
" diſſentiret a nobis." But he adds, that no human underſtanding was ſufficient for this taſk. To ſeparate truth from falſehood, to point out in all caſes what was to be approved, and what rejected, required, in his judgment, the aid of a divine Inſtructor [*a*]. He is ſo far from condemning

" tience, his extenſive erudition, and his other emi-
" nent and ſuperior talents, all encomiums muſt
" have fallen ſhort of his merit. Yet, *ſuch as he was*,
" his virtues and labours deſerve the admiration of
" all ages; and his name will be tranſmitted with
" honour through the annals of time, as long as
" learning and genius ſhall be eſteemed among men."

Eccleſ. Hiſt. 8vo. Vol. I. p. 270.

[*a*] This ſentiment was by no means peculiar to

ing all Philoſophy, that he blames the Academics, who, becauſe all Sects had fallen into errors, adopted a ſyſtem of univerſal ſcepticiſm. He ſays, that, inſtead of the Chriſtian Fathers. The wiſeſt Philoſophers of Greece and Rome felt and acknowledged their own weakneſs. Hence Cicero wiſhed, that it were poſſible, by any reward, to engage ſome perſon to find out a *new reaſon*, which ſhould more powerfully convince us, that virtue alone is ſufficient for happineſs. (Tuſc. Queſt. V. 7.) Hence Ariſtodemus told Socrates, that he would willingly worſhip the Gods, if he could believe that they intereſted themſelves in human affairs; and that he ſhould believe that, whenever they ſent *meſſengers* to inform him what he ought to do, and what not to do. (Xenoph. Mem. l. 1. c. 4. §. 11. and 15. Edit. Simpſon, 8vo. Oxon. 1780.) Claudian declared, and he ſpoke the ſentiments of all thinking men, that he had great doubts whether there was any God who intereſted himſelf in the government of the world:

" Sæpe mihi dubiam traxit ſententia mentem,
" Curarent ſuperi terras, an nullus ineſſet
" Rector, et incerto fluerent mortalia caſu."

Lib. 1. in Ruffinum, v. 1.

When he conſidered the frame of Nature, and the regularity of all things, he believed there was a God;

of concluding, that there was no ſuch thing as truth, they might have ſeen that there is no Sect ſo fooliſh or abſurd, as not to poſſeſs

God; but, again, when he ſaw virtuous men unfortunate and unhappy, and bad men proſperous, his faith was overthrown.

V. 12. " Sed cum res hominum tanta caligine volvi
" Adſpicerem, lætoſque diu florere nocentes,
" Vexarique pios: rurſus labefacta cadebat.
" Religio, &c."

And I might quote Dr. Middleton, a man learned in antiquity, who will not be ſuſpected of paying any undue deference to Revelation, and who nevertheleſs declares, that there might be found " The teſtimony of all ages, the experience of all the great " reaſoners of the heathen world, that reaſon had " not light enough to guide mankind in a courſe of " virtue and morality;" that there was " ſuch an " univerſal conviction and experience of the inſuf- " ficiency of reaſon, as ſeemed to be the voice of " nature, diſclaiming it as a ſufficient guide in the " caſe of religion." Letter to Dr. Waterland, p. 49. 50.

Another powerful argument, for the neceſſity of a divine inſtructor, was grounded on this, that, ſuppoſing the opinions of any public teacher to have been all right, yet nobody would ſubmit to them.

poſſeſs ſome juſt opinions, and that the great reaſon why they did not ſeparate theſe from the reſt, was, that they were too much addicted to the ſpirit of party, and more intent on defending each his peculiar ſyſtem, than on diſcovering the truth, which was ſcattered through them all *. With reſpect to the origin of thoſe few truths and juſt opinions, relative to the Deity, the origin of nature, and other ſublime ſubjects, which were to be found ſcattered about in the writings of the Philoſophers, the Fathers generally entertained a peculiar opinion. They did not think that men had diſcovered theſe by the light of their own reaſon, but they held that they had learned them either directly from Revelation, or indirectly by tradition handed down from thoſe who had *thus*

Such teachers wanted ſufficient authority. The amazing effects produced by the humble preaching of the Apoſtles, above all the Grecian eloquence, are well delineated by Athanaſius, de Incarnatione Verbi Dei, cap 47. p. 88. tom. I. ed. Benedict. Par. 1698.

* Inſtit. Div. l. vii. c. 7.

learned

learned them. It is not our buſineſs at preſent to enter into this curious queſtion. We ſhall only remark, in paſſing, that thoſe who believe the Moſaic account of the Creation of Man, and have at the ſame time conſidered how great a ſtore of knowledge we gradually acquire in youth, in childhood, and even in infancy [*a*], muſt perceive

[*a*] Dr. Reid has ſhewn, in various parts of his "Inquiry into the Human Mind," that infancy is ſpent in acquiring the proper uſe of the *ſenſes*. Thus, p. 330. ed. 4th, "Children muſt ſee imper-
"fectly at firſt; but by uſing their eyes, they learn
"to uſe them in the beſt manner, and acquire,
"without intending it, the habits neceſſary for
"that purpoſe." P. 447. "From the time that
"Children begin to uſe their hands, nature directs
"them to handle every thing over and over, to look
"at it while they handle it, and to put it in various
"poſitions, and at various diſtances from their eyes.
"We are apt to excuſe this as childiſh diverſion,
"becauſe they muſt be doing ſomething, and have
"not reaſon to entertain themſelves in a more
"manly way. But if we think more juſtly, we ſhall
"find that they are engaged in the moſt ſerious and
"important ſtudy; and if they had all the reaſon of
"a Philoſopher, they could not be more properly
"employed.

perceive that the firſt man would have cut a very aukward figure, when ſuddenly introduced into the world in full growth and vigour, without a ſingle idea in his mind, or the leaſt knowledge of any one object around him. I may appeal to the diſcoveries of modern Philoſophers, whether ſuch a man would have had any uſe of his underſtanding, or even almoſt of his ſenſes [*a*].

In what remains of the writings of CYRIL of Jeruſalem, I have met with little relative to our preſent enquiry. His fourth Catechetical Inſtruction is founded on St. Paul's words: Col. ii. 8. "Beware, leſt "any man ſpoil you through Philoſophy "and vain deceit, &c." But he treats it in his uſual way, quite practically, and nothing direct can be collected from his

"employed. For it is this childiſh employment "which enables them to make the proper uſe of "their eyes. They are thereby every day acquiring "*habits* of *perception*, which are of greater importance "than any thing we can teach them."

[*a*] See more of this afterwards.

words.

words. However, it appears from this Section, and from the Epitome of the Chriſtian doctrine which he annexes to it, that by Philoſophy, in this paſſage, he underſtood not at all what we mean by that term; namely, ſcience and uſeful learning in general: but a peculiar ſyſtem of "Science *falſely ſo called*," as the ſame Apoſtle elſewhere deſcribes it, a ſyſtem which had begun during the life of the Apoſtles, and conſiſted of an impure mixture of the Doctrines of Chriſtianity, with the exaggerated fancies and ſpeculations of the Oriental Philoſophy. The Profeſſors of this Philoſophy aſſumed the name of Gnoſtics, or Men of Science. They taught the doctrine of two principles, a good and evil Being; and many of them denied the Univerſe to be the work of the good Deity. Beſides theſe, ſome of them maintained that Chriſt was only a man in appearance; that he ſuffered only in appearance; that the God of the Old Teſtament was a different Being from the

God of the New; with various other extravagancies.

This Father appears to have had a very different idea of Medical Science from that entertained by Mr. Rouſſeau. For in his ſixth Catecheſis *, he relates a ſtory in a manner very honourable to our profeſſion. While the impoſtor Manes, ſays he, was in Perſia, the ſon of the King was ſeized with a diſtemper, and the Phyſicians were called to attend him. Manes, however, perſuaded the King, to commit his Son to his charge, promiſing to cure him by prayer, as he pretended to poſſeſs ſuper-natural powers. The Phyſicians were diſmiſſed, but Manes failed in his cure; and, before they could be recalled, the young Prince died. Cyril charges Manes in a direct manner with the death of the Prince;

" Τὸν γὰρ δυνάμενον διὰ τῆς ἰατρικῆς ἐπιμελείας
" σωθῆναι, ἕτος τὰς ἰατρὰς ἀπόσησας, ἐφόνευσε
" τῇ ἀμελείᾳ θανατώσας; for him, whom
" the aid of the Phyſicians could have

* §. 14. p. 94. Ed. Th. Milles Fol. Ox. 1703.

" ſaved,

" ſaved, he killed, by ſending away the " Phyſicians, having deſtroyed him for " want of care." Mr. Rouſſeau would probably have pleaſed himſelf with a witticiſm on the occaſion, and ſaid, that Manes did the prince a ſervice by driving away the Phyſicians, and thus permitting him to yield up in peace that life, which their pretended art could not have ſaved. But Cyril reaſons differently.

In his 18th Catecheſis *, he inſtructs his Pupils how to defend the doctrine of the Reſurrection of the Dead againſt the Greeks. For as they do not acknowledge the Scriptures, ſays he, you muſt not oppoſe them by arguments borrowed thence; but muſt uſe reaſonings and analogical proofs. One of thoſe he produces is ſomewhat curious—Go back a hundred or two hundred years ago, and ſay, where then were we who now ſpeak and hear? You are not ignorant from what weak and rude beginnings we originated; from what groſs,

* Sect. 4th and 5th.

confuſed,

confuſed, and, ſeemingly, unfit materials we derived our exiſtence? How from theſe were produced the fleſh of muſcles, the energy of nerves, the brightneſs of the eyes, the ſmell of the noſe, the hearing of the ears, the ſpeaking tongue, the beating heart, the labouring hands, the running feet, and, in ſhort, members of all kinds. And, by and by, this weak and puny being became a builder of ſhips, a raiſer of houſes, an architect and an artiſt, a ſoldier, a prince, a legiſlator, a king!—And can it be difficult for that God, who, from ſuch ſlender materials, made us become all this, to reſtore us again when we have loſt our life? May not he, who brought us from non-exiſtence into life, reſtore it to us when we are deprived of it?—There is ſomething ingenious in this reaſoning. Where was Sir Iſaac Newton a hundred thouſand years ago? Is it more improbable *now*, that he ſhould recover exiſtence a hundred thouſand years after this, than it was *then*, that he ſhould have exiſted at all? Does the analogy of nature furniſh no ground

to expect a *return of mankind*, while the whole fabric of it ſeems to move on in *perpetual circle?* Is it more difficult for that power, whatever it was, which firſt gave him exiſtence, to reſtore to him that life he has loſt, than it was to confer it at firſt? Or is there any reaſon to conclude from our ideas of identity, ſuppoſing them complete (inſtead of obſcure and uncertain as they are), that ſuch a reſtoration is impoſſible?

The opinion of St. Basil I ſhall lay before my readers in an account of his xxivth Homily. Πρὸς τοὺς νέους ὅπως ἂν ἐξ Ἑλληνικῶν ὠφελοῖντο λόγων, or an Addreſs to Young People, to inſtruct them how they may derive advantage from the ſtudy of the Greek profane literature, printed in the 1ſt volume of the Paris edition of his works, fol. 1618, p. 570. He begins with expreſſing his affection for them, and the advantages which his years and great experience of the changes of human life gave him, in inſtructing them who were but entering into the world. On theſe introductory

troductory points, he writes with an elegance and ſimplicity, which would not have diſgraced the pen of Cicero himſelf. Wonder not, adds he, if you ſhall learn of me ſomething more uſeful than your Preceptors, and the books of the Ancients, which they have put into your hands, have yet taught you. For I would not have you to reſign entirely your opinions to theſe guides, but to follow only what is uſeful in them, and reject the reſt. For nothing in this world is abſolutely perfect, nothing human is entirely free from error. The greatneſs and glory of this life is not worthy of our affections and admiration; we ſhould fix them on more diſtant hopes, and direct our attention ultimately to a future world. For though any one could deſcribe, in one oration, the whole ſum of happineſs that has exiſted ſince the beginning of the creation, he would fall as far ſhort, of conveying an idea of the ſmalleſt part of future felicity, as a ſhadow or a dream falls ſhort of the real ſubſtance. The ſacred writers inſtruct us in theſe

myſteries, but your tender years do not as yet permit you to underſtand them. Wherefore you muſt be employed for a time in other ſtudies, which are not altogether without ſome relation to theſe, imitating thoſe who, by military exerciſes, gain dexterity and experience, and prepare themſelves to hold one day an honourable place in the field of battle. Of all conteſts, ours is the greateſt; it demands our whole powers; and, to accompliſh it well, we ſhould collect aſſiſtance from every quarter, even from Poets and Orators, if they can give it to us. For as the Fullers and Dyers (this is a beautiful idea), by a firſt dip in certain compoſitions, prepare their cloth to receive that colour which they wiſh it finally to bear, ſo we, being initiated by external learning, are prepared to receive afterwards high and ſacred knowledge.

If there be any connexion between ſacred and profane learning, then the ſtudy of the one will aſſiſt you in the knowledge of the other; and though there ſhould be

no

no ſuch connexion, you will however derive advantages from comparing them together; you will be enabled to give a preference, on rational grounds, to that which is beſt, and to continue more firm in your Attachment to what you have choſen [*a*].

I may illuſtrate my opinion by a ſimile. A tree is expected to produce fruit at a certain period of time; but its leaves and branches likewiſe prove ornamental to it. So the ſoul, whoſe glorious fruit is *Truth*, ought alſo to be adorned with external learning, as the leaves on the tree, which give us an earneſt of having fruit in due ſeaſon. Moſes, one of the wiſeſt of men, at firſt exerciſed his mind in the learning

[*a*] P. 572, A. This liberal reaſoning of St. Baſil may very properly be oppoſed to any *appearance* of argument, which there may be in the illiberal and abſurd apology of the Caliph Omar, for burning the Alexandrian Library. "If theſe books," ſaid he, "contained nothing but what was agreeable to the "Koran, they were uſeleſs; if any thing contrary "to it, they were miſchievous, and ought to be de-"ſtroyed."

of

of the Egyptians; and Daniel ſtudied the ſciences of the Chaldæans, before he acquired divine knowledge.

Thus far I have endeavoured to prove the uſefulneſs of profane learning; I come now to ſhew how you are to ſtudy it, in order to derive theſe advantages from it. And to begin with the Poets. Every thing that they have written is not worthy of your attention, but ſuch works only as they have devoted to the actions and ſayings of wiſe and good men. Theſe you ought to read, and to imitate, as far as you are able, the character of the perſons deſcribed in them. When you come to ſtories of infamous and wicked men, ſhut your ears as carefully as Ulyſſes did againſt the ſongs of the Syrens. For to accuſtom oneſelf to vicious diſcourſes, is the ready way to the acts themſelves. Wherefore take care, that, amidſt the elegance of the language, you do not carry away ſomething bad with you, for poiſon may be concealed and diſguiſed amongſt honey. I cannot commend haughty or abuſive

Poets,

Poets, nor thoſe who paint the characters of lovers and drunkards, or place their ſupreme felicity in eating and obſcene ſongs. And leaſt of all do I admire their doctrine about the Gods, eſpecially when they make a plurality of them, and repreſent them as various in nature and diſcordant. For among their Gods, Brother contends with Brother; the Father wars againſt the Sons; and the Sons againſt the Father. Nay, they impute to them, and to Jupiter himſelf, the King and Head of all, ſuch adulteries, rapes, and unnatural luſts, as one might bluſh to aſcribe even to Savages or Wild Beaſts. With ſuch writers we have nothing to do; we leave them to the THEATRE.

The ſame rule will apply to the Hiſtorians and Orators. We ſhould ſcrupulouſly avoid that part of the oratorical art which teaches to pervert cauſes. Deceit in matters of law, is extremely unſuitable to the characters of thoſe, who profeſs a religion hoſtile to ſuch conteſts altogether. But let us attend to thoſe parts of their

works,

works, in which they have praiſed virtuous men, or cenſured the vicious. As the bees do not alight equally on every flower, nor endeavour to carry off the whole of it, but only that which is uſeful to them, the honey; ſo ſhould we, like wiſe and ſober perſons, extract from authors what is uſeful to us, and agreeable to truth, paying no attention to other things. And as, in gathering roſes, we avoid the thorns, ſo, in the courſe of our ſtudies, let us collect the valuable, and avoid the noxious parts. For which purpoſe, accuſtom yourſelves always to conſider the tendency of every doctrine, and try it by a certain ſtandard.

If the poets and hiſtorians have ſometimes praiſed virtue, the philoſophers have done it ſtill more frequently, and therefore you ſhould often peruſe their writings. It is of the higheſt advantage to young people to be early familiarized with virtue; for firſt impreſſions made on their yielding minds long remain imprinted there. HESIOD, in a celebrated part of his poem, obſerves, that vice holds forth to us a

broad and eaſy road; while the path of virtue is at firſt rugged, but, after we have attained the ſummit, it becomes quite ſmooth. In which he deſigns to encourage young people to take virtue as their guide, neither being allured by pleaſures at the beginning of their courſe, nor diſmayed by the difficulties of the road before they have arrived at the end of it. Theſe ſentiments, and ſuch as are ſimilar to them, wherever they occur, are worthy of all your attention.

I have heard from a judicious friend, who has ſtudied the poets much, that the whole poetry of Homer is one continued encomium on virtue; that all that he has written may be referred to this end; and not a ſingle paſſage be found contrary or foreign to it. A fine example occurs in his deſcription of Ulyſſes's eſcape from ſhipwreck, at the iſland of Corcyra, where his virtues made ſuch an impreſſion on the Phæacians, that luxurious people, that, abandoning their pleaſures, to which they were ſo entirely devoted, they ſeemed to

wiſh for nothing ſo much as to reſemble Ulyſſes. In this ſtory Homer ſeems to ſay to his readers :—O, my fellow men, preſerve your virtue above all things whatever. Virtue deſerts not him who is ſhipwrecked ; ſhe ſwam along with Ulyſſes in the ſea ; and on the land rendered him, though poor and naked, more honourable in the eyes of the Phæacians, than all the opulent and fortunate !

Such truly is the ſtate of the caſe. All other things are precarious ; they are ſcarcely more ours than other peoples ; and, as at dice, are conſtantly changing and ſhifted from one to another. Virtue is the only immortal and unchangeable poſſeſſion ; ſhe only attends us living, and forſakes us not in death.———

St. Baſil goes on to point out ſuch other paſſages of the profane writers, as he thinks moſt proper for the inſtruction of his young audience. He relates the memorable ſtory of The CHOICE of HERCULES ; refers to the anecdotes of great

men, who have ſubdued their paſſions, enterprized noble deeds, and, without the precepts of the Goſpel, have, from their own reaſon, practiſed upon its principles; and then proceeds thus:

To return now to my original rule. We are not to receive every opinion, but thoſe only that are right and uſeful for us. Is it not ſhameful for us, to be careful in ſeparating any thing noxious that may be in our food, when we pay no attention to our ſtudies and books, which are the food of the mind? Doth any wiſe archer ſhoot his arrows at random, without conſidering the mark he ought to hit? What rational pilot will abandon his veſſel to the caſual guidance of the winds, inſtead of directing her to the deſired harbour? Shall every artiſt conſider the *end* of his work, and we, during the whole courſe of it, never think of the end of human life? Whoever does not think of that end, and govern all his actions with reſpect to it, is certainly no better than the brute creation: his ſoul is

like a ſhip without ballaſt or crew, toſſed about here and there in the trackleſs ocean.

He who would obtain praiſe, muſt ſeek it in the practice of thoſe arts for which he has been previouſly prepared and exerciſed. Polydamas and Milo, whoſe bodily ſtrength gained them ſuch glory at the Olympic games, did not think of contending for the prize in muſic. Nor did Timotheus, the muſician of Alexander, abandon his art to contend in wreſtling; otherwiſe he would have gained little credit to himſelf. Since I have mentioned the Athletæ and Wreſtlers, I would beg of you to conſider what labour and pains they take with themſelves, trying a thouſand ways to increaſe their ſtrength; toiling at preparatory exerciſes; patiently ſubmitting to the blows and bruiſes they are continually receiving; living ſtrictly according to the diſagreeable regimen preſcribed for them; and, in ſhort, going through a thouſand difficulties; ſo that their whole life ſeems to be nothing elſe but a preparation for theſe conteſts;— and all this, that at length they may ap-

pear in the field, to ſubject themſelves to ſtill greater riſks and labours, in order to gain a little fame, and be crowned with a garland of olive or parſley! And ſhall we, before whom are placed ſuch high rewards in a future life—felicity that no language can deſcribe—expect to attain this by heedleſs indolence, living without thought or without care? As well might lazy Sardanapalus, or that Margites, who, as Homer tells us, neither plowed nor ſowed, nor did any one thing neceſſary in life, claim to be made the happieſt of mortals!

We have indeed many difficulties to overcome, and there is need of all our efforts. But for our comfort we know, that caſual errors will be forgiven; deliberate ones ſhould not be pardoned. Our duty is plain before us. Let us lay aſide inferior concerns, and take care of our ſouls. To the body no attention is due beyond what the neceſſities of nature require. But as the ſoul is connected with it, let us endeavour to exalt her above it,

as

as a captive is delivered from his priſon. There are men whoſe ſole delight is in eating, who ranſack the whole earth for cooks and diſhes—miſerable ſlaves to their bellies—in heavy bondage to a tyrannical maſter—fatally buſy in bringing upon themſelves gouts and torments, almoſt equal to the pains of damned ſpirits. Extreme attention to the hair, and to dreſs, is alſo to be cenſured, as it indicates a vain and laſcivious turn of mind. No one can gain any thing with wiſe men by having on a fine coat. Such men look farther than outward appearance, becauſe they know that it is not that which is *external* which conſtitutes *the man*.

The great object of wiſdom is to know oneſelf; but this requires that the mind be cleared of the clouds of ſenſe and pleaſure. We muſt ſhut our eyes to vain ſhews and prodigies, and our ears to that kind of muſic which corrupts the ſoul. For this muſic produces a mean and ſervile turn of mind; it heightens laſcivious and low paſſions. We have a more exalted (a ma-

jeſtic) muſic, which ſtrengthens every noble feeling: that muſic by which David reſtored his reaſon to diſordered Saul; and that by which Pythagoras ſo impreſſed the minds of intoxicated men, that they became aſhamed of their ſituation, and went immediately home. Great is the difference between virtuous muſic and that which is vicious and obſcene. Fly from what is commonly uſed, as much as you would do from the greateſt of evils [*a*]."

I am aſhamed to mention the folly of thoſe who uſe perfumes and foreign ointments. But, to ſum up all at once, the body is to be diſregarded, or only cared for, that it may act as the ſervant and inſtrument of the ſoul. This is the doctrine of Plato; and it agrees exactly with that of St. Paul *. The paſſions are like wild horſes, which are to be checked and reſtrained by reaſon, that they may not run

[*a*] Doth it yet any where exiſt, gently enfeebling the manly mind, and chiming away all that is noble, heroic, and virtuous in man?

* Rom. xiii. 14. 2 Cor. v. 13.

away

away with the ſoul. I inſiſt ſo much on mortifying the body, becauſe he who deſpiſes it, will be ſuperior to all vicious temptations to gratify its deſires. Such a man will never do a wrong thing to get wealth, becauſe he will not want it. He can eaſily ſatisfy nature, and more he will not deſire. Indeed, if we depart from this principle, there is no boundary to our folly. Solon juſtly obſerved, that there was no end of accumulating money. Theognis deſired only a ſmall fortune as moſt conducive to happineſs. By being contented with little, Diogenes was truly richer than Alexander. Conſider what glory theſe admirable ſtatuaries, Phidias and Polycletus, obtained, independent of gold. Had they turned their thoughts to hoarding up money, and neglected their art, they might have attained it; but they would have ceaſed to be reſpectable. We ought to eſteem virtue and merit ſufficient ornaments, and neither to ſeek praiſe to ourſelves for any thing elſe, nor, like flatterers, give it to others. A flatterer, who

can

can turn himſelf into any ſhape to pleaſe the people he is amongſt, is a moſt deſpicable character.

But theſe moral counſels are all more ſtrongly enforced in our own ſacred books. In other writings we have but an obſcure view of them. However, as I ſaid before, even theſe are not to be neglected. His ſtock will at laſt be very great, who collects what is uſeful from every author. The learned man, according to Heſiod, increaſes his knowledge, as the miſer does his gold, by little and little. There is a noted ſaying of Bias, that Virtue is the Viaticum of old age; that is, the whole proviſion neceſſary on the journey of life. Could I attain the old age of Tithonus, or Arganthonius, or of our Methuſalem, who is ſaid to have lived a thouſand and thirty years, I would account them all as nothing, when I conſidered, for a moment, that immenſely prolonged and ever youthful period of duration, in a future world, whoſe extent no human imagination can graſp, and to the attainment of which we are

called

called upon to uſe every effort, and to leave no exertion untried. Nor let us be diſcouraged at the difficulty of the enterprize, but ever keep in mind his exalted maxim who ſaid, " Chuſe that courſe of " life which is beſt, and cuſtom will render " it moſt delightful."

I have now given you the beſt advice in my power; and I entreat you to pay attention to it in the courſe of your lives. Conſider me as your ſpiritual Phyſician, and ſhew yourſelves obedient patients. There are ſome afflicted with incurable diſeaſe and melancholy, who will neither go to a phyſician, nor admit one to come to them. Heaven forbid that the diſeaſe of your minds ſhould be of this kind. Liſten to thoſe who are qualified to teach you, and all ſhall go well with you.

FAREWELL.

Such is the ſum of St. Baſil's excellent Homily. I intended to have extracted only a paſſage or two from it; but, being pleaſed, I went on. I hope ſome of my readers

readers will not be diſpleaſed at ſeeing this ſpecimen of an ancient Greek ſermon.

We proceed now to another illuſtrious evidence. In the fourth century, the Emperor Julian, in order more effectually to ruin the Chriſtian cauſe, ſhut up the ſchools of the Chriſtians, and endeavoured to prevent them from the ſtudy of learning. This meaſure, unworthy of a good man, and diſgraceful to a Philoſopher, was received with great diſſatisfaction by the Chriſtians. But no one ſeems to have reſented it more than ST. GREGORY *of Nazianzum*. This eloquent and animated Father has written two Orations againſt Julian, which are the third and fourth of his works; and he has animadverted on it very ſeverely in them, as well as in other parts of his writings. He exhibits to public and deſerved contempt the reaſons which the Emperor had aſſigned for this decree: "Ἡμετεροι φησιν, οἱ λογοι, και Ἑλ-
" ληνιζειν, ων και το σεβειν θεους ὑμων δε ἡ
" αλογια, και ἡ αγροικια· και ουδεν ὑπερ το,
" πιστευσον,

" ωισευσον, της ὑμετερας εςι σοφιας." " Ours, fays Julian, " are Orations; it belongs to " us to learn the *Greek language*, as it be- " longs to us to adore the Gods. To you " belong ignorance and ruſticity; and all " your wiſdom conſiſts in, *I believe* *."

He had before (p. 51, A.) ſhewn the abſurdity of Julian's idea, of an excluſive right to knowledge; as if language and letters, which are common to all men, could be appropriated to any particular claſs of men. He had expoſed alſo the meanneſs and timidity of his plans, as wiſhing firſt to deprive the Chriſtians of their chief ſtrength, and then to fight againſt them. " For it was neither like a " man convinced of the truth of his own " religion, or ſatisfied with the force of " his own arguments, to deſire to ſuppreſs " thoſe of our party. It was juſt as if one " ſhould maintain himſelf to be the braveſt " of the Wreſtlers, and demand to be " publickly preferred to all others, while

* Gregorii Nanzianz. Op. Orat. tertia, in Ed. Prunæi: Coloniæ 1680. Tome I. p. 97. B.

" at

" at the ſame time he deſired that none of
" the valiant or ſtrong men ſhould deſcend
" into the Arena, and engage in combat
" with him, &c." (P. 51. D.)

After mentioning the reaſon aſſigned for the Edict, as quoted from p. 97, he expatiates more fully on it, and refutes Julian, on his own ground, for ſeveral pages farther. He owns that the FAITH of Chriſtians expoſed them to calumny and cenſure *; but he contends, that they did right, to ſubmit implicitly to perſons whom they knew to be divinely inſpired, and whoſe authority was therefore of higher weight than any human reaſoning. He very properly reminds Julian of a ſimilar fact among his party, the example of the Pythagorean philoſophers, who deemed the aſſertion of their maſter a ſufficient authority for their opinions, and who certainly had far leſs ground to juſtify their *αυτος εφη*, or ipſe dixit, he hath ſaid it; than the Chriſtians had to plead for their *Πιςευω*, I

* I have made ſome remarks on *faith* in another Paper.

believe. By theſe arguments he vindicates the right of Chriſtians to Philoſophy; and he certainly would not have reaſoned in this manner, if either the eminent Believers of his age, or he himſelf, had been of opinion, that it was unlawful and pernicious for them to exerciſe their faculties in the purſuit of ſcience. Indeed, this was ſo far from being his opinion, that he was a zealous and ſucceſsful cultivator of literature. Suidas commends him equally as a Grammarian, a Poet, a Philoſopher [*a*], and an Orator. Philoſtorgius, who oppoſed his religious tenets, bears honourable teſtimony to his learning; and Ruf-

[*a*] Some one may ſmile at the application of the term *Philoſopher* to St. Gregory. But let it be remembered, that the learning of the Fathers was the learning of the times. They created not their Æra; they were formed by it. Their philoſophy was the philoſophy of the age. The queſtion was not, whether it was juſt; but whether it was as much ſo as that of others. And I apprehend, on a candid review, it will be found, that they were equal to their contemporaries in ſcience, and far ſuperior to them in Morals and Theology.

finus

finus adds, in honour of his character, " ea docuit, quæ fecit, nec ſeipſum con- " demnavit agendo contraria quam doce- " bat: he did what he taught; and did " not condemn himſelf by acting otherwiſe " than he inſtructed others to do:" an encomium which could have been beſtowed on few of the Philoſophers.

In his thirty-eighth Oration, ſpeaking of the tree of knowledge, he ſays it was not planted with an ill deſign, or invidiouſly forbidden; for knowledge is good at the proper ſeaſon. But it is only fit for thoſe of mature conſtitution; as ſolid food is unfit for thoſe of tender age, who ſtand in need of milk; p. 619. A.; and vid. p. 681. A.; and Tom. II. Arcanor. Carm. VII. p. 172. His opinion is confirmed by another father, Epiphanius, who ſays (contra Ophit.) " There was no evil in the tree " itſelf; for God hath planted nothing " evil; nor did death come through *know-* " *ledge*, but through *diſobedience*."

In his twentieth Oration, as an Introduction to the Hiſtory of the Education

and

and Studies of his friend, St. Baſil, on whom this diſcourſe was written, he premiſes ſome remarks on learning in general, which, he ſays, has ever been eſteemed, among thinking men, as the moſt excellent of human acquiſitions. "I do not," adds he, "ſpeak only of our exalted ſcience, "which relates to ſalvation, and is the ob-"ject of pure intellect, but of profane "literature, which many Chriſtians un-"juſtly contemn as dangerous and apt to "miſlead." He proceeds to vindicate his opinion, and concludes, "Wherefore, "Erudition is not to be deſpiſed, as ſome "think, who are to be deemed fooliſh and "ignorant people, deſirous of having all "others like themſelves, that their own "ignorance may be concealed, and no one "be able to betray and reprove them *."

The laſt writer, whoſe opinions I ſhall conſider, is THEODORET, of Antioch, biſhop of Cyrus, a learned and good man, who flouriſhed in the beginning of the

* P. 323 & 324. paſſim.

fourth century. As this writer was deeply acquainted with the ſentiments of the early Fathers, and had formed his own according to their model, he may very properly be conſidered, as exhibiting on this ſubject the ideas of the primitive times, and of men who lived centuries before his own age. I have not been able to conſult all his writings, which are voluminous [*a*]; but I

[*a*] He was the Author of Commentaries on the Scripture, an Eccleſiaſtical Hiſtory which ſerves as a ſupplement to that of Socrates and Sozomen, and other learned works. Photius much admires the purity of his ſtyle, as he never departs from the Attic Dialect. Du Pin thinks, that of all the Fathers who have attempted works of various kinds, Theodoret has ſucceeded beſt, being at once an elegant writer, a judicious hiſtorian, an able critic, and excellent commentator. And Beauſobre, who cenſures him a little for his zeal againſt Heretics, and his partiality to the Myſtics, owns however, that he was learned, reaſoned well, and was one of the moſt valuable of the Fathers. Father Sirmond publiſhed his works at Paris, 1642, in 4 vols. folio; to which the Jeſuit Garnier added a fifth in 1684. A very uſeful edition has ſince been printed at Halle, in 5 vols. large 8vo. 1774, by Profeſſor Schulze. It is this edition that is now before me.

ſhall preſent my readers with a regular Analyſis of one of his works, which contains a great many obſervations relative to our ſubject; and is beſides ſo full of curious information, that the peruſal of it is not unworthy of a ſcholar even of the preſent age [*a*].

He

[*a*] Profeſſor Schulze (Præfat. ad tom. quart. Opp. Theodoreti) ſays of this work, "tum ab illis "qui ſanctioris fidei noſtræ vindiciis juſtum ſtatuunt "pretium, tum ab elegantiorum literarum dignis "æſtimatoribus merito ſumma laude condecoratur; "which is deſervedly honoured with the higheſt "applauſe by all who ſet a proper value on the vin- "dication of our holy religion, or poſſeſs a juſt re- "gard for the cultivation of elegant literature."

F. Z. Acciaolus, the friend of Laſcaris and Marſilius Ficinus, who tranſlated theſe books into Latin, in his dedication to Pope Leo X. entitles them, De Spirituali Græcarum Affectionum Medicina; and ſays, he publiſhed them at the requeſt of John Picus, Earl of Mirandula, by way of a corrective to the errors in Plato, of whom a new edition had juſt been printed. He adds, that no one can read theſe books of Theodoret without acknowledging "nullos "eum Poetas, nullos Oratores, nullos Hiſtoricos, "nullos preſertim Philoſophos latuiſſe: nulluſque

 "tam

He entitles the book GRECIAN THERAPEUTICS, "ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΩΝ ΘΕΡΑ-"ΠΕΥΤΙΚΗ ΠΑΘΗΜΑΤΩΝ," or the cure of the mental diſeaſes or *prejudices* of the Greeks. It would almoſt be ſufficient for my purpoſe, to tranſlate the titles and ſummary of the twelve diſcourſes, into which he divides his work; for theſe would ſhew with ſufficient certainty, that Theodoret may be produced as an illuſtrious evidence to the truth of my hypotheſis; but for the reaſons already mentioned, and becauſe the work is excellent in itſelf, I ſhall be more particular in my *account* of it.

The Preface * contains an *account* of the deſign of the work. As it often happens to me, ſays he, to meet with people who admire the fables of the Greeks, and deride our faith, aſſerting, that we teach our converts nothing but *mere credulity*, accuſing the Apoſtles of ignorance, and calling them Barbarians, becauſe they did not poſ-

"tam doctus ſit homo, qui ex ejus lectione nova ſibi
"atque inaudita quam plurima non ſit accepturus."

* P. 689, &c. of tome IV.

ſeſs the ornaments of eloquence; and ridiculing us for honouring the Martyrs, becauſe the living can derive no advantage from the dead; I have thought it proper to offer to the public a refutation of theſe ill-grounded charges; deeming it highly wrong to ſuffer plain and ſimple men to be led away by ſuch ſophiſms, without, at leaſt, endeavouring to undeceive them.

The firſt diſcourſe or diſputation is ΠΕΡΙ ΠΙΣΤΕΩΣ, or a Defence of the Faith of Chriſtians, and of the Learning of the Apoſtles, by Arguments extracted from the Greek Philoſophers *. After an elegant compariſon between the diſeaſes of the mind and thoſe of the body, and the peculiar difficulties which occur to the phyſicians of each, he mentions the firſt malady he purpoſes to treat, which is that of *arrogance* or *ſelf-ſufficiency* †. Some, ſays he, accuſtomed to the peruſal of the Poets and Orators, diſdain to be inſtructed by poor fiſhermen, and ſet no

* P. 694, &c.

† P. 696.

value on divine truth, unleſs it come recommended by elegance of language. And there are many of this ſtamp, who are not perſons of profound learning, but ſhallow and ſuperficial people—ſmatterers in Greek learning—men to whom "the "wrath of Achilles" is unknown, and who have ſcarcely heard the names of the Philoſophers; and yet pretend to accuſe the ſacred books of barbariſm, building their pride on no better foundation than mere ignorance. How different was the conduct of the great ancient ſages, Pherecydes, Pythagoras, Plato, &c. who travelled over all kingdoms in ſearch of *truth*; and, to obtain it, heſitated not to go amongſt the rudeſt nations, and to ſubmit to the greateſt hardſhips *. Were my opponents acquainted with Grecian learning, they would know that the Greeks derived all their knowledge from foreigners, and thoſe whom they called *Barbarians*. Hence they would have no prejudice againſt the inſtructions of the Apoſtles †.

* P. 696—699. † P. 699.

In

In this animated argument, we ſee Theodoret ſpeaking with that manly dignity which the excellence of his cauſe inſpired. He wipes off the charge of ignorance from the Chriſtians; and fixes it, where it was due, on their illiberal antagoniſts [*a*].

Give

[*a*] We ſhall extract the eſſence of ſome others of the more intereſting paſſages.

Liſten to Porphyry, one of our bittereſt foes. The way to the Gods, ſays he, is ſhut up by iron gates; it is rugged; it is arduous. The Greeks have wandered farther from it than all others; and when they found it, they quickly loſt it again. To the Barbarians we owe the diſcovery of it *. Plato, in his Timæus, tells us, that an Egyptian prieſt ſaid to Solon, Ye Greeks are always children; your knowledge is all of yeſterday †.

Ye accuſe us of requiring implicit faith, and giving no reaſons for our doctrines. But we confirm them by facts, and we retort the charge upon you. Did not your Pythagoras enjoin ſtrict ſilence on his diſciples? Did he not refuſe to anſwer their queſtions, and teach them that his *ipſe dixit* was a ſufficient authority? And ſhall we heſitate to pay that reverence to God, which ye have paid to men ‡?

* P. 705. † P. 708. ‡ P. 709.

Give credit, adds he, to your own an-

" The diſtinguiſhing characteriſtic of wiſe men is " to baniſh prejudices ; not to confine themſelves to " the cuſtoms of their fathers, but to ſeek truth, " and collect what is uſeful wherever it may be " found. Ανδρων γε σωφρονεντων ιδιον, μη προληψει " δουλευειν, μηδε εθεσι προσδεδεσθαι παλρωοις, αλλα ζητειν " ταληθες, και το χρησιμον πανταχοθεν ξυλλεγειν *." Behold a ſentiment, which, with every friend of liberality, will immortalize Theodoret.

" It is by the eye of the mind that we muſt con- " template intellectual objects. For as we require " corporeal eyes to diſtinguiſh things that can be " ſeen, ſo we ſtand in need of faith to diſcern divine " things. What the eye is in the body, that faith " is in the mind ; or rather, as the eye wants light " to enable it to diſcern viſible objects, in like man- " ner the mind requires faith to illuminate divine " things, and to enable it to preſerve a ſtrong and " permanent idea of them †."

Socrates ſhewed Alcibiades, that the way to learn, was firſt to lay aſide confidence in one's own knowledge. He firſt of all taught him, that he knew nothing : wherefore THE BEGINNING OF SCIENCE IS THE KNOWLEDGE OF OUR IGNORANCE. " Αρχη " αρα γνωσεως, της αγνοιας η γνωσις ‡."

* P. 715. † P. 714. ‡ P. 715.

cient Philoſophers, who have ſpoken of theſe ſubjects, and have mentioned our doctrines, obſcurely indeed, and often like thoſe birds which imitate the human voice, but underſtand not the ſenſe of what they ſay. They, however, are to be excuſed, as they had not the inſtructions of Prophets and Apoſtles; but were obliged to follow the faint remains of that natural light, which was at firſt divinely communicated, but which the wickedneſs of mankind had nearly extinguiſhed. God, the original author of it, did not ſuffer it to be entirely loſt; but reſtored it in part, by exhibiting to men his works of nature and providence. Now, as phyſicians extract medicines even out of poiſonous animals, ſo do we bring forth valuable information from amidſt all the errors of your Poets and Philoſophers. So that whom ye think our opponents, we turn into evidences in our favour, and make them teachers of our doctrine. And as we have proved to you the neceſſity of faith, if ye will now adopt Pythagorean ſilence, and liſten with

attention

attention and candour, we will proceed to inſtruct you in the paths of truth *.

The ſecond diſputation is ΠΕΡΙ ΑΡΧΗΣ, concerning the beginning or origin of things †, in which Theodoret recounts the various, abſurd, and contradictory opinions of the Pagan Philoſophers on this ſubject, and endeavours to confirm the credit of Moſes. He is leſs ſucceſsful in this than in the preceding diſcourſe. Having aſſerted, that moſt of the ancient ſages derived the important truths contained in their writings from the inſtruction of the Hebrews, and the peruſal of the ſacred books, he concludes the diſputation in this manner: It is now time, my friends, that you ſhould examine the FOUNTAIN of truth itſelf. For, as thoſe who dig for gold and ſilver, when they have diſcovered ſome ſmall veins, purſue them diligently, and ceaſe not from their enterprize until they have found out the ſource of the precious ore, in like manner it becomes you to in-

* P. 724—726. † P. 726—759.

veſtigate

veſtigate that fountain, from which ſome little ſtreams having flowed, form the brighteſt ornaments of the writings of Anaxagoras and Pythagoras, of Plato, Numenius, Plutarch, Plotinus, and your other Philoſophers. Be not offended at the poverty, but conſider the wiſdom of the ſacred writers. "By them inſtructed, "ye will no longer divide the ALMIGHTY "into many Deities; but will adore HIM "who is the eternal and only true God; "who, moved by nothing but his own "goodneſs, has given exiſtence to all "things. Then, in place of opponents "and enemies, ye will become domeſtics "and friends, and ſhall enjoy confidence "as relations; ſo that thoſe who now re-"quire guides ſhall be able to bring many "wanderers to the knowledge of truth *."

The third diſputation is ΠΕΡΙ ΑΓΓΕΛΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΩΝ ΚΑΛΟΥΜΕΝΩΝ ΘΕΩΝ, ΚΑΙ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΩΝ ΠΟΝΗΡΩΝ ΔΑΙΜΟΝΩΝ, of the Angels, and thoſe who are called *Gods*, and of the *evil Dæmons* †. The de-

* P. 758, 759. † 759—792.

ſign

ſign of it is to prove, that there were ſome Pagans who believed in no God, while others aſſerted a multitude of Deities; between which extremes, the Chriſtians adhered to the juſt medium, in acknowledging one only true God; that, according to the teſtimonies of their own writers, the Heathen Deities were either dead men, or the heavenly bodies *; that the Creator had exhibited theſe works of Nature to lead mankind up to himſelf; but that they had entirely counteracted his deſign, worſhipping the Creatures inſtead of the Creator; and making the very excellence and greatneſs of his gifts, the occaſion of forgetting the Bountiful Giver: "και των "δωρεων το τε μεγεσθος και το καλλος, αφορμη "γεγονεν αχαριςιας †;" that there were defects in all created things, and nothing completely perfect but the Deity ‡; that

* P. 768.

† P. 762. This thought is beautifully enlarged on in Fénelon's Prayer, at the end of his Demonſtration of the exiſtence of God.

‡ P. 762 and 763.

we

we ought not therefore to miſtake the *works* for the *artiſt*; nor yet to imagine the artiſt had the ſame defects as we found in his works; ſince, even in human productions, the artiſt was greater than his works; nor was there any *one* of his productions which ſhewed the whole of his ſkill and power *; that though they knew their Gods to have been no more than men, they were ſo infatuated as to pay them divine honours; that they exalted bad men to this ſacred dignity, and aſcribed the worſt actions to their Deities †; that they erred alſo in making images of the Gods; ſince the wiſeſt of their own writers confeſſed, that it was impoſſible to form a reſemblance of the Deity; and the attempt to do it occaſioned the ſtrangeſt abſurdity. Every nation formed them different, according to their own ideas of beauty; thus

* P. 763 and 764. This idea which is hinted, but not very diſtinctly expreſſed by Theodoret, is excellently illuſtrated in Dr. Price's Diſſertation on Providence.

† P. 765—779.

the Ethiopians made them black, and with monkey-faces, like themſelves *. That, in their opinions concerning Angels and inferior ſpirits, they miſtook in aſſerting, that theſe beings were of different ſexes, ſince their numbers never increaſed, and ſex would be uſeleſs to them; or that they were originally evil beings, ſince God had created nothing evil, but they had fallen from their firſt eſtate of rectitude into vice and depravity; and, laſtly, that, whereas Plato and others had taught, that theſe evil ſpirits had power over the *weak*, ſo as even to lead them to deſtruction, the ſacred writers, with ſuperior judgment, aſſerted, that they had no power but what God allowed them, and could not injure any but thoſe who voluntarily and culpably reſigned themſelves up to their temptations †.

The fourth diſputation is ΠΕΡΙ ΥΛΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΚΟΣΜΟΥ, of Matter and the World ‡; in which he collects an immenſe number of theories, adopted by ancient philoſo-

* P. 779—784. † P. 784—791. ‡ P. 792—816.

phers, relative to theſe ſubjects, in order to prove that they differ entirely from one another, and even not infrequently contradict themſelves. The peruſal of this part of his work * would alone be a ſufficient evidence of the learning of Theodoret, and of his extenſive acquaintance with the Greek writers. He commends very highly ſeveral opinions of Plato, chiefly extracted from his Timæus †; and points out others in which he erred; and concludes with giving the true ſyſtem of nature, as taught in the Sacred Writings.

Diſputation the fifth, ΠΕΡΙ ΦΥΣΕΩΣ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΥ, of the Nature of Man ‡; contains a compariſon of the opinions of the Heathen Philoſophers, with thoſe of the Sacred Writers on that ſubject; and ſhews, that in the former you find little elſe than errors, inconſiſtencies, and mutual diſſention; while, in the latter, truth, rectitude, and univerſal harmony, appear. The author mentions the ſentiments of the

* P. 792—802. † P. 802. ‡ P. 816.

Philoſophers,

Philoſophers, relative to the origin and ſtate of men *, pre-exiſtence of ſouls, connexion of mind and body, nature and ſeat of the ſoul. Hippocrates, ſays he, Democritus, and Plato, affirm, that it is ſituated in the brain; Strabo, in the middle between the eye-brows; Eraſiſtratus, near the membrane covering the brain, called Epicranis; Herophilus, in the lower part of the brain; Parmenides and Epicurus, in the whole of the thorax; Empedocles, Ariſtotle, and all the Stoics, place it in the heart. Beſides theſe, ſome will have it to reſide in the ventricle of the heart; ſome in the blood; others in the pericardium; others in the diaphragm †. He proceeds to enumerate a variety of other opinions about the ſoul, free will, &c. approving moſt of the doctrines of Plato on thoſe points; and aſſigning this circumſtance as the great ſource of the errors and mutual contradictions among the Philoſophers, that they were not inſpired with a love of truth, but

* P. 819—824. † P. 824.

filled

filled with ambition and a thirſt of fame; which led them to wiſh to be conſidered as the founders of new ſyſtems *. Truth, adds he, is conſiſtent and ONE; while falſehood is inconſiſtent and VARIOUS. Amidſt the eternal differences of your Philoſophers, we rejoice to diſcover the conſtant harmony of the ſacred writers. The Legiſlator Moſes, the Prophet David, the gallant Job, Iſaiah, Jeremiah, and all the company of the prophets, Matthew alſo, and John, Luke, Mark, Peter, Paul, and all the Apoſtles, have every where delivered the ſame doctrine, and vary not from one another [*a*].

After

* P. 824—832.

[*a*] From a paſſage in Exodus, chap. xxi. 22 and 23. "If men ſtrive, and hurt a woman with child, "ſo that her fruit depart from her, and yet no miſ-"chief follow, he ſhall be ſurely puniſhed, accord-"ing as the woman's huſband will lay upon him; "and he ſhall pay as the judges determine: and if "any miſchief follow, then thou ſhalt give life for "life:" Theodoret infers, that the fœtus is completely formed in the womb before it is animated;

 becauſe,

After ſome other obſervations, Theodoret adds: The ſyſtems of your great Philoſophers

becauſe, if it were alive, the perſon who had occaſioned its deſtruction would be as guilty as if he had deſtroyed the mother, according to the conſtant maxim of the Jewiſh law, *Eye for eye, tooth for tooth, life for life.* As, therefore, a diſtinction is made, and the puniſhment in the firſt caſe limited to a fine, he concludes, that Moſes proceeded on the principle, that the fœtus was not alive *. The Roman Law adopted the ſame idea; for it did not puniſh a woman who deſignedly procured abortion; firſt, becauſe it was ſuppoſed, that the fœtus formed part of the viſcera of the mother, over which ſhe had the ſame power as over other parts of her body; and, ſecondly, becauſe the fœtus was conſidered as poſſeſſing no more than vegetable life in the Uterus; ſo that the taking away of that, was, to uſe their compariſon, no more than plucking of unripe fruit. See a valuable little tract of an eminent lawyer and elegant ſcholar, Gerard Noodt, entituled, "Julius "Paulus, ſive de nece et interitu partûs;" publiſhed in his works. I believe, however, modern Phyſiology will not give its ſanction to theſe ideas. According to Haller, the veſſels are the firſt formed parts of the fœtus; and if Mr. Hunter's opinion be juſt, which I

* P. 834.

think

phers are now all at end: who now profeſſes himſelf a diſciple of Zeno, or Anaxagoras, or Arceſilaus? where is the doctrine of the Stoics taught? what ſects now ſide with the Stagirite? are there any cities governed by the laws of Plato? any Republics conſtructed after his model? But turn your eyes to the doctrines of the Prophets and Apoſtles. Behold theſe exiſting with all the force and efficacy they had when firſt delivered. The Hebrew books have not only been rendered into

think highly probable, "that the blood is alive," it will follow that the fœtus poſſeſſes life very early in the uterus, perhaps from the firſt. Indeed, we have no grounds to conclude, that there is any particular period when life is infuſed, or ſuddenly takes place in the fœtus. On the contrary, the phænomena lead us to believe, that life exiſts in it, though in a low degree, from the very beginning, and, whether material or immaterial, grows with its growth. It is ſafer, therefore, to conſider the diſtinction made by Moſes, as founded upon a moral conſideration, namely, that of the ſmall value of the life of a fœtus in Utero, compared with that of a grown-up perſon.

Greek, but alſo into Latin, Egyptian, Perſian, Indian, Armenian, Scythian, and Tartarian. All the wiſdom of Plato could not convince ſome of his own pupils of the immortality of the ſoul; but our fiſhermen and mechanics have perſuaded whole nations of this important truth; and have diſſeminated it, and other opinions, over all the world, ſo that it is not confined to learned men, but known to the very vulgar; and the pooreſt peaſant may now be wiſer, and know more of human nature, than either Ariſtotle or Plato *.

Diſputation the ſixth † treats ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΣ ΘΕΙΑΣ ΠΡΟΝΟΙΑΣ, Of the Providence of God. Our Author enumerates various opinions of the Philoſophers on this ſubject, moſt of them extremely erroneous: thus Diagoras, being an Atheiſt, refuſed to admit any providence at all; Protagoras ſpoke doubtfully of the matter; Epicurus admitted the exiſtence of a God, but did not allow that he took any care of human

* P. 835—840. † P. 846.

affairs;

affairs; and Nicomachus limited the care of Providence to the ſphere of the moon, ſuppoſing all below that to be governed by blind deſtiny *. He makes remarks on the ſtoical doctrine of *fate* †; on omens and augury ‡; quotes, with applauſe, ſome paſſages of Pindar and of Plato, on the ſubject of Providence §; ſuggeſting, however, that the laſt Philoſopher had copied them out of the Sacred Writings. Of this there may be reaſon to doubt. Le Clerc, in various parts of his works, has endeavoured to invalidate the opinion of the ancient philoſophers borrowing directly out of the Sacred Books. But, though Plato probably did not do this, it does not follow that he invented theſe juſt and ſublime ſentiments himſelf. The opinions of the Jewiſh people were diſſeminated over the world; and a philoſopher, who travelled on purpoſe to ſeek knowledge, could not fail to meet with them. Beſides, Plato had employed himſelf aſſiduouſly in

* P. 848. † P. 849. ‡ P. 852. § P. 855—864.

collecting the remains of that *ancient truth*, which originated from Heaven, and had been conveyed down from age to age by tradition. His ſentiments, quoted by Theodoret, bear the ſtamp of divinity. Such theology never originated from the narrow mind of feeble man.

Next he replies in a very ingenious manner to ſeveral objections made againſt Providence; ſhewing the propriety and neceſſity of the difference of ranks in ſociety; quotes with approbation ſeveral paſſages from Plotinus of Alexandria; and concludes with ſome reflections on what are called the peculiar doctrines of Chriſtianity [*a*].

DISSER-

[*a*] P. 864—882. Before finiſhing our account of this ſixth Diſputation, we ſhall take notice of an idea of Plato, which meets with the higheſt approbation from Theodoret (859—862). It occurs in his Book of Laws, where he divides the things that are good and deſireable into two kinds, divine and human. Divine bleſſings are Wiſdom or Prudence, Underſtanding and command of the Paſſions, Juſtice and Fortitude. Human bleſſings are Health, Beauty,

DISSERTATION the ſeventh, ΠΕΡΙ ΘΥΣΙΩΝ, Of Sacrifices. After ſome remarks on

Beauty, Strength and Agility, Riches and Power.

If any one, ſays Plato, poſſeſs the firſt claſs of bleſſings, the ſecond will be truly advantageous to him; but, if he have only the laſt, without the firſt, however much the vulgar may call him happy, he is really to be conſidered as unfortunate and miſerable.

This diſtinction, ſays Theodoret, I highly approve. For all theſe inferior bleſſings are good only in as far as they are properly applied, and directed by the higher order of qualities. Of what real value is riches or power to a man deſtitute of wiſdom and virtue? They only enable him to plunge deeper into folly and vice, and to entail upon himſelf greater degrees of miſery and wretchedneſs. Good health ought not to be called the *firſt of bleſſings*; for to a bad man it is only an inſtrument of miſchief.

It is unneceſſary to point out to intelligent readers, how admirably juſt theſe ſentiments are. Setting aſide religious ideas, and conſidering the matter merely as men of the world, we muſt acknowledge, how very equivocal are thoſe bleſſings which the vulgar regard as all in all—riches—beauty—and conſtant health. No one who has lived long on the Theatre of life, can have failed to meet with many inſtances, in which theſe envied qualities have proved the ruin of their poſſeſſors. How many are there

on the frailty of human nature, the levity and thoughtleſsneſs which accompany the bulk of mankind, the origin of falſe deities, and the ſhameful worſhip paid to them, of which barbarous ſacrifices and impure feaſts formed a part, he explains the nature of ſacrifices in the Jewiſh ritual, and

of both ſexes, who, at this moment, would rejoice to begin their lives again without theſe dangerous gifts, and be content to be rendered poor and coarſe, and even feeble, if they could recover that innocence and peace of mind, that character and reputation, which they have for ever loſt! The want of inferior qualities is often the occaſion of attaining ſolid and permanent excellence. This conveys an intereſting leſſon to the favourites of fortune. Boaſt not too much of your ſuperiority, ye darling ones! who have received double portions of her gifts, ye rich and great! ye ſons of Genius, and daughters of Beauty! Nature diſtributeth to her children with more impartiality than you ſeem to believe. Much is indeed in your power; but liſten to this alarming truth: from the beginning of the world to the preſent day, by far the greater number of thoſe endowed with extraordinary powers, or bleſſed with extraordinary advantages, have abuſed them. Such has been the hiſtory of mankind, and ye are no more than men.

offers ſome ingenious obſervations on the Moſaic Inſtitutions [*a*].

Laſtly,

[*a*] It was not, ſays he, (p. 886, &c.) as you abſurdly believe, becauſe the ſupreme God delights in ſacrifices; becauſe he deſires the blood of victims, or becauſe the ſmoke of them, aſcending to heaven, fills his noſtrils with grateful odour, that the Almighty permitted ſuch rites to be performed by his own people, and inſtituted ſome of them himſelf. On the contrary, all theſe inſtitutions aroſe from his indulgence to their weakneſs, and the allowance he made for the peculiar circumſtances in which they had been placed. The children of Iſrael, during their long ſtay in Egypt, had been corrupted by all the ſuperſtitions of that country. They had been accuſtomed to offer ſacrifices to idols and dæmons; and if all external rites had been at once prohibited, they would not have been able to bear the change—they could not have been reſtrained by a pure and ſimple ſyſtem of theology—they would have forſaken the obedience of the true God, and returned to the groſsneſs of their former idolatry. If they made ſeveral efforts towards this, even under ſo mild and accommodating a diſpoſition of things, how much more would they have done it, if they had been at once placed under the direction of the pure and perfect laws of Chriſtian Philoſophy!

But attend to the nature of theſe inſtitutions:

The

Laſtly, he makes an affectionate addreſs to entreat them to liſten to theſe inſtructions;

The Jewiſh people were not permitted to ſacrifice to every God, nor every thing to the true God; they were not allowed to ſacrifice to the falſe Gods of the Egyptians; but they were enjoined to ſacrifice to the true God thoſe things, which theſe ſuperſtitious people reverenced as Gods. The Egyptians reckoned amongſt the number of their Deities, the Ox, the Sheep, the Goat, the Pidgeon, &c. all which the Iſraelites were commanded to offer up; the wiſe Phyſician thus adminiſtering a remedy to the diſorders of their minds, by making them ſacrifice what before they worſhipped, that they might be ſtrikingly convinced, that thoſe things were not Gods which they put to death in honour of God.

In like manner he forbade them to eat ſwines fleſh, the only kind which the Egyptians made uſe of. For as he knew that they were prone to gluttony and idolatry, he arranged matters ſo as to prevent the firſt, where it would have been of no uſe to have run the riſk of it; and he permitted them only to eat fleſh in thoſe caſes, where it would be effectual to cure their ſuperſtition, ſince they could not poſſibly worſhip, as Gods, thoſe creatures which they uſed for daily food.

He proceeds to quote a variety of paſſages from the New Teſtament, which explain the true deſign

of

tions; and abandoning barbarous and bloody ſacrifices to falſe Gods, offer the ſacrifice of praiſe to the God of the Univerſe. "To this," adds he, "we would "perſuade you, not by the edicts of "Princes, or the fears of puniſhment, but "by the power of truth, whoſe influence "has now extended itſelf to every quarter "of the habitable globe."

Before I paſs to the next Diſputation, I ſhall give Theodoret's account of human nature, which is contained in the firſt paragraph of Diſputation the ſeventh.

"Φιλοπαιγμονες ὡς επιπαν και φιλογελωτες
"των ανθρωπων οἱ πλειστοι· και θυμηρης αυτοις,
"ουχ ὁ σπουδαιος και ξυντονος, αλλ' ὁ ὑγρος και

of ſacrifices, and ſhew how different they are from real and ſolid piety. He ſhews that Porphyry and the wiſeſt of the Philoſophers entertained the ſame ideas of them; he ſuggeſts, that the reaſon why Socrates ordered a cock to be offered to Æſculapius, was, that he might completely refute the calumny of Anytus and Melitus, who had accuſed him of being an Atheiſt; but that he knew the Deity had no need of any thing, is evident, ſays he, from many things he has taught.

"ανειμενος

" ανειμενος Βιος. οθεν δη, και ξαιρα νεκρα τηκει
" αυτων ο ωαμπονηρος δαιμων."

" The great majority of mankind are " gay and full of levity; they diſlike a " thoughtful and uniform, and prefer a " negligent and undetermined courſe of " life: hence they are ſo eaſily drawn into " vice and folly [a].

Diſputation the eighth, ΠΕΡΙ ΤΗΣ ΤΩΝ ΜΑΡΤΥΡΩΝ ΤΙΜΗΣ, Of the Honour due to the Martyrs. He recapitulates ſome obſervations he had made before on the ſtyle of the Sacred Books. It would have been eaſy, ſays he, for him who is the fountain of all wiſdom, to have made the heralds of truth more eloquent than Plato, ſublimer than Demoſthenes, ſeverer than Thucydides, and more ſubtle than Ariſtotle or Chryſippus; but their ſtyle was rightly made very plain and ſimple, becauſe their writings were not deſigned for the learned alone, or any particular claſs of men, but for all mankind, whether

[a] See more on this ſubject in another place.

Greeks or Barbarians, learned, ignorant, rich or poor, of all ſexes and of all conditions *. Theſe writings, adds he, ſimple and unadorned as they are, have been tranſlated into all languages, admired by all people of all countries, and had their excellence ſtamped by the ſufferings and death itſelf, which thouſands have undergone for their ſake. Theſe Martyrs we honour in the higheſt manner; and *you* ought leaſt of all to blame us, who conſtantly offer ſacrifices to dead men, and have exalted ſo many heroes to the rank of Deities. The proofs of this aſſertion he purſues through ſeveral pages, and ſoon after cloſes the diſquiſition.

Diſputation the ninth, ΠΕΡΙ ΝΟΜΩΝ, Of Laws. Again our Author reſumes his old argument, that the Greeks ought not to reject the precious truth contained in the Sacred Writings, on account of the ſimplicity of the ſtyle in which it was delivered [*a*]. Diſ-

* P. 898—9.

[*a*] P. 924. The valuable pearl, ſays he, is ſhut up

Diſputation the tenth, ΠΕΡΙ ΧΡΗΣΜΩΝ ΑΛΗΘΙΝΩΝ ΤΕ ΚΑΙ ΨΕΥΔΩΝ, Of true and falſe Oracles.

The

up in a mean ſhell; the diamond has a rough outſide; and gold and ſilver are inveloped in earth and ſtone, and mean materials. Men are not diſcouraged by theſe external appearances, becauſe they know the excellence of what is contained within. Would men attend to the Sacred Writings with equal care, they would find them equally precious. Behold a ſtriking proof of their vaſt importance in the effects they have produced on mankind. The ancient Legiſlators delivered their rules with all the ſplendour of human eloquence. Yet they were not able to perſuade the people immediately around them to ſubmit to their authority. The wiſe laws of Minos were never adopted by the Sicilians, Carthaginians, or Greeks; they only governed the ſmall iſland where the author reigned *, and that but for a little time. Lycurgus hardly eſtabliſhed his laws in Sparta; and the Argives, Corinthians, and neighbouring ſtates, never acknowledged them. And, whenever any kingdom changed its maſter, the laws were changed with him †. But a band of poor fiſhermen and publicans have impoſed laws on whole nations, not the Romans only, and thoſe under

* P. [illegible]25. † P. 924—928.

The common opinion of the age was, that the ancient Oracles proceeded from evil

their dominion, but the Sythians and Sarmatæ, the Indians, Ethiopians, Perſians, Chineſe, Britains, and Germans. I may ſay the whole human race have ſubmitted to the obedience of a crucified Legiſlator. Theſe diſtant nations were not compelled to this ſubjection by arms and troops of ſoldiers, by force and perſecution, but by the ſeemingly weak power of reaſon and perſuaſion; the propagators of theſe truths uſing no violence; but, on the contrary, often enduring it from thoſe to whom they wiſhed to do good; expoſing themſelves to continual danger, and ſubmitting to ſtripes and bruiſes, to torture and wild beaſts, and death. Your magiſtrates deſtroyed them; but their rules they could not deſtroy. How different has been the caſe with human inſtitutions! The laws of Lycurgus, Solon, Charondas, and Minos, are no more; thoſe who ſubdued the countries of theſe heroes aboliſhed them at once. What men eſtabliſhed, men could deſtroy. Where is now the famed Areopagus of Athens, the Council of Five Hundred, the Undecemviri, and the Annual Archon? Their very names are known only to a few Antiquaries. But a ſyſtem of regulations, ſet up by ſome fiſhermen, publicans, and tent-makers, has overcome all oppoſition. Againſt it the cruelty of Caius, and Claudius, and Nero, has accompliſhed

nothing.

evil ſpirits; and that at the birth of Jeſus Chriſt they ſuddenly became ſilent. Theodoret

nothing. The latter deſtroyed Peter and Paul, two of the prime leaders; but they did not annihilate the laws with the Legiſlators. Againſt them neither Veſpaſian, nor Titus, nor Domitian, could prevail, though they tried various ways to deſtroy them. Trajan and Adrian raiſed in vain the arm of human power againſt them. The firſt overthrew the empire of the Perſians, and compelled the nations of Scythia to obey him; but he could not aboliſh the precepts of Paul: the laſt razed to the ground the city of Jeruſalem; but changed not the faith of thoſe who lived in it, and believed in Jeſus. Antoninus and Verus impoſed the Roman yoke and laws on many conquered people; but neither by force nor perſuaſion were able to make the followers of the croſs falſe to their Lord. Need I mention the fury of ſubſequent Emperors, the perſecutions they raiſed againſt the Chriſtians; their ſetting fire to churches filled with people, and demoliſhing them in every quarter of the world? Their feeble power overthrew the ſtones of the buildings; but the piety of the worſhippers remained unchanged. Thoſe who lived in the age before us ſaw the exquiſite arts of Julian againſt our religion, and ſaw alſo that they were fruitleſs. Your princes diſtinguiſhed themſelves by the greatneſs and ſucceſs of their exploits; they

odoret ſupports theſe ideas by a variety of arguments, and by the teſtimonies of Plu-

they conquered empires, overwhelmed nations, and ſubdued the ferocity of the wildeſt barbarians; but they had no ſucceſs in their endeavours againſt our poor fiſhermen and labourers, ſimple and illiterate people, women and children. There they reſembled thoſe, who, to quench a flame, pour oil into the fire, and make it blaze more powerfully. Their war againſt our religion nouriſhed the immortal plant; from every branch they lopped off, a thouſand ſprouts aroſe. Children abandoned the faith of their parents; the rites of Greece evaniſhed before the doctrines of the Goſpel; and the God of the fiſhermen was acknowledged to be the *God* of the *Univerſe* *.

The ſimple precepts of our divine religion changed the very nature of men, and altered their moſt obdurate habits of life. The Perſians, accuſtomed to live in every kind of debauchery and unnatural luſt, as ſoon as they embraced the faith of Jeſus, became modeſt, and chaſte, and blameleſs. Barbarians forgot their ferocity, and became gentle; the Tibarini no more threw down their old men from the tops of rocks; the Hyrcanians ceaſed to feed their dogs with human fleſh; and the Scythians no longer buried the living with the dead. P. 936, 937.

* P. 928—934.

tarch, Porphyry, and others. Laſtly, he ſhews that the anſwers of theſe Oracles were often ambiguous, abſurd, and falſe, and contraſts them with the certainty of the prophecies of the Sacred Volume *.

Diſputation the eleventh, ΠΕΡΙ ΤΕΛΟΥΣ ΚΑΙ ΚΡΙΣΕΩΣ, Of the End and of Judgement. In this part of his work Theodoret enumerates the various and contradictory opinions of Epicurus, Democritus, Heraclitus, Pythagoras, Hecatæus, Antiſthenes, Anaxagoras, Plato, Ariſtotle, and many more, relative to the *ſupreme good*, and the *great end*, of Man. It is almoſt unneceſſary to ſay, that the confuſion and contradiction of ſentiments, on ſo important a ſubject, amongſt the firſt thinkers of the ancient world, ſhew, in a ſtriking manner, how far ſuch ſpeculations exceed the feeble graſp of the human underſtanding. The ideas of Plato are chiefly commended: but our author ſhews, that he was not conſiſtent with himſelf; for, after he had ſpoken pretty rationally of the future condition of

* P. 949—983.

Man,

Man, he debaſed all the dignity of his ſyſtem, by introducing the tranſmigration of ſouls; an opinion which leads to very abſurd, and even ridiculous conſequences. He concludes with exhibiting the doctrines of the Sacred Books, relative to the intereſting ſubject of the future condition of Man.

Diſputation the twelfth, ΠΕΡΙ ΠΡΑΚΤΙΚΗΣ ΑΡΕΤΗΣ, Of Active Virtue *. Our Author here ſhews the neceſſity of carrying our principles into practice, quotes the declarations of the ſacred writers on the ſubject; and proves that the ancient philoſophers failed remarkably in this reſpect. He does not even ſpare Socrates; and his zeal here ſeems to have carried him too far; ſo difficult is it, when one has a point in view, not to ſtrain evidence into the ſervice of it. Having refuted the objection againſt the morals of Chriſtianity from the bad lives of ſome of its profeſſors, he is incidentally led to the queſtion, whether all crimes are equal; which he

* P. 1011—1040.

denies, and offers ſeveral good illuſtrations of his opinion. He concludes by ſome farther remarks on Chriſtianity; and hopes that the remedy he has provided for the diſeaſes of their minds, in this and the eleven preceding Diſquiſitions, will prove effectual to their cure [*a*].

The

[*a*] An obſervation on friendſhip, which occurs in this Diſquiſition, deſerves to be noted. A Pythagorean philoſopher having ſtated, that intereſt or advantage was the ſource of friendſhip, Theodoret refutes the idea; for, ſays he, we ſometimes find them who never received advantage from us doing us good; and often thoſe whom we have ſerved are ungrateful, and make no returns of friendſhip. "Wherefore, friendſhip is not the reſult of intereſt, "though intereſt is the fruit of friendſhip." This definition is unqueſtionably juſt. The friendſhips of men of the world, founded upon mutual intereſt, deſerve not the name of friendſhips. They are merely *connexions*; and, when intereſt ceaſes, the connexion ceaſes with it. They are the friendſhips of merchants, dependant on the beſt market. When the market fails, the friendſhip exiſts no more. True friendſhip ariſes from affection and eſteem. Even diſſipated men will form real friendſhips with thoſe who are in no ſtate to ſerve their intereſts,

merely

The ſpecimens I have now given of the ſentiments of the Primitive Fathers will, I hope, be deemed ſufficient, though I have not included every one of them. Some of their works have not fallen in my way; and others were ſo voluminous, that I was deterred from making uſe of them. In this laſt claſs are *Cyril of Alexandria*, of whoſe works we have a Paris Edition, in 7 vols. folio; and *John Chryſoſtom* [*a*],

merely becauſe their manners are ſimilar to their own. Friendſhip once formed may, and probably will, produce intereſt as its fruit, but never is produced by it. There is even ſomewhat in an interested connexion which is hoſtile to the exiſtence of ſincere friendſhip. The *ſervices* of our friend may rival *himſelf*; and we may transfer our affection from his perſon to the favours he does us. Intereſt may bring people together, who otherwiſe would not have known each other; but it is conformity of heart that makes them friends. In general we may affirm, that friendſhip depends on the heart and affections. Intereſt may make ADHERENTS; but it is only love that makes FRIENDS.

[*a*] A friend informs me, that this Father, in his Treatiſe on the Prieſthood, employs ſeveral chapters, to ſhew that a Chriſtian Biſhop ſhould be an univerſal Scholar.

whom Sir Henry Saville publiſhed in 8 vols. folio, pure Greek; and the Benedictine Monks, in Greek and Latin, Paris, 1718, in 13 vols. But, from looking over theſe writers, I apprehend I may venture to add them to the liſt of our Adherents. It will not be doubted that we have the patronage of the amiable and learned *Euſebius*. I am ſorry that a want of time puts it out of my power to exhibit ſome of his elegant ideas to my readers. But I have already gone too far.

Hence, it appears, that the Primitive Writers, ſo far as they were free from ſuperſtition, were no enemies to true Philoſophy, although there are paſſages in their works, which, on a ſuperficial peruſal, might give countenance to ſuch an idea[*a*].

However,

[*a*] If, notwithſtanding what has been ſaid, there ſhould remain ſome, who entertain doubts as to the judgment of a young writer, in a ſubject of ſuch remote antiquity, I might refer them to a veteran in Eccleſiaſtical learning, the Author of an Inquiry into the ſecondary Cauſes, which Mr. Gibbon has aſſigned

However, if we conſider their ſituation, we ſhall not be ſurprized, that they were ſometimes

aſſigned for the rapid progreſs of Chriſtianity, 4to. Edin. 1786; who, though he touches ſlightly on this ſubject, yet ſays enough, in his fourth chapter, to authorize me to avail myſelf of his reſpectable authority. This learned writer proves, in the fulleſt manner, that the fathers never proceeded ſuch lengths in the condemnation of innocent pleaſures, as ſome of the philoſophers, and eſpecially Seneca, have done. And, with reſpect to thoſe writers whom Mr. Gibbon repreſents, as deſpiſers of all knowledge that was not uſeful to ſalvation, he moſt judiciouſly obſerves, that "theſe writers did not de-
"ſpiſe ſecular knowledge; but they conſidered it to
"be of leſs utility and importance than religious
"ſentiments." p. 142.

I cannot conclude without expreſſing my opinion, that this valuable inquiry, and ſome other intereſting works that are expected, will tend to revive our character in Eccleſiaſtical learning with the ſcholars in England, who have too juſtly regarded us as ill-acquainted with ſuch ſubjects. It is not that in this country we want a taſte for religious inquiries. On the contrary, we are famous for our attachment to theological diſquiſition, and even theological wrangling. But there is ſomething in the genius of our ſpeculations that is vulgar, unclaſſical, and gloomy.

ſometimes led to ſay harſh things relative to human ſcience. In modern times, we have

The fact is, the oppreſſive influence of a huge volume, filled with arbitrary deciſions, extending from the exiſtence of God, to every, even the minuteſt, article of religion and morals, peremptorily impoſed in a rude age on the preſent more enlightened times, by men who at the very inſtant were proteſting againſt all human authority in religion, has chilled the reſolution of perſons of genius and learning amongſt us, and prevented thoſe exertions which a happier arrangement of things would have produced. Men have choſen not to think at all, on ſubjects where they could not think freely, and ſpeak what they thought. They have left the narrow and cramped paths of theology, to expatiate unfettered in the chearful plains of hiſtory, philology, and poetry; and their ſucceſs in theſe lines ſhew us, what they might have done in their own. Hence eccleſiaſtical learning and ſacred criticiſm have fallen into the hands of obſcure and illiterate people, who ſeemed to have no other object in view, but to ſupport and even aggravate the eſtabliſhed errors; for it is remarkable, that the greater part of our Sectaries have gone deeper into abſurdity than the Church herſelf. Our diſputants, therefore, are generally ill-informed men; and they neither write like gentlemen, nor like ſcholars. With Eccleſiaſtical Hiſtory they are uſually

have ſeen prejudiced and miſanthropic writers, produce laboured works againſt Philo-

uſually very little acquainted; and of ſacred criticiſm they have ſo little conception, that I have actually heard my friend, Dr. Campbell of Aberdeen, ridiculed, for recommending to his pupils ſuch "*idle* "*books*" as F. Simon's Hiſtoires Critiques. Profeſſing themſelves Proteſtants againſt all human authority in matters of faith, they generally rely with implicit reverence on the infallibility of the Greek text, ſettled by the printer Robert Stephens, and the Engliſh Verſion, executed by King James's Tranſlators.

Much indeed may be hoped from an advancing race of young men, born in happier times, illuminated by brighter lights, and improved by liberal communication with their enlightened brethren of the South. To theſe I look with pleaſing hopes; with partial, yet, I hope, excuſable attachment. Great are their opportunities, and reſpectable their genius. One anxiety only remains with me: It is the danger of running into one extreme to avoid another—the riſk of renouncing narrow for no principles, and bigotry for indifference. Men may forſake Turretine and Witſius for Hume and Voltaire; overſtepping Grotius and Lardner, Locke and Newton. They may leave the traſh of the Aſſembly's Catechiſm,

Philoſophy, under a pretence, that they found human learning magnified, to the depreciation of Revelation [*a*]: but in the

Catechiſm, to take up the quibbles of the Philoſophical Dictionary.

Men have different ideas about the influence of religious opinions; and there are ſome of my friends, whoſe worth I reſpect, who do not eſteem them of the ſame importance as I do. I ſhall not enter into this at preſent; but ſhall only remark, that, whatever we may decide relative to theological opinions, the importance of *truth* and *honeſty* will ever be incontrovertible.—That men ſhould profeſs to believe what they do believe, and not pretend to believe what they do not believe, are laws of eternal morality, which admit of no diſpute. Every deviation from them muſt be highly injurious, both to ſociety at large, and to the minds and moral feelings of individuals. I ſhall conclude with an aphoriſm of an ingenious writer. "I know deiſts whoſe religiouſ-
"neſs I venerate, and atheiſts whoſe honeſty and
"nobleneſs of mind I wiſh for; but I have not yet
"ſeen the man, who could have tempted me to
"think him honeſt, who I knew publicly acted the
"Chriſtian, whilſt privately he was a poſitive deiſt."

Lavater, Aph. 254.

[*a*] I have Mr. Baker more particularly in my eye. I reſpect his genius; and can ſee that he writes in a ſtyle ſuperior to his age. But I like not the ſpirit of his book.

primitive

primitive times this plea was real. The Fathers daily heard human learning magnified againſt the Goſpel; and were perpetually meeting with the moſt injurious treatment from ignorant and vicious men, who arrogated to themſelves the title of Philoſophers. Yet, though they chaſtiſed the pride of theſe vain pretenders to ſcience; though they expoſed the imperfection of their boaſted knowledge; and though they ſhewed the weakneſs and inſufficiency of Philoſophy, unaided by Revelation, to conduct men to the favour of God and eternal life; they never uttered any thing equivalent to the opinion of Mr. Rouſſeau; they never taught that learned nations were neceſſarily vicious; or that there was an irreſiſtible tendency in knowledge to corrupt the manners of mankind. If Mr. Rouſſeau had taken up the argument in another way; if, inſtead of pretending that the great Primitive Writers were on his ſide, in diſcarding all philoſophy, he had alledged, that they philoſophized too much, or, to ſtate it more accurately,

curately, that they corrupted Chriſtianity by erroneous tenets, borrowed from Plato and the Orientals, I ſhould not have attempted to have diſproved the aſſertion: for all the learned converts from heatheniſm were deſirous of incorporating the doctrines of Plato with the ſyſtem of the Goſpel. It was pleaſing to them to diſcover a coincidence between the opinions they had anciently held, and thoſe which they were now to hold. The ſuppoſition that they diſcovered ſuch a coincidence, probably contributed not a little to reconcile them originally to the new ſyſtem, and they would ſoon find out, that it was a powerful engine to bring about the converſion of others. It is not therefore to be wondered at, if at ſome times they carried it too far. This is a charge from which it is impoſſible to acquit either Juſtin, or Tertullian, or Origen, or Clemens, or Gregory [*a*]. And the conſequence of this diſpoſition

[*a*] Mr. Brucker himſelf, though he reprobates the charges brought by Chriſtopher Sandius and Mr. Souveraine

diſpoſition ſoon appeared. The ſimplicity of the Chriſtian doctrine was depraved, by an

Souveraine againſt Juſtin, finds himſelf obliged to own, " Juſtinum a Platoniſmo liberari totum non " poſſe," &c. Hiſt. Crit. Philoſoph. III. p. 76.

And of Irenæus he ſays, although Maſſuetus has left no ſtone unturned to defend him, yet " adeo " tamen manifeſte Platoniſmi Alexandrini veſtigia in " nonnullis expreſſit, ut ipſe Maſſuetus negare ea " non potuerit, ſatiſque eluceat, Irenæum de Plato- " nica philoſophia eandem opinionem foviſſe, quæ " pleroſque patres ſeculi ſecundi in tranſverſum " egit." III. p. 408.

Of Clemens Alexandrinus " Platoniſmum atque " Stoiciſmum Clementis in dubium vocare velle, " idem eſt, ac contra ſolem loqui :" III. p. 424.

Of Origen, &c. " Inter quos imprimus Origenes " eſt, ex Egypti philoſophia et ſchola Ammonii im- " puras has ſcorias auro divinæ fidei admiſcens. " Nec ex aliis fontibus hauſere ſua Baſilius, Gre- " gorius Nyſſenus, Procopius Gazeus, Theophanes," &c. III. p. 274.

Eraſmus ſays of Gregory Nazianzen, " De rebus " divinis, quæ vix ullis verbis humanis explicari poſ- " ſunt, *libenter* ac *frequenter* philoſophatur."

The truth is, the Fathers were not ſenſible themſelves, how much Platonic notions influenced their ideas of the doctrines of Chriſtianity. They cenſured

Plato

an impure mixture of Platonic chimeras. The Goſpel became paganized, while Heatheniſm was chriſtianized; till, at length, matters were carried ſuch a length, that Ammonius Saccas propoſed a coalition betwixt them; and taught in the ſchool of Alexandria, that the one of them was not deſigned to ſuperſede the other. At this period many perſons, among whom was the Emperor Alexander Severus, ill able

Plato in general, becauſe they ſaw that many of his tenets were inconſiſtent with the doctrines of the Goſpel. But they perceived not that they had found many coincidences between Plato and the Goſpel which the Apoſtles had no idea of. This circumſtance ſeems totally to have eſcaped the notice of that declamatory writer, F. Baltus. Wherever he can produce a paſſage from one of the Fathers, reprobating Plato, he concludes that this Father is unjuſtly accuſed of Platoniſm. But Tertullian called the Platonic philoſophy the great ſource of hereſy; yet Mr. Brucker owns that he erred by following its principles: "Ut alii quoque doctores Eccleſiæ, ita "ille quoque notiones et locutiones ad explicandum "S. S. Trinitatis myſterium afferret ex Platonica "philoſophia hauſtas, eaſque ad retundendos hære-"ticos adhiberet." III. p. 413.

to decide on the claims of the ſeveral pretenders to a divine miſſion, and wiſhing to make ſure work in the matter, divided their reverence among all the ancient heroes, and paid equal honours to Abraham, Orpheus, Apollonius of Tyana, and Jeſus Chriſt *.

Hence aroſe a great controverſy, which was long carried on in the church, whether Learning and Philoſophy were advantageous to the Goſpel or not. The ſimple and illiterate Chriſtians ſaw clearly, that their learned brethren had corrupted the ſyſtem of Revelation, and that they talked of its doctrines in a manner very different from Chriſt and the Apoſtles. Hence they concluded, that all ſcience was detrimental to Religion. It was natural enough for them to fall into this miſtake; but a miſtake it certainly was. It was confounding the uſe of things with the abuſe of them; and alledging the ill effects of falſe philoſophy to depreciate the true. Had they

* M. Tillemont, Hiſt. des Empereurs, &c. Tom. III.

lived in an age when true philoſophy was cultivated, and when it was employed, as it ever may be, to preſerve the purity of Religion, they would have entertained very different ſentiments of it, and ſeen clearly that Philoſophy and Revelation proceed from the ſame ſource, and tend to promote the ſame end [*a*].

We

[*a*] It is a curious remark of Dr. Hartley (Obſ. on Man, vol. II. p. 113.) that all the nations that have been diſcovered in the world have been found, when other things were equal, to poſſeſs more or leſs knowledge, civil and religious, in proportion as they were nearer to, or more connected with thoſe kingdoms, which were enlightened by immediate Revelations from God. So that taking Paleſtine as the centre, becauſe the people of God dwelt there, the inhabitants of the extreme parts of the world would be, and many of them ſtill are, Savages.

The learned Dr. Jortin hath publiſhed a ſhort charge, in the ſeventh volume of his Sermons, entitled, "Chriſtianity the Preſerver and Supporter of Literature;" in which he concludes, "That the "learning which now exiſts, is, if not ſolely, yet "principally, to be aſcribed to Chriſtianity; and "that its Divine Author ſaid moſt juſtly of himſelf "in this ſenſe alſo:

"Ego

We cannot, therefore, ſo eaſily excuſe the conduct of thoſe, who, in this enlightened

" Εγω ειμι το φως τυ κοσμυ.
" I am the light of the world."

This little tract diſplays the ſame elegant and enlightened mind that characterizes all the writings of Dr. Jortin. It is only to be regretted, that he did not treat the ſubject more largely. To what he has ſaid I ſhall add one obſervation: that, as long as Chriſtianity exiſts in the world, ſo long will the Greek language be ſtudied, becauſe the Sacred Books of Chriſtians are written in Greek. And ſo long as the Greek language is ſtudied, ſo long will a taſte for elegant ſcience and uſeful learning continue to prevail among mankind.

As the improvement of the mind is unqueſtionably, ſo far as their ſituation permits, a part of the duty of all rational, that is, of all improveable beings, it may be expected, that in the Goſpel we ſhould find ſome direct encouragement to learning, or ſome expreſs recommendation of it. To account for the want of this, let it be conſidered:

1. That the deſign of the Goſpel was not to make us philoſophers, but pious and good men. We are not, therefore, to look for warm exhortations to philoſophy in it, nor indeed for any thing that is not immediately connected with its great end. If there

ened age, revive ſuch an argument; who would have us throw aſide Philoſophy, and

be any other matters mentioned there, it is but accidentally.

2. The Goſpel is addreſſed to us as rational beings; it previouſly ſuppoſes us to be ſo; and therefore does not ſtudiouſly teach us ſuch things as reaſon was ſufficient to give us full information of. The advantage and neceſſity of cultivating thoſe faculties which God has given us is evident, both from the reaſon of things, and the experience of life. Hence there was no urgent neceſſity, that this ſhould be enforced by the Goſpel.

3. Eſpecially if it be conſidered, that God has implanted in our minds a love of knowledge, a deſire of information, which are ſtrong enough to excite us to the purſuit of them. The immenſe difference between knowledge and ignorance, truth and falſehood, muſt be perceived by every rational being; and, when perceived, cannot fail to ſupply a powerful motive to obtain the one, and avoid the other.

4. And farther, the peculiar circumſtances of the time when the Goſpel was publiſhed, deſerve particular attention. The world was then in a ſtate of extreme depravity and wickedneſs. There was little occaſion to recommend learning, for of that they were not deſtitute. Pretenders to philoſophy were numerous—

and pretend that it is hurtful to Chriſtianity, from the example either of ſome of the

numerous—virtuous men were wanting. The cure therefore was to be ſuited to the diſeaſe.

5. Had the Apoſtles in their writings recommended philoſophy, they muſt have ſpecified ſome particular ſyſtem of it; otherwiſe the church would have been divided into parties of Peripatetic Chriſtians, and Epicurean Chriſtians, and Stoical Chriſtians, &c. Some would have been of Plato, and ſome of Socrates, and ſome of Ariſtotle, as they were of Paul and Cephas, and of Apollos. And if, to prevent this, the Apoſtles had ſpecified any ſyſtem, or, like the Eclectics, framed one out of all the reſt, this muſt have led them into arguments on the various tenets of the different ſects, and produced inveſtigations and reaſonings totally foreign to the deſign of the Goſpel, and tending to retard its progreſs.

6. Another reaſon, which might make it a very delicate matter for the Apoſtles to ſpeak of Philoſophy, was, that they foreſaw, that philoſophy would be the innocent cauſe of corrupting the doctrines of the Goſpel. While the Apoſtles were yet alive, many perſons, accuſtomed to nice and metaphyſical ſpeculations, could not reliſh the ſimplicity of the Chriſtian ſcheme, and had begun to ornament the religion of Jeſus, by opinions borrowed from the

the ancient Fathers, or of ſome modern writers, whoſe attachment to human ſcience

Orientals and the ſyſtem of Plato. To have recommended philoſophy to men of this deſcription, might have been dangerous, as it would have given too much countenance to future corruption. The Apoſtles, therefore, ſpoke rather diſcouragingly of it. And they might be excited to uſe harſher expreſſions, becauſe they were often oppoſed by vain pretenders to ſcience, who ſet up philoſophy againſt the Goſpel, and whom the Apoſtles diſcerned to be really fools, though they profeſſed themſelves wiſe.

7. Farther, it ought never to be forgotten, that the New Teſtament is not a regular ſyſtematic work on the duties of man, but rather is to be conſidered, as a great body of excellent moral rules, ſuggeſted by accidental occurrences, and extending to moſt, but not all, of the caſes and ſituations in which mankind are placed. The Goſpel does not recommend private friendſhip, though many valuable advantages reſult from it, probably becauſe there is a ſufficient ſtimulus in nature to it, and becauſe it ſubſiſted in ſufficient ſtrength among the people of that age. The Goſpel does not recommend valour and patriotiſm, becauſe they were generally carried too far at that period. It does not enjoin family religion, nor prohibit ſuicide, by any *poſitive precept*; and, what is ſtill more to our purpoſe, the Goſpel does not recommend

ence led them to corrupt the doctrines of

commend mercy to the inferior creatures, although this is a very high branch of duty. Yet, I apprehend, had St. Paul, or any of the other Apoſtles, chanced to meet with any ſtriking inſtances of cruelty to the animal creation, they would have inſerted ſomething relative to this ſubject in their writings.

8. Theſe go upon the ſuppoſition, that there is no recommendation of philoſophy in the Sacred Writings. But if there be no expreſs recommendations of it, there are ſeveral indirect ones. For whenever the Apoſtles recommended to Chriſtians the ſtudy of the Scriptures—the enquiry into the truth of their religion—the knowledge of Divine Revelation—its doctrines—and its excellence—they did indirectly recommend Science and Learning, ſome portion of which are abſolutely neceſſary to theſe attainments. As to the paſſages, which are ſuppoſed to prohibit or cenſure human learning, I have already obſerved, and could eaſily ſhew, that they relate to falſe philoſophy, not to true ſcience.

Theſe different conſiderations appear to me abundantly ſufficient, to account for the ſilence of the Apoſtles with reſpect to Philoſophy and Literature. That, however, they had a juſt eſteem of true Philoſophy, and that the excellence and value of good learning is as much admitted, and taken for granted in the Scriptures, as in any other book, might be proved by a variety of ſtriking paſſages.

Religion. For, whatever temporary ill effects may ariſe from ſcience, it carries in itſelf its own cure; while one learned man is ready to expoſe the errors and innovations of another. But the hiſtory of mankind ſhews us, that ignorance is the moſt fertile ſource of the corruptions, which deprave religion; and that corruptions which ariſe from that ſource, are at once the groſſeſt and the moſt incurable. If, from a diſorder in my organs of viſion, I ſee falſe and imaginary objects, the proper remedy will be, not to put out my eyes, but to take ſuch ſteps as are neceſſary to remove the malady. The Fathers, corrupting Chriſtianity by *falſe Philoſophy*, exhibit one extreme; and ſome Moderns, ready to corrupt it by *ignorance*, exhibit another equally as bad. The juſt medium between them is found in *true* Philoſophy, which ſtrengthens the evidences, elucidates the doctrines, and vindicates and confirms the precepts of divine Revelation. It can never ſufficiently be preſſed upon the attention of the thinking part of mankind,

that

that Reaſon and Religion, Philoſophy and Revelation, are in the moſt perfect harmony together; that the Book of Nature, and the Book of Scripture, are both to be ſtudied; and that, without ſome acquaintance with both, it is impoſſible to profit fully from either. "Dieu a parlé" (ſays the excellent SENEBIER) "dans le Spec-
"tacle de l'Univers comme dans l'Ecriture
"Sainte; et ceux qui ſont attentifs à ces
"deux Revelations, ſavent bientot en re-
"marquer les grands rapports [*a*]." Hiſtoire Litteraire de Geneve, vol. I. p. 176.

[*a*] God has ſpoken in the Spectacle of Nature, as well as in the Sacred Scripture; and thoſe who are attentive to theſe two Revelations, will readily obſerve a wonderful connexion between them.

II.

REFLECTIONS

SUGGESTED BY THE CHARACTER OF

PAMPHILUS OF CÆSAREA.

"I have been inclined to think, that there are
"greater men who lie concealed among the ſpecies,
"than thoſe who come out, and draw upon them-
"ſelves the eyes and admiration of mankind."

SPECTATOR, N° 610.

"Were the memoirs of an obſcure man, who
"lived up to the dignity of his nature, and accord-
"ing to the rules of virtue, to be laid before us,
"we ſhould find nothing in ſuch a character, which
"might not ſet him on a level with men of the
"higheſt ſtations." Ib. N° 622.

TO MY FRIEND

EDMUND GOODWYN, M. D.

ALTER PAMPHILUS!

Si quis erit, raros inter numerandus amicos,
Quales prisca fides, famaque novit anus:
Si quis Cecropiæ madidus Latiæque Minervæ
Artibus, et *vera simplicite* bonus:
Si quis erit recti custos, imitator honesti,
Et nihil arcano qui roget ore Deos:
Si quis erit magnæ subnixus robore mentis,
Dispeream si non hic Goodwynus erit.

Mart. lib. 1. Epig. 40.

REFLECTIONS, &c.

OF all the kinds of writing which relate to the actions of mankind, I believe the moſt generally uſeful is *Biography*, or that which exhibits the lives of ſingle men. Whatever ſuperior advantages *example* has above *precept*, all theſe are poſſeſſed by this kind of writing. *Biography*, when properly executed, will do more than *Hiſtory* can do, and more than *Romance* ever has done. Hiſtory furniſhes examples only for the higheſt ranks of ſociety; and the peruſal of romances will always be accompanied, in the minds of grown-up people, with a certain conſciouſneſs of the want of reality, which will prevent it from making any ſteady and ſerious impreſſions. Whenever high virtue is attributed to a fictitious being, the mind is apt to ſuggeſt tacitly, "this is above nature."

Hiſtory, being chiefly concerned with the actions of kings and great men, cannot be ſo uſeful to the generality of mankind as Biography, becauſe it relates not to the ſcenes in which they are immediately engaged, nor delineates thoſe walks of life in which they are obliged to trudge. And thus, as it is leſs important, I believe it would alſo be leſs attracting, if their judgments were more true; if they conſidered what objects really merited their attention, and did not ſervilely gaze at the objects which others gaze at, and admire many things for no better reaſon than becauſe others admire them.

When mankind ſhall thoroughly underſtand the dignity of their own nature, they will perceive, how much more intereſting is the hiſtory of a wiſe and virtuous citizen, than that of moſt heroes:—they will diſcover more utility in contemplating the character of a good man in private life, than that of moſt kings. It is a juſt obſervation

ſervation of an eminent writer*, that a little reflection on the *real* deſigns and views of moſt ſtateſmen and conquerors, muſt needs take away much of the pleaſure, which otherwiſe the idea of their ſagacity, foreſight, and comprehenſion, would give to a virtuous and benevolent mind. Let the Diary of Lord Melcombe, and the various collections we have lately had of *State Papers*, bear evidence to the truth of his obſervation.

In modern times Hiſtory has become more intereſting, by deviating from its ſubjects. The great hiſtorical works of the preſent age contain remarks and information philoſophical and moral, legal, philological, biographical, and even theological. A queſtion naturally occurs here, Whether it would not be better to keep different branches of knowledge ſeparate, than thus to mix all things with all? Viewing only

* Dr. Prieſtley, Hiſt. of Electricity, 4to, Lond. 1775. Pref. p. 4.

the propriety of the thing itſelf, and the intereſt of men of ſcience, I am inclined to think it would; but, on the other hand, when I conſider, that the great deſign of all writing is, or ought to be, the inſtruction of mankind;—that hiſtorical facts alone are not ſufficient for the inſtruction of thoſe who do not poſſeſs ſome higher knowledge;—that the generality of men are deſtitute of ſuch knowledge, and not likely otherwiſe to attain it; becauſe, being little accuſtomed to abſtract reaſoning, they can ſcarce be ſuppoſed to have reſolution to go through books purely philoſophical, even if they had leiſure, and could underſtand them:—for all theſe reaſons, I am inclined to believe, that the preſent mode of writing hiſtory is commendable, as it affords an opportunity of doing what is very deſirable, namely, of conveying a portion of ſublimer knowledge to the body of mankind, in an intelligible manner, and of rendering it agreeable, by a mixture of hiſtorical facts and relations.

Wherefore, I do not join with thoſe who

who cenſure what are called, "Philoſophic "Hiſtories." Nor have I any quarrel with theſe works, except where their Authors omit to give the public a full and accurate Index, when I think they are highly reprehenſible. For as the title-page conveys no idea of the multifarious matter, contained in ſuch miſcellaneous productions, the omiſſion of a good Index is an inexcuſable neglect, and an unpardonable inſtance of want of reſpect in an author to the public [*a*].

Formerly I think we had more of Biographic writing, in proportion, than we have at preſent. And I earneſtly wiſh ſome of our modern hiſtorians would employ their talents and eloquence occaſionally, to illuminate the walks of private life. Plutarch, and the Atticus of Cornelius Nepos, will ever afford pleaſure. Notwithſtanding

[*a*] That I might not be charged with a ſimilar fault myſelf, I have drawn up myſelf an Index to theſe Miſcellanies in ſuch a way, as I conceive things of this kind ought to be done. It is what I think Biſhop Wilkins would have called *Index realis*.

defects of ſtyle, and ſometimes other faults, I believe ſuch books were read with general ſatisfaction; as Birch's life of Tillotſon and Boyle; Burigny's of Grotius; Des Maizeaux of Bayle; Mallet of Bacon; Burton of Boerhaave; Le Clerc of ſome of the Fathers; Middleton of Cicero, &c.

Of late we have had ſome few ſimilar productions: Condorcet's Turgot; Nichols's Bowyer; Diſney's Sykes and Jebb; Johnſon's Poets; Corniſh's Firmin; Kippis's Lardner and Cook; and a treaſure of ſuch information is now preparing for the public in the new edition of the Biographia Britannica by the ſame excellent writer. In theſe biographical works a juſt medium is obſerved. The writers do not enter into trifling particulars, or delicate circumſtances, which would be inſipid to the public, and neither decent nor friendly in them to relate; yet they give us as much of their private hiſtory, of their opinions, ſayings, and writings, as to render the peruſal of their books truly intereſting, and to a great majority of mankind more

practically

practically useful than the history of statesmen and princes.

For a reason similar to that which renders Biography agreeable, Romances and Novels are so eagerly perused. I think it both uncharitable and unjust to assert, that the fair sex read romances merely because they are filled with trifles and folly. The fact is, the actions of kings and statesmen are too far out of their line to interest them much. And with respect to other characters, if we consider the present education of women, which, unfortunately for their real happiness, is almost entirely directed to external accomplishments, to the neglect of useful duties and solid learning, we shall not wonder, if they are scarcely capable of relishing the history of persons eminent for their knowledge, virtues, or piety, such persons having in general little connexion with music, or painting, or dancing, gallantry, or the theatre [*a*]. Hence they

[*a*] Here I must request my female readers to attend, that I make a vast distinction between *gallantry*,

they are neceſſarily obliged to read romances, becauſe they are the only writings which contain accounts of perſons like themſelves, and placed in circumſtances ſimilar to their own.

Romances, therefore, *muſt* be written. The only queſtion is, how they may be written ſo as to do leaſt harm, or rather ſo as to do ſome good. If they were well written, they might be truly uſeful. A

lantry, and that *ſincere* admiration and *permanent* attachment to the ſex, which will always exiſt in the heart of every man of feeling and virtue. Men of gallantry are incapable of this. Their attachment is generally mere *affectation*. Nor is a *general* love of *all*, or a conſtant ſuſceptibility of *new objects* of regard, to be reconciled with ſtrong or ſteady attachment to one. To a real lover, there is but one woman in the univerſe. All others are to him as if they exiſted not. When the heart is *ſincere*, its affections muſt be *undivided*. It cannot own the ſway of more than *one miſtreſs*. Surrounded by her ſacred influence, the lover is impregnable to every other impreſſion; a thouſand darts may be levelled, but none will penetrate to him. He knows but ONE WOMAN, as the muſician knew but ONE FARINELLI, and the pious but ONE GOD!

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few ſuch we have; and ſome of the beſt of theſe, I believe, are compoſed, not by men, the natural inſtructors of the female ſex, but by the ladies themſelves. But of the greater part we muſt affirm, that they are either executed in a trifling chit chat ſtyle, which has no tendency to correct the defects of their readers, but rather to confirm them in them; and, inſtead of curing their intellectual weakneſs, will ſerve only to debilitate their minds ſtill farther; or that they are filled with immoral and licentious narrations, calculated to deſtroy all virtuous principles, and deprave the heart; or, laſtly, that they are written in a fanciful and viſionary manner, which has no effect but to inſpire romantic ideas, and to excite unreaſonable expectations of the world and man, and every thing around us[a]. From this laſt cenſure I

[a] Rouſſeau informs us, that the firſt kind of reading to which he applied was romances; which, ſays he, formed in me a new kind of reaſon, "and "gave me a romantic extravagant notion of human "life, *which experience and reflection have never been* "*able entirely to eradicate.*" Confeſſions, vol. I. p. 6.

cannot acquit the celebrated Richardſon, who has painted ſeveral characters, and eſpecially his GRANDISON, in colours too brilliant for any human being that ever exiſted, and which, I believe, no perſon acquainted with *real men*, ſuch as live in this world, can ſurvey without diſguſt. If a woman of feeling and virtue, were to believe in the reality of ſuch a character as this, and to permit it ſeriouſly to impreſs her mind, I apprehend it would have a very unhappy effect on her conduct. It would lead her to deſpiſe that ſincere, though humble and imperfect virtue, which we find even in the beſt of human beings; and it would make her neglect and contemn ſome of the other ſex, whom, if ſhe truly knew human nature, ſhe would love and honour. And there is ſome riſk, that, after all, ſhe might not take up this diſlike, on account of the want of ſolid worth and virtue; for the preſence or defect of theſe qualities cannot often be aſcertained on a ſlight acquaintance; but very probably for the want of ſome of

theſe refinements, delicacies, and poliſhed nicety, which are deſcribed as entering into that marvellous aſſemblage of excellencies, which formed the character of this all-accompliſhed and Utopian Hero. Romance writers, like painters, delineate not the whole of nature or man. But they ſelect what is fair, and beautiful, and ſublime, and romantic, and leave out all that is common or coarſe, although more or leſs of theſe enter into the compoſition of every ſcene in nature, and every human character. So that a man can no more learn what human nature really is, from their deſcriptions, than he can judge of the actual face of a country, from the landſcapes of Pouſſin or Claude Lorraine.

If we had no examples in real life of virtue and excellence, it would be laudable to create them. If neither the hiſtory of paſt ages, nor that of our own times, could furniſh us with any character of diſtinguiſhed worth, it would be neceſſary to ſeek for ſuch in the ſtores of imagination. But, thanks to Heaven, this is not the

caſe. In ſpite of the weakneſs of mankind, and the degeneracy of particular periods, I will venture to aſſert, that there never was any age, which did not produce ſome illuſtrious and amiable characters—ſeveral who ſuſtained the dignity of human nature, and whoſe lives and conduct might fitly be held up as models to their fellow-men.

It is the hiſtory of theſe perſons that I would have written, for the inſtruction and improvement both of youth and grown-up people. I would not charge their memories with relations of ſuppoſitious virtue, when they could be equally well inſtructed, and beſides have their ſtock of knowledge increaſed, by accounts of real excellence. What need of models of imaginary benevolence, when we have had a Firmin and a Hanway, and ſtill have a Howard?

Of late years theſe fictitious narratives have increaſed to an amazing degree. The hiſtory of ideal beings takes up that time which ſhould be devoted to real men; and the puppets of human fancy ſeem in dan-

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ger of driving off the ſtage the men created by God.

The facility of compoſing ſuch works is one great reaſon of their accumulation. Men of genius, not ſatisfied with human beings, as they find them in real life, endeavour to comfort themſelves by painting them as they would wiſh them to be; and to this end, nothing more is neceſſary to a man of ſome imagination, but to retire into his cloſet, and take up his pen. There he may create men and characters, and ſcenes, as quick as thought, and ſuch as ſhall be entirely according to his own fancy. But if he is to write the life of a real man, he muſt leave that cloſet, and go forth into the world to collect information, and examine facts, which requires no ſmall trouble, much diligence, and much exertion.

I was led into theſe reflections, when I had occaſion to peruſe the few remains that are preſerved to us, of the life and character of PAMPHILUS *of Cæſarea*. The great Euſebius wrote his life; but it is unfortunately loſt; and from this circum-

ſtance, and becauſe his virtues were chiefly of the private kind, becauſe he excited no commotion in human ſociety, ſacked no peaceful cities, nor turned the world upſide down, we have almoſt loſt the memory of one of the moſt excellent perſons that ever adorned human nature.

In my Obſervations on the Literature of the Primitive Chriſtian Writers, I have mentioned ſuch particulars of Pamphilus, as were connected with my deſign, and have recorded him as the founder of the greateſt library in the Chriſtian world. But I muſt requeſt the indulgence of my readers, while I ſay a little more of this amiable man, as I am reluctant to leave ſo delightful a ſubject. For what can be more pleaſing, than to contemplate a character like that of *Pamphilus?* what more elevating and improving to the mind, than to view in his virtues a pattern for our own conduct? ſhall the naturaliſt gaze with rapture on the beauties of inferior nature, exult at the glorious colours of a plant or a ſhell, and extol the ſublimity of

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an inanimate object, while we neglect to admire the excellence of rational and immortal beings, and overlook *moral beauty*, the moſt perfect ſpecies of *lovelineſs?* A virtuous human ſoul is a fairer flower than ever bloomed in Eden; the fineſt tints that adorn Indian gardens, and all the beauties of the Flora Malabarica, are not to be compared with it. Would any one behold the true ſublime, let him ſeek it in undaunted virtue, ſuffering nobly in the cauſe of truth! Behold what neither misfortune nor Cæſar could ſubdue, "invictum animum Catonis, the invincible mind of "Cato." Deſolation and ruin may ſpread their terrors abroad; the man of *worth* beholds them unappalled, "impavidum ferient ruinæ. If the foundations be deſtroyed, what hath the *righteous* done?

We ſee, then, in Pamphilus the higheſt of human characters—that which is formed by the union of the *Philoſopher* and the *Chriſtian*. This man was benevolent as Cimon, gentle as Atticus, learned as Cicero, modeſt as Virgil, firm as Cato, and

wiſe as Socrates. He was of an eminent family, and large fortune, and might have aſpired to the higheſt honours; but he withdrew himſelf from the glare of temporal grandeur, and led an humble and philoſophical courſe of life, employed only in promoting the cauſe of truth and virtue; improving his own mind, and doing all the good to mankind that was in his power. "He was," ſays Euſebius, "remarkable, above all the men of our "age, for his unfeigned regard to the Sa-"cred Writings, and for his unwearied "application in whatever he undertook, "whether it were kind offices to his friends, "or to others who ſought his aid." Jerome ſays, he relieved all that were in ſtraits, giving them bountifully, as his fortune permitted. He was a great encourager of learning and piety in others; for he not only lent books to read, but, when he found people well diſpoſed, he made them preſents of his manuſcripts. Euſebius calls him a man of fine underſtanding, "a Phi-"loſopher in *word* and *deed*;" a diſtinction

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material to be obſerved, for there are many Philoſophers who are only ſo in *words*, mere *ſpeechifiers*, whoſe improvements reſt all in the head, but never reach the heart. All the worthy and intelligent men of his age courted the ſociety of Pamphilus. Euſebius calls him "my deareſt friend." He aſſiſted him in making out the works of Origen for the Cæſarean library; and he wrote three books of his life; the loſs of which, ſays Lardner, is much lamented by many learned men. "Quis ſtudioſo-"rum amicus non fuit Pamphili?" ſays Jerome. "What ſtudious man was not a "friend of Pamphilus?" Yet, he adds, that, though nobly qualified to inſtruct mankind, ſuch was his modeſty, that he wrote nothing of his own, except letters to his friends; "but he diligently read the "works of ancient authors, and was con-"tinually meditating upon them."

Such was the life of Pamphilus; and his death did not diſcredit it. For when a perſecution was raiſed againſt the Chriſtians, and Urbanus, the Roman preſident

of

of Cæſarea, an unfeeling and brutal man, required him to renounce his religion or his life, Pamphilus, the *gentle* Pamphilus, made the latter choice, and cheerfully ſubmitted to impriſonment, to torture, and to death.

When I peruſe the account which Euſebius gives of the cruelties, which this gentle and amiable ſpirit was forced to endure, and which he, and eleven others, who were put to death with him, ſuffered with the moſt noble bravery and undaunted fortitude, I am ſtruck with admiration at the greatneſs of that Power, which could raiſe men ſo much above themſelves, and enable them ſo completely to overcome all the weakneſs of humanity. At all times there have been men ignorant, ferocious, and brutal, who have ſet death at defiance, and deſpiſed pain; but it was reſerved for Chriſtianity to exhibit a new kind of ſufferers—men who joined cool reaſon to heroic reſolution, and tender ſenſibility to inflexible fortitude. The tiger and the bear will always retain their own manners; but

where is he, who ſhall give the feelings of the lion to the modeſt deer, or the gentle lamb!

This ſubject appears to me not ſo well underſtood as it ſhould be, and therefore I ſhall offer a few farther remarks on it.

The ancient Danes, and many other Northern nations, inſpired with a vehement deſire of being praiſed after their death, and believing in ſome kind of future exiſtence of the ſoul, affected the greateſt heroiſm in this laſt trying ſcene of nature. They thought that thoſe who fell in battle would be welcomed into the Valholl, or place of happineſs, by the God ODIN; and that, in that happy place, they would ſit and regale themſelves to all eternity, eating ſwines fleſh, and drinking large draughts of mead and ale out of cups formed of the ſculls of their enemies *.

Hence they pretended not only to have no fear of death, but even to die in tri-

* Bartholini Antiquitat. Danicæ, 4to. Coppenhag. 1689; and Le Clerc, Bib. Univ. vol. XV. p. 394.

umph;

umph; and it was thought glorious among them to brave the agonies of death with a ſmile. A Norwegian poet mentions it to the honour of one of their princes. "The "hiſtorians relate, that King Half died "laughing." And a Daniſh author, ſpeaking of one of their heroes, ſays, "Agnar "fell, laughed, and died."

On the other hand, they judged it moſt diſmal and ſhameful to die a natural death; and when they foreſaw this approaching, they cried out and lamented like children: "lamentabantur *in morbo* quaſi turpiter et "miſerabiliter perituri," ſays Val. Maximus, l. 2. c. 6. To avoid dying of old age or diſeaſe, they often killed, or made their friends diſpatch themſelves; nor did they heſitate to plunge a dagger into their own hearts, that they might accompany ſome warrior to the ſhades.

This their contempt of death, therefore, had nothing truly heroic or excellent in it: for it was the reſult chiefly of the ferocity of their manners. Their conſtancy, ſays Cicero, was not the effect of reaſon and wiſdom,

wiſdom, but the reſult of enthuſiaſm, and an unregulated thirſt of fame.

Porphyry de Abſt. l. 4. c. 21. mentions ſimilar facts of the Meſſagetæ, and Derbices, who, to prevent natural death, killed even their own parents and eat them.

We find the ſame ideas among the Orientals. Quintus Curtius tells us, that the Bramin Calanus, on the approach of a diſeaſe, burnt himſelf in the camp of Alexander, to prevent his dying a natural death.

The fame of Auguſtus, ſays Suetonius, c. 21. excited the Indians to ſend ambaſſadors deſiring his friendſhip. One of theſe followed the example of Calanus. Amidſt a great concourſe of people, he entered the fire naked, anointed, and laughing. He deſired them to engrave on his tomb, "Here reſts Zarmanochagas, the "Indian of Bargoſa, who, according to the "cuſtom of his country, rendered himſelf "immortal."

Hence, let us learn to correct our ideas of the merit of ſuffering with conſtancy; and remember, that two things are requi-

ſite, to ennoble every caſe of this kind— the goodneſs of the cauſe, and the ſenſibility of the ſufferer. From the creation of the world till now, in every age, frantic enthuſiaſts have gloried in ſuffering pain, and death itſelf, for their abſurdities. The ſavage Indian, taken priſoner, contemns all his enemies can do to him. They may tear off his ſkin, half roaſt his body, and cut off his fleſh by bits, but they cannot extort from him a ſingle groan. On the contrary, he upbraids them for their want of ſkill in tormenting him; and tells them, that his belly has been the grave of many of their relations. It has been no rarity to ſee at Tyburn hardened wretches launching into eternity, ſome in ſullen ſilence and unconquered obſtinacy; others in ſavage rage, curſing God, and braving all his terrors. To fight the fear of death, hath ever been a ſerious matter to the man of modeſt worth, to the enlightened Chriſtian, to the tender and feeling mind; while to the ſavage and the vicious it hath been often a very eaſy conqueſt. Before, therefore, we

admire a ſufferer, we ought to know, that he ſuffers in the cauſe of reaſon; that he ſuffers as a rational being; and that he is capable of feeling what he is to endure. Death is an awful, a dark, an unknown object to every human mind, unintoxicated by enthuſiaſm, and unhardened by ferocity. I would have the ſufferer to ſhew that he knows what it is to die. If he appears inſenſible to this, his fortitude no longer commands my veneration.

There was a ſufferer in the cauſe of mankind, to whom this obſervation will ſtrikingly apply. Do I admire his ſufferings leſs becauſe he felt keenly what he was to endure; becauſe he uttered a wiſh, the dictate of unaffected nature, that the glorious end could have been accompliſhed by leſs ſevere means? Can I marvel that he experienced a temporary deſpondency of mind, at the proſpect of the awful ſcene before him; a ſcene which was to be preſented on the great theatre of the world; a ſcene where *angels* were to be ſpectators, which was to affect millions yet unborn,

and extend its influence to the remoteſt periods of time? Who, that could feel the importance of the part he had then to perform, would not have been anxious, even unto *anguiſh*, leſt in any reſpect he ſhould fail on that trying occaſion? Shall feelings like theſe withdraw my admiration from the GREAT PHILANTHROPIST? No.— In theſe conſiſt to me the merit of his ſufferings, ſince theſe ſhew the coolneſs of his reaſon, and the *exquiſite ſenſibility* of his ſoul. Theſe are to me his ſhining ſcenes: by theſe he appears *fitted* to be the great exemplar to human kind; and from him I deduce this concluſion, that THEY ONLY CAN NOBLY SUFFER WHO CAN TENDERLY FEEL!

But to return to amiable Pamphilus. At the contemplation of his character, even the cool imagination of the FIRST OF SACRED CRITICS is warmed, and for a moment excellent LARDNER, forgetting the calm and uniform tenor of his learned reſearches, breaks out with Horace into a, "Quando invenimus parem?" "Where

"can

" can ſuch a man as this be found in the
" heathen world? How rare were ſuch
" examples, under the Moſaic inſtitution,
" of men who employed their whole time
" in improving their own minds, and ſerv-
" ing others, without noiſe and oſtentation,
" and without worldly views; and, at laſt,
" quietly reſigned their lives, rather than
" diſown the principles by which they had
" hitherto been conducted and ſupported."
Farewell then, excellent Pamphilus! reluctant we leave thee, bright STAR of HUMAN EXCELLENCE! obſcure in the regiſters of men! illuſtrious in the CALENDAR of HEAVEN [a]! At ſight of thy beams for ever

[a] " If we ſuppoſe that there are ſpirits or an-
" gels who look into the ways of men, as it is
" highly probable there are, both from reaſon and
" Revelation; how different are the notions they
" entertain of us, from thoſe we are apt to form of
" one another! Were they to give us in their ca-
" talogue of ſuch worthies as are now living, how
" different would it be from that which any of our
" own ſpecies would draw up!—They do not look for
" great men at the head of armies, or among the

ever ſhining in the FIRMAMENT of REASON; let kings be eclipſed, and heroes hide their diminiſhed rays. While we contemplate thy virtues, may our ſouls be warmed to the love and imitation of them; that, when the few years of this our fleeting life are ſpent, we may indulge the animating hope, of meeting thee in ſome far diſtant and peaceful country; of finding thy Euſebius there, and HIM of whoſe virtues ye were conſtant followers, and of paſſing, in ſuch divine ſociety, an exiſtence of happineſs immutable and immortal!

" pomps of a court; but often find them out in
" ſhades and ſolitudes, in the private walks and
" by-paths of life. The evening's walk of a wiſe
" man is more illuſtrious in their ſight, than the
" march of a general at the head of an hundred
" thouſand men. A contemplation of God's works;
" a voluntary act of juſtice to our own detriment;
" a generous concern for the good of mankind;
" tears that are ſhed in ſilence for the miſery of
" others; a private deſire or reſentment broken
" and ſubdued; in ſhort, an unfeigned exerciſe of
" humility, or any other virtue; are ſuch actions as
" are glorious in their ſight, and denominate men
" great and reputable." SPECTATOR, N° 610.

" The

" The moral of the preſent ſpeculation
" amounts to this, that we ſhould not be
" led away by the cenſures and applauſes
" of men; but conſider the figure that
" every perſon will make at that time,
" when wiſdom ſhall be juſtified of her
" children, and nothing paſs for great or
" illuſtrious, which is not an ornament and
" perfection to human nature."

SPECTATOR, N° 610.

III.

HINTS

RESPECTING THE

STATE AND EDUCATION

OF

THE PEOPLE.

" HOMO SUM, HUMANI ME NIL ALIENUM PUTO."

TERENT.

" The end of learning is to teach the PUBLIC."

JOHNSON.

TO

MY HONOURED RELATION

AND DEAR FRIEND,

GEORGE DEMPSTER, Esq.

[MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT.

A FRIEND OF MAN!

FROM

THE AUTHOR.

HINTS, &c.

AMONGST the culpable parts of the conduct of the ancient Philoſophers, we muſt reckon that ungenerous contempt which they almoſt univerſally affected for the lower claſſes of mankind. Forgetting that the diſtinction of ſuperior learning was only accidental, they ſeem to have conſidered the common people as an inferior claſs of beings, who neither poſſeſſed any knowledge, nor had a title to any; whom it was right to keep in the deepeſt ignorance, and whoſe want of knowledge might be lawfully made uſe of, to ſuit any purpoſe they or their friends had in view.

Plato, in his Timæus, ſays, "it is very "difficult to find out the Author and Pa-"rent of the Univerſe; and, when found, "it is *impoſſible* to declare him unto all: "τον μεν αν ποιητην και πατερα τα δε τα

" παντος ευρειν τε εργον, και ευροντα, εις παν-
" τας αδυνατον λεγειν *." This might be true in ſome caſes, though not probably in the extent Plato meant to apply it. But Cicero goes ſtill farther; for when he tranſlated this work of Plato into Latin, he rendered the paſſage, " et cum jam inve-
" neris, indicare in vulgus nefas: when
" you have found him, it is *unlawful* to
" declare him to the vulgar." " Perhaps, ſays the candid Lardner, " this was Ci-
" cero's own ſentiment. Being a ſtateſman
" and politician, as well as a philoſopher,
" he might be more concerned for peace
" than truth †." Cicero, indeed, very probably did not think the common people capable of ſuch inſtruction; nor, though they had been ſo, would he have thought it worth while to beſtow it on them. For he aſſerts, that they have neither prudence, reaſon, judgment, nor induſtry. " Non
" eſt conſilium in vulgo, non ratio, non
" diſcrimen, non diligentia ‡."

* P. 28. tom. III. Serran. et ap. Fabr. p. 336.

† Letter on the Logos, Works tom. XI. p. 175.

‡ Orat. pro Muren.

With ſuch ungenerous ſentiments, as theſe entertained by the Philoſophers, we may very properly contraſt the eloquent ſpeech of St. Paul to the Athenians. Indeed I have often thought, that the Apoſtle had in his eye, the very paſſage of Plato we have juſt quoted; for we know that he was no ſtranger to Greek literature. "Ye "men of Athens, I perceive that in all "things ye are too ſuperſtitious. For as "I paſſed by, and beheld your devotions, I "found an altar with this inſcription, TO "THE UNKNOWN GOD:—whom therefore "ye ignorantly worſhip, *him declare I unto* "*you*. GOD that made the world, and all "things therein, ſeeing that he is Lord of "heaven and earth, dwelleth not in tem-"ples made with mens hands: neither is "worſhipped with mens hands, as though "he needed any thing; ſeeing he giveth "to all life, and breath, and all things:— "For in him we live, and move, and have "our being, as certain alſo of your own "poets (Aratus) have ſaid: for we are

"alſo

"alſo his offspring *." He proceeds to deliver his divine meſſage to the *whole* human race, as all equally the children of the Almighty, and all entitled to the care of their common and benevolent Parent.

Lactantius, whoſe eloquence gained him the appellation of the Chriſtian Cicero, in a paſſage which I had occaſion to quote, in the *Obſervations on the Literature of the Primitive Chriſtian Writers*, has addreſſed the Roman Orator, in a very animated manner, on his duplicity in profeſſing before the people opinions, which, in private among his friends, he ridiculed; and remonſtrates with him for thus abuſing his talents, in confirming men in thoſe errors, which it was his duty to have endeavoured to correct. "*To make the people wiſe*, "ſays he, O Cicero, is an undertaking "worthy of all the powers of your elo-"quence."

A ſentiment of ſuch extended benevolence points out its own origin. There is

* Acts xvii. 22, &c.

nothing

nothing terreſtrial in it; it wears the veſture of heaven, and could only have proceeded from the benign Creator of all; to whom, as the common parent of the Univerſe, all his children are originally equally dear.

There is ſomething in the whole genius and tenor of the Chriſtian Religion calculated to humble human arrogance. The diſtinction of ranks in civilized ſociety, though uſeful and neceſſary, is at the ſame time dangerous, and liable to great abuſe. I think it therefore a peculiar excellence of Chriſtianity, and at the ſame time a proof of its divine origin, that, in its original pure ſtate, and before it is debaſed by an alliance with human power and policy, it furniſhes a check to this abuſe, by *equalizing* mankind as members of a *greater ſociety* than any that exiſts at preſent; and turning their attention, from the world immediately around them, to a diſtant and far nobler ſyſtem, where no claim to pre-eminence will be of any avail, unleſs founded on *real excellence*—on ſuperior

worth and virtue. Thus the dignity of human nature is truly ſupported; the *great* are taught humility, and how needful it is for them to poſſeſs ſome higher acquiſitions than fortune can beſtow; and the *poor*, and thoſe whoſe lot is the moſt diſcouraging in human life, are inſtructed in patience, and taught not to deſpond, while ſuch glorious hopes are held forth to them, if they perform the part aſſigned to them well.

It was probably on this account, as well as for other important reaſons, that the firſt teachers of Chriſtianity were ſelected from the loweſt orders of mankind. And the extreme reluctance with which men ſubmitted to receive inſtruction from theſe teachers, evidently ſhewed how far their ideas were perverted; and how much they ſtood in need of ſuch a leſſon as this ſelection taught them. The Apoſtles ſeem to have gloried, in levelling the little diſtinctions of this life founded on wealth and external grandeur. The Philoſophers deſpiſed the common people: "Odi pro-

" fanum vulgus et *arceo* *," was their maxim. But the Saviour of the World proceeded upon principles very different. The ſpirit of his conduct declared " Miſe- " reor pauperis plebis et *eligo* †." Such a ſentiment was entirely worthy of that great Philanthropiſt, who conſidered himſelf as the friend and brother of the whole human race; who has declared, that at the great day of retribution he will, above all others, reward the humane, the charitable, and the benevolent; and will ſay unto them, " Foraſmuch as ye have ſhewed kindneſs " unto one of the leaſt of theſe *my brethren*, " ye have done it unto me ‡."

It deſerves particular notice, that Jeſus Chriſt reaſoned with the common people on religious ſubjects, the ſublimeſt of all others; and, by ſo doing, plainly ſhewed, that they were capable of judging of theſe

* I hate the profane vulgar, and drive them from me.

† I pity the poor common people, and call them to me.

‡ Matth. xxvi. 40.

ſubjects when fairly laid before them. It therefore becomes all thoſe, who call themſelves by the honourable name of Chriſtian, to remember in what manner their *Maſter* treated the lower claſs of mankind; and to judge whether they ought to follow his example, or to adopt the reaſonings of politicians and men of the world, who in this, as in many other matters, I apprehend, reaſon very impolitically. For there are but four ways of ruling our inferiors, and of governing mankind:

1. By *force*. In this way the galley-ſlaves are governed. The whip held over their heads urges their inceſſant toils; and the rack, or the wheel, awaits to chaſtize their offences.

2. By *fraud*. Thus knaviſh prieſts have governed mankind, while they falſely pretended to be entruſted with a divine commiſſion to hold in their hands the thunderbolts of Heaven. The Jewiſh prieſts of old, as we are told, were enraged at the Apoſtles, "being grieved that they taught "the people." Acts iv. 2.

3. By

3. By *intereſt*. Thus weak and unprincipled politicians govern by penſions and bribes; aſſuring themſelves of the fidelity of their ſervants, by making it moſt profitable for them to ſupport their ſchemes.

The firſt of theſe kinds of government laſts no longer than the people under it are able to ſhake it off. Thoſe concerned are obliged to exerciſe dreadful ſeverity, and to add cruelty to cruelty. In return, they frequently meet with retaliation, being murdered without mercy when opportunity offers; and they are continually in terror, as conſcious what they have to fear from thoſe whom they oppreſs.

The ſecond mode is equally precarious. It continues only till the people find out the cheat; and then the impoſtors are diſgraced. And the attainment of our ends is hardly recompenſed, when we balance it with thoſe fears of diſcovery, and ſecret ſenſe of meanneſs, which always accompany deceit and impoſture.

The third mode is no leſs unſtable. It ſubſiſts only till ſome wealthier adventurer

comes into the field; not to mention that there are thouſands who will take a bribe, and cheat the giver to the bargain.

A humane man cannot adopt the firſt mode; nor an honeſt man the ſecond; nor any but a rich man the third.

In Britain, a maſter dares not govern his ſervants by the firſt mode; the ſecond is impracticable to him; and the third is attended with many inconveniencies.

There is a *fourth* mode, though it ſeems to have eſcaped the notice of ſome who have pretended to be Politicians, and Philoſophers, and Chriſtians:—It is,

By a ſenſe of honour, of character, and of duty. This does not exclude the other three modes, ſo far as they are lawful and honourable. He who governs in this way, may correct his ſervants if their behaviour require it: this is different from *brutal force*. He may uſe all prudent means to preſerve ſacred his authority, and to avoid that familiarity which leads to contempt. This is different from *diſhoneſt fraud*. And he may put his ſervants upon equal terms

with

with others, as to pecuniary advantages: this is not the ſame as *mean bribery*, or *expenſive over-payment*.

Now this is the only true and permanent method of governing *rational* beings;—to inſpire them with a ſenſe of honour; to give them a character to keep up; to inſtruct them in the principles of duty; and, in brief, to make them judge themſelves, and condemn themſelves.

Every other mode, ſuggeſted by the narrow views of weak and unprincipled politicians, will be found partial and defective. It will be found impoſſible to preſerve ſubjection on ſuch plans for any length of time, until every ſpark of underſtanding and of moral feeling be eradicated from human nature [*a*].

But

[*a*] Cromwell's maxim, "*Pay well, and puniſh* "*well*," is not a bad one for a ſtateſman; but it is more applicable in public than private ſociety; and, after all, it is founded upon the partial wiſdom of a mere *Politician*. A *Philoſopher* will go much deeper, and will diſcover, almoſt at firſt view, the abſurdity

But this plan of government ſuppoſes Inſtruction. It is impoſſible to inſpire men, who are brutally ignorant, with any ſuch ſenſe of character, honour, or *duty*, as I have mentioned [*a*]. And this brings me

of attempting to govern *rational* beings, by means entirely *mechanical*. Can a government be permanent, where the Prince ſtudies only to be able to bribe or force his ſervants to obey him, without any regard to the approbation or diſapprobation they may feel of his meaſures?

[*a*] If any one think otherwiſe, let him inveſtigate facts. Let him take the *ſeamen* as an inſtance. They are an illiterate ſet of men; but they are reckoned in general to be uncommonly faithful and *honeſt*: that is to ſay, they would not pick a man's pocket, nor impoſe upon a brother tar, if they could do it ever ſo eaſily. This is not *their mode* of cheating. For it is peculiar to all uninſtructed men, to ſet up *imperfect* and *partial* ſtandards of morality, by which they regulate their actions, like ſome *honeſt* merchants, who reſpect every obligation but a *cuſtom-houſe-oath*, which they hold to be only a form of unmeaning words; or, like the old Scotch Highlanders, who had each ſome particular oath, one, for inſtance, by his *dirk*, and another by his *philibeg*, by which, when he ſwore, he thought himſelf bound to

me to an intereſting ſubject, THE EDUCATION OF THE COMMON PEOPLE; the ſhameful

to perform his promiſe; but as to all other aſſeverations and obligations, however ſacred, he conſidered them as juſt nothing at all. If then we would diſcover the real ſtate of the caſe with reſpect to ſeamen, let us aſk the Captain of their ſhip, he who pays them for their labour, and has a title to expect their utmoſt exertions for his intereſt. Now he will uniformly tell us, that there is more work done in *one hour* when he is aboard, than in *a whole day* when he is aſhore!

But it may be ſaid that this claſs of men are corrupted by bad company in towns. Let us then ſtep into the country, and ſee what happens there. Aſk a farmer how his reapers conduct themſelves when he or his overſeer is abſent. He will aſſure you, that it is impoſſible to get them to do any good, unleſs when ſome perſon is ſtanding by them, watching their motions, preventing their idle ſquabbles and vain conteſts (amidſt which their employer's intereſt would always be forgotten), and conſtraining their unwilling and faithleſs hearts to attend to their duty.

This holds good at leaſt of nine out of ten caſes. And ſuch are the pictures of human nature, which an attentive ſurvey of real life offers to the view of

the

ſhameful neglect of which, I am fully convinced, is one of the moſt fertile ſources of profligacy and vice, in civilized nations.

Time does not permit me here to refute ſome ſophiſms, that have been uſed to juſtify the plan of keeping the people in ignorance. One writer ſays, their chief happineſs conſiſts in ignorance, becauſe it renders them inſenſible of their miſery. But this writer ought to have perceived, that that ignorance was itſelf the *cauſe* of their miſery.

Were they more enlightened, they would the obſerver—pictures ſomewhat different from thoſe painted by poets and writers of Novels.

Let it be noticed, that I do not here ſpeak of the caſe of people who are kept totally ignorant of vice. How they might conduct themſelves, I am not intereſted to enquire. In civilized countries in general, and in *towns*, and in this *free* country in particular, all the lower claſſes of mankind, all our domeſtics and ſervants, are perpetually ſurrounded with *temptations to wrong*. And I do not ſee how it can be expected, that they ſhould ſurmount theſe, without having good principles, and a ſenſe of character and honour early inſtilled into their minds.

become

become ſenſible of the infamy and miſery of their ſituation; they would plead their own cauſe with their oppreſſors; and, if their pleadings were not heard, they would have recourſe to arguments of a different nature. The enlightened mind cannot be enſlaved: Science reſiſts oppreſſion, and will repel it, or fall in the attempt. It is nothing but ignorance, which, from the beginning of time, has put it in the power of one half of mankind to tyrannize over the other. In every kingdom of the earth ignorance ſupports the reign of tyranny, and ſuperſtition, and cruelty. In every quarter of the world it rivets the fetters of the miſerable man, and ſtifles the groans of the unpitied wretch.

I am far from aſſenting to their opinion, who prefer ſavage life to civilized ſociety; but I will freely own, that I think many things in the latter ſtand in need of reformation. Mankind, in their original independent ſtate, may be compared to a number of packages, ſuppoſe of wool or flax, placed by the ſide of one another, in

a merchant's warehouſe, where each is fair and full, and retains his own proper ſize and form. Whereas, in civilized life, their ſtate ſeems to reſemble that of the ſame packages, piled up for conveniency on each other's heads to the cieling of the warehouſe, where there is a gradual preſſure, beginning at the top, and increaſing downward to the loweſt ranks, many of which are ſqueezed out of all ſhape, and ſome have their very bowels preſſed out. Such, I fear, is the caſe, more or leſs, in every civilized ſociety in Europe: in this country leſs perhaps than in any other. Ye friends of human kind, ye who can feel another's woe, decide on this queſtion! Do we not bear too hard on the *poor man?* Do we not make his burdens too heavy, and his comforts too few? Are not many of our enjoyments purchaſed by his ſorrows—many of our luxuries procured at the expence of his health, and of his life? But to proceed,

"There is no man," ſays Dr. Clarke, "who is not capable of ſome inſtruction,

" and *who may not be made the better for it.*
" Perſons of the meaneſt natural capacities
" may have a mind attentive to inſtruction;
" may have a love to truth and right;
" may have great probity, integrity of
" heart, &c. *"

An obſervation of a ſenſible writer deſerves particular attention here: " Si l'ig-
" norance pouvoit s'abſtenir de juger, elle
" ſeroit, ſans doute, moins mepriſable et
" moins dangereuſe: malheureuſement
" l'eſprit humain ne peut etre ſans action,
" il faut qu'il ait des opinions bonnes ou
" mauvaiſes; il faut qu'il ait des prejuges,
" s'il n'a pas des connoiſſances et des ſu-
" perſtitions au defaut de religion; j'en
" appelle a tous les peuples barbares qui
" exiſtent de nos jours †."

" If ignorance could refrain from judg-
" ing and paſſing deciſions, it would be
" undoubtedly leſs contemptible and leſs
dangerous; but unfortunately the human

* Vol. III. S. 19. p. 318. (8vo.) Lond. 1756.

† M. Borde, ſeconde Replique a M. Rouſſeau, P. 377.

" mind

" mind cannot be without action; men muſt
" have opinions good or bad; they muſt
" have prejudices if they have not know-
" ledge; and ſuperſtition if they have not
" true religion. I appeal to the hiſtory of
" all the ſavage nations now on the face of
" the earth."

M. Borde's obſervations are certainly juſt. The narrow powers of reaſoning, which ignorant perſons uſually poſſeſs, ſerve to miſlead, inſtead of guiding them. They are apt to make very improper compariſons between the ſuppoſed happy ſtate of their maſters, and their own hardſhips, poverty, and, as they eſteem it, unhappy fate. They are apt to ſay, what better are they than we; and, on the ground of their repining ideas, to juſtify to their own minds every inſtance of unfaithfulneſs.

It is one of the evils of ignorance, not to be ſenſible of its own defect. You ſhall never perſuade an ignorant ploughman to adopt an improvement in agriculture. You may tell an uninſtructed man of the advantages of inoculating his children; but

he

he will lend a deaf ear to you, and ſay that it is tempting Providence to bring diſeaſes on children in health. Perhaps, ſoon after, that loathſome diſeaſe gets into the family, and you are called upon to aſſiſt in carrying one of the putrid carcaſes to the grave. You imagine this will produce conviction. By no means. The blinded parent tells you, " that ſince his child died *in God's* " *way*, he is ſatisfied; but, if he had died " by man's hands, he ſhould have been " quite miſerable."

The Author of " Eſſays on various " Subjects, intereſting to Politics and Mo- " rality," having obſerved, that the diſcoveries in agriculture made by men of ſcience are rendered nearly uſeleſs, when not communicated to common huſbandmen, and recommended the compilation of accurate abridgments, containing a plain and eaſy account of them, to be introduced into the ſchools where the children of peaſants are educated, adds, " Nor let it be " regarded as a chimerical ſcheme, im- " poſſible to be executed, to inform the

" minds

" minds of the common people. Experi-
" ence proves its practicability. A German
" Prince (Erneſt the pious Duke of Saxe
" Gotha) entirely changed the face of his
" principality not more than a century ago.
" Truly great by his political virtues, he
" had his people inſtructed by compen-
" diums of every kind of uſeful know-
" ledge, which were put into the hands of
" the peaſants in all country ſchools." He adds, that though theſe conſtitutions do not now exiſt in their original vigour, yet it is amazing to obſerve the difference which ſtill ſubſiſts between the people of this and the other circles. See the paſſage in a note to p. 348 of the Engliſh verſion of an excellent German book, *M. Hirzel's Rural Socrates.* By the adviſe of the rural philoſopher, the Swiſs peaſants were encouraged to attend the meetings of the Phyſical Society of Zurich. There every one gave an account of his method of huſbandry, and received proper advice from the Society. M. Hirzel's relation of this is truly intereſting, and cannot fail to

be

be very pleaſing to every benevolent mind. It ſhews how much we might do to promote the happineſs and the knowledge of our fellow-creatures, would we only be at pains enough, would we lay aſide pride and vanity, were we capable of feeling for their ſituation, and of rejoicing in the pleaſure of doing good.

" Is there any thing on this ſide Heaven," ſays a benevolent writer, " equal to the " gratification of knowing and contem- " plating the wiſdom of God in the won- " derful works of the creation? And is " this pleaſure to be denied to all but a " few philoſophers and prieſts, who would " become the tools of tyranny, to keep " the people in ignorance, and ſet them " on a level with the brutes * ?"

And M. D'Alembert very properly obſerves, " Quelques ſavans, il eſt vrai, ſem- " blables à ces Prêtres d'Egypte qui ca- " choient au reſte de la nation leurs futiles " myſteres, voudroient que les livres fuſ-

* Monthly Review, vol. XXXIII. p. 44.

" ſent uniquement à leur uſage, et qu'on
" dérobât au peuple la plus foible lu-
" miére, même dans les matieres les plus
" indifferentes ; lumiere qu'on ne doit pour-
" tant guere lui envier, parce *qu'il en a*
" *grand beſoin*, et qu'il n'eſt pas à craindre
" qu'elle devienne jamais bien vive. Nous
" croyons devoir penſer autrement comme
" citoyens, et peut etre même comme des
" gens de lettres *."

" Some learned men, it is true, like
" thoſe Egyptian prieſts who concealed
" their trifling myſteries from the reſt of
" the nation, would have all books written
" ſolely for their own uſe, and would take
" away from the people every ſpark of
" light, even in the commoneſt matters—
" a light which we ſurely ſhould not envy
" them of, ſince they have much need of
" it, and there is little danger that it will
" ever be too clear. Doubtleſs we ought
" to think more liberally as fellow-citizens,
" and perhaps alſo as men of letters."

* M. D'Alembert, Preface du 3 vol. de l'Encyclopedie.

Unqueſtionably

Unqueſtionably—the intereſt of literature depends on the number of its cultivators.

I would beg of thoſe who are extremely afraid of truſting the common people with *any* power of ſelf-direction, to read the hiſtory of mankind, and ſay, whether, by allowing them to follow their own judgment, they could ever have been led into greater errors than they have been, by reſigning themſelves up totally to the direction of deſigning men, who have rivetted them in the moſt fatal prejudices, and often hurried them on to ſedition, perſecution, murder, bloodſhed, rapine, and every kind of wickedneſs and enormity. Upon this foundation, "the ignorance of the "people," have been erected all thoſe *permanent* and *ſtupendous* ſyſtems of ſuperſtition and tyranny, which in different ages and countries have oppreſſed and degraded the human race.

We ſhould not be raſh in determining, that the Deity never meant the bulk of men to poſſeſs any knowledge, becauſe he has placed them in a ſituation where

it is impoſſible for them to acquire it. We ought to enquire, whether this impoſſibility reſults from the appointment of the Deity, or rather from the unreaſonable actions of men. In this, as in other matters, God has been pleaſed to order things ſo, that much of the happineſs of one man ſhall depend on the conduct of another. While we blame Providence for placing men in ſuch a ſituation, as that they cannot obtain knowledge, it is a fact, that, in many kingdoms of Europe, the poor common people are ſtudiouſly kept in the darkeſt ignorance by their tyrannic ſuperiors. Were that time, which, in Catholic countries, is devoted to abſurd ſuperſtition, employed in inſtructing the people, ignorance would ſoon be baniſhed from among them. In proteſtant kingdoms, I cannot but regard that as an improper and unreaſonable ſtate of police, which conſtrains the people to inceſſant labour from Monday morning to Saturday night, without leaving a ſingle ſpare moment.

For then Sunday will in general, and in-

deed

deed almoſt *neceſſarily*, be employed in amuſement, if not in diſſipation. Both the mind and body require ſome relaxation. I know I ſhall be immediately reminded of the loſs of time to our manufacturers, which this would occaſion; an argument which ſtrikes ſome people ſo forcibly, that they are angry that Sunday itſelf is not employed in labour. But I confeſs my view of this matter is very different indeed from theirs. I own their plan may enable us, to make our buckles and buttons a little better for the money than our neighbours; but, in the mean time, what becomes of our *men*, how do we ſucceed in the formation of *human minds*, the greateſt of all manufactures? Is it any compenſation to ſociety, to the public weal, to the real intereſt of a nation, that a great manufacturer has acquired a fortune of twenty thouſand pounds, if he has obtained it, by degrading and plunging into ignorance and depravity many hundreds of his fellow creatures? I would aſk any ſound politician, what effect ſuch ſyſtems will *ulti-*

mately produce in a nation? Can one claſs of mankind be depraved without in time affecting all others? Does not vice, like contagion, ſilently diffuſe itſelf over all? Are the proſtitutes of great manufacturing towns reſorted to only by thoſe of their own ſtation? Do they not corrupt our ſervants, both male and female, and through them our ſons and daughters?

But to return: Even under this ſtate of police, ſomething may be done. A part at leaſt of the Sunday may be uſefully employed in inſtructing thoſe who will not go to church, and indeed cannot be expected to go, becauſe they can neither read, write, nor underſtand.

Since theſe remarks were firſt written, a grand and extenſive plan has been ſet on foot in England, by Mr. Raikes of Gloucester, for the education of the common people. It will eaſily be underſtood that I allude to the inſtitution of SUNDAY SCHOOLS. It is with infinite ſatisfaction, that I find ſo many eminent and excellent perſons, have now engaged in promoting

theſe,

theſe, and that the good effects flowing from them are already beyond all expectation. Excellent Mr. Raikes! May thy benevolent example be univerſally followed. Thou haſt raiſed the depreſſed human mind, and given light to thoſe who ſat in darkneſs. The bleſſing of them that were ready to periſh ſhall come upon thee; and the people who were deſtroyed for lack of knowledge, ſhall celebrate thy name!

Enlightened politicians throughout Europe, are generally beginning to adopt the ſame ſentiments.

I have lately met with a French work, which I have long been in queſt of, "Vues "patriotiques ſur l'education du peuple; "a Lyon, 1783," 12mo.* This little piece is elegantly written, and contains many valuable obſervations. The author

* I have heard alſo of a German writer, Frederick Gabriel Reſewiſs, who has written much on Education; and in one of his works, "On the Education "of the Common People;" but I have never met with his work.

does not extend his ideas quite ſo far as I have done, or as I think his principles ſhould have led him to do. He appears to have been afraid, leſt it ſhould be made a capital objection to his book, that he granted too much to the people; an objection which would indeed be more formidable in his country than in Britain. However, there is great merit in the work. I ſhall tranſlate a paſſage from it here. Rouſſeau having ſaid, in the firſt book of his Emilius, that the poor ſhould not be educated, becauſe they had no need of education, our author refutes this idea, and aſks, " How, without ſome inſtruction, " ſhall they learn to conform themſelves " to their ſituation, to leſſen the number " of its difficulties by induſtry, to mitigate " them by reſignation, or ſometimes to riſe " above that unfortunate condition, into " which the chance of their birth has " thrown them?——I teach the rich, ſay " you, to make a proper uſe of their riches; " but what can I teach the poor man? " Much—not to make a bad uſe of his " poverty;

" poverty; not to make it a pretence for
" giving himſelf up to beggary and idle-
" neſs; or for making free with the for-
" tune of others; laſtly, to pay his country
" that tribute with his ſtrength, which
" another pays with his gold.—Do not
" then conſider this as the leaſt uſeful taſk.
" Whether well or ill educated, the rich
" can always lay out their money; and it
" is of little conſequence to ſociety, whe-
" ther the tavern-keeper or the jeweller is
" the mean of circulating it. But is it
" alſo indifferent in what manner the poor
" man employs his hands? Is it the ſame
" thing to ſociety, whether he ſprinkles the
" furrows of the plains with the ſweat of
" his brow, or drenches the highways with
" the blood of the traveller?—To ſpeak
" with propriety, it is the poor man, it is
" the common people, who have moſt
" need of education." Ch. III.

The inhabitants of Buda having aſked leave, of the preſent Emperor of Germany, to erect a ſtatue to him, that monarch refuſed the honour, " until," ſays he, " the

" time

" time ſhall arrive, when I ſhall have been
" ſucceſsful in my attempt, to level all the
" prejudices which obſtruct the progreſs
" of human reaſon :—till the time, when I
" ſhall perceive equity and good order pre-
" ſiding over the courts of juſtice ; know-
" ledge increaſed by the perfection of the
" means of acquiring it ; *the common people*
" *better informed* ; the clergy more regular ;"
&c.

In addition to the ſeveral ſocieties for promoting particular branches of knowledge, I could wiſh to ſee one inſtituted for diffuſing KNOWLEDGE *in general* ; one that ſhould employ itſelf in encouraging modeſt merit, in ſearching after the village *Newton*, in reſcuing from obſcurity the genius of the cottage, and in calling forth the ſong of the *Milton*, who would otherwiſe have been mute and inglorious * : a ſociety that ſhould cauſe books to be compoſed for the particular purpoſe of inſtructing the unlearned, and that ſhould print and

* See note (A) at the end of this Miſcellany.

circulate,

circulate, in different regions, ſuch performances as had a tendency to awaken the love of letters, and promote the improvement of human minds: a ſociety which ſhould receive a certain number of ingenious youths; and, after inſtructing them in the ſciences, ſend them forth, ſome as *miſſionaries*, to put to flight the illuſions of error and ignorance among men; and others to occupy various uſeful ſtations in life, as their talents or ſituation ſhould direct them; and who, in return for the advantages of their education, ſhould be required at their diſmiſſion only to promiſe, that they would, in their ſeveral ſpheres, exert themſelves to inſpire the love of knowledge into the boſoms of their friends and acquaintance, and all around them: laſtly, a ſociety which ſhould place philoſophy in all the genuine dignity of her character; and which, inſtead of celebrating days in honour of hypocritic ſaints and enthuſiaſtic devotees, ſhould compile a new kind of Calendar, and conſecrate a day to commemorate the birth of Ariſtotle, and

of

of Socrates, of Confucius, Locke, Newton, and ſuch, as like them, have exalted the depreſſed human mind, inſtructed mankind in the uſe of their faculties, vindicated the rights of human nature, and ſupported the cauſe of letters, liberty, and virtue, in various periods of the world.

It is with regret I quit a ſubject, on which ſo much might yet be ſaid. But as I cannot pretend to go beyond a few *hints*, I ſhall only offer one obſervation more, which is, that,

This matter deſerves the ſerious attention of the friends of liberty in Britain. A general ſpirit of *reform* now pervades us; and an inclination to enlarge in every ſhape the powers and privileges of the PEOPLE. But, perhaps, it may be found, that we are beginning at the wrong end of things; and that, before we make the people more powerful, we ſhould endeavour to make them better qualified for it; leſt, by giving them POWER, before they have got WISDOM, we make them more unhappy, and more vicious, than before.

(A) I wiſh I could aſſent to an opinion entertained by ſome of my friends, that "genius will *always* emerge." It would be much more pleaſing to me to adopt this idea, than to have to regret with the poet, that

"Full many a flower is born to bluſh unſeen,
"And waſte its ſweetneſs on the deſert air."

But I muſt confeſs that, from all I have obſerved, I am led to conclude, that the *Poet* is here a *Philoſopher*, and that the *Philoſophers* who differ from him, are *Poets*. I readily own that genius will ſurmount great diſadvantages; but beyond this I cannot go, becauſe I know that all human power is *limited*. There is a degree of *preſſure*, under which the ſublimeſt genius muſt *ſink*, unleſs its elaſticity were *infinite*.

Perhaps it was a little hyperbolical, to ſpeak of a *Newton* remaining unknown, although, as I ſhall ſhew by and by, I am not the firſt who have ventured on ſuch an expreſſion; but, if I ſhould admit, that ſuch a man, who often will not occur in the courſe of centuries, would always be able to raiſe himſelf into notice and diſtinction, it would ſtill be true of all the inferior claſſes of men of genius—of thouſands who might be highly uſeful to ſociety, who might in various ways inſtruct and enlighten mankind—that the diſadvantages of their circumſtances, ſtifling or miſdirecting their talents, would keep them in the ſituation of thoſe of whom the ſame Poet ſays,

"Chill

" Chill penury repreſs'd their noble rage,
" And froze the genial current of the ſoul."

That ſuperior talents ſhould lie dormant, and thus *ſeem* to have been created in vain, may indeed appear an unaccountable fact, although it is analogous to what happens throughout all nature. I have no evidence to convince me, that at this moment one half of the *power* that exiſts in the univerſe, animate or inanimate, is called forth into exertion. What treaſures of mineral ſtores are buried in the bowels of the earth! How vaſt a quantity of marble remains unpoliſhed in the quarry! Of the matter of precious ſtones and diamonds, how ſmall a proportion has been brought forth from the regions of darkneſs! how few, comparatively, have been enabled to reflect the ſolar light from their reſplendent ſides, or to exhibit their varied and brilliant colours to beings capable of admiring their beauties!

Is there any country now in the world, that nouriſhes ſo many animals, or men, as it might do? I believe not. China has been ſaid to be over-peopled; but this is a vulgar error. The avaricious genius of the people makes them throng together into towns, and on the banks of rivers, in order to carry on trade; and their relaxed ſyſtem of morals renders the expoſition of children very common; but the interior parts of their country contain *immenſe deſerts*, where the traveller is eternally in danger of being devoured by tigers. We may therefore truly ſay out, with Dr. Young,

" A

" A part how ſmall of the terraqueous globe
" Is tenanted by man! the reſt a *waſte*,
" *Rocks, deſerts*, frozen ſeas, and burning ſands! &c."

N. I.

The ſame analogy holds in the vegetable kingdom. The amazing and continual waſte of *ſeeds*, which, placed in more favourable ſituations, would have produced uſeful and beautiful plants, and ſhrubs, and trees, has been remarked by many Naturaliſts, and ſupplied matter of ſerious and profound ſpeculation to theſe excellent moraliſts, Biſhop Butler and Dr. Price. A thriving *elm*, according to M. Dodart, produces upwards of three hundred thouſand ſeeds annually. Of theſe there are not probably, on an average, above two or three that are placed in ſuch ſituations as to become trees. Other vegetables are ſtill more prolific; but their powers are exerted, *to appearance*, equally in vain. Put any ſpot of the earth into a new ſituation, and new productions will ſpontaneouſly ariſe, from ſeeds that have been entombed there for ages, and never would have ſprung up but for that circumſtance favourable to their production. Thus dry ground ſuddenly laid under water produces aquatic plants, which were not ſown there; and there are many inſtances on record, where, after great fires that have burned the ſurface of the ground, peculiar plants have ſpontaneouſly ariſen, flouriſhed for one year, and never appeared more.

From plants we may riſe to inſects. If we ſpeak

of

of the fate of their innumerable inviſible eggs, we ſhall diſcover the caſe to be exactly the ſame. The earth, ſays Mr Chamberlayne, will be found full of an inconceivable number of vegetables and animals, already perfectly formed and deſigned in miniature, which only ſtay for certain favourable accidents to appear in full length.

Animals come next, and obſerve the ſame laws. Every one knows what myriads of future beings are precluded from exiſtence, when the roe of a fiſh is deſtroyed. If we adopt the old ſyſtem of generation, from *animalcules* in the ſeminal liquor, and believe in the countleſs millions which Lewenhoeck ſaw by his microſcope in a ſingle drop, we ſhall readily grant, that one man, in certain circumſtances, might people the earth. But modern phyſiologiſts, in general attribute the rudiments of the future animal to the female, and the vivifying power alone to the male. It makes little difference to our argument. On every ſyſtem we perceive an amazing number of human embryos, who *might* have come into life, and been brought to perfection, if circumſtances had been favourable, and who, for want of theſe, have been utterly loſt. The world of embryos is more numerous than that of men and women!

How many children periſh in the womb—what numbers at their birth and in early infancy!—The proportion of mankind who arrive at the years of maturity is extremely ſmall.

Now *intellectual power*, and the developement of ge-

nius,

bius, are ſubjected to the ſame laws. "The *natural* "*improveableneſs* of the human race," ſays Dr. Price, "has never taken its complete effect. The greateſt "part of men have, from the beginning of the "world, been in a ſtate of darkneſs and barbariſm." And he adds, "This loſs of the effect of human "improveableneſs will appear equally remarkable, "if we conſider the *individuals* of mankind. *Thou-* "*ſands* of Boyles, Clarkes, and NEWTONS, have "probably been loſt to the world, and lived and died "in ignorance and meanneſs, merely for want of "being placed in favourable ſituations, and enjoying "proper advantages *."

Dr. Price, adopting the idea of Butler, carries the analogy ſtill farther, and makes uſe of this loſs of *improveable beings*, to juſtify his opinion of the final loſs and ruin of a great number of moral agents in a future world. But here, I own, I feel a ſtrong inclination to differ from this excellent writer, and to hope that a diſtinction may be made. The forms of *material nature* may change, and the diſſolution of *organization* will be leſs alarming, if we recollect, that the ſame particles become, in general immediately, parts of ſome other living and ſentient being. Their condition, therefore, is probably on the whole improving. But amidſt theſe changes in material bodies, the indiviſible, immaterial, and indeſtructible *mind* remains unmoved and ſecure. Our Author

* Diſs. on Providence, 4th edit. p. 151.

and Dr. Butler admit the diſtinction between mind and body, and therefore will not object to this mode of reaſoning. Now there is no proof that ever a Mind was loſt—there is even no probability of it. But my opinion in this matter is built on firmer grounds than metaphyſical argument. I conſider the final felicity and perfection of moral agents, as a neceſſary reſult of the divine perfections. The Almighty Phyſician will find out a remedy for every one that is ſick. He will not cut off, but cure, his patients. Men may be ſo infatuated as to wiſh to deſtroy themſelves; but they are the creatures of God, and he will not ſuffer his creatures to be deſtroyed, either by themſelves or any other. Infinite Goodneſs muſt deſire the happineſs and perfection of *all* under its care: Infinite Wiſdom knows the beſt means to bring it about;—and Infinite Power is able to put them in execution. Theſe are the great PILLARS on which this opinion muſt be built. We may be fooliſh and blind to our own intereſt, and our folly may excite the pity of our Creator; but it cannot change the benevolence of his nature; it cannot defeat the purpoſes of his wiſdom, nor diminiſh the energy of his power!

Moſt truly philoſophical was the maxim of the old Calviniſts, that "God did not change with change-"able man—that whom he loved, he loved unto the "*end*."—A ſenſible child knows that his parent will not ſuffer him to continue in habits of evil, and will puniſh him if he acts wrong. Yet he loves his pa-

rent,

rent, and confides in him, becauſe he believes that his parent loves him; and that, though he may correct him for his good, he will never finally withdraw his affection from him, or abandon him, much leſs ſeek to hurl him to deſtruction. If I believed that the Deity changed with my changes, I ſhould place in him only that faultering confidence which I put in myſelf. I ſhould feel myſelf leaning on feeble humanity, inſtead of the ROCK OF AGES!

But to reſume our ſubject. The ſame waſte that we ſee in inanimate nature, alſo takes place in vegetable nature, among animals, and in intellectual nature. There is the ſame waſte and loſs of the ſeeds of genius, as there is of the ſeeds of plants, or the embryos of animals and men. And to prevent this waſte, as far as is practicable, to bring forth the latent powers of nature, and carry them on to perfection, now furniſhes, and will probably continue to furniſh, a ſource of pleaſing and generous exertion, to benevolent minds in every period of exiſtence.

The powers of genius, deſtitute of favourable circumſtances and of education, either lie dormant for want of ſome object to call them forth, or are exerted on unworthy or extravagant objects, which render their efforts uſeleſs and ridiculous (of which I think I have obſerved ſeveral inſtances in the country); or, laſtly, they are often unfortunately directed to unlawful and pernicious objects, when they prove equally hoſtile to ſociety, and ruinous to their poſſeſſors.

Examples might eaſily be given to confirm theſe ideas. Educated amongſt robbers, Sir *Iſaac Newton* would perhaps have done more miſchief in a ſhorter time than others, and probably have arrived ſooner at an ignominious death than his companions. For want probably of proper impreſſions of wiſdom and virtue in early life, ariſing from that moſt important, but moſt neglected part of education, which reſpects the *culture of the heart*, the genius of *Crichton* was totally loſt to himſelf and to mankind. I cannot help conſidering this man as one of the moſt accompliſhed that ever appeared on the earth. For he excelled other men as much in *all things*, as thoſe commonly called Men of Genius, do in one or two things. But it was of no conſequence or value to himſelf or to mankind. For, not to mention the exceſſive drinking, to which he was addicted, his life in his ſober hours was little different from that of a mountebank; and, having lived as a fool, he died as one too.—In the way to which early impreſſions had directed it, what availed the genius of *M. Servin*, whom his father brought to the Duke of Sully "to "make him an honeſt and virtuous man," nature having made him complete in every thing elſe. From ſome unhappy turn given to his mind, *Mr. Philips* directed his extraordinary powers of addreſs and command over the human paſſions to the moſt infamous of purpoſes, having devoted his whole life to the ſeduction of innocent females; and, in fact, debauched

more virtuous women, in different countries, than any private individual that ever lived.

Thus genius requires education to *excite* its efforts, and to *direct* them to proper objects. If we ſpeak of the *moral*, which is the higheſt part of education, men of genius probably ſtand moſt in need of it. For our moral powers do not keep pace with natural endowments. Moral rules are a reſtraint on natural powers; and this reſtraint will be felt more oppreſſive, where the laſt power is ſtrong and luxuriant, than where it is ſcanty and feeble. The occurrences of common life make ordinary men tolerably virtuous. Such men quickly feel the difficulty of being vicious. But men of great abilities are not thus to be taught, for they ſurmount the difficulties, and continue their courſe. Wherever there is great power, there will be great temptation to abuſe it. Wherefore great genius is always dangerous, both to ſociety and itſelf, when it has not, by good education, been formed to habits of wiſdom and virtue.

In the opinions I have here and elſewhere delivered relative to human nature, I have endeavoured conſtantly to adhere to facts which I have myſelf obſerved, or which ſtand upon authentic record in the hiſtory of mankind. For it is only thus, and not by indulging the imagination in forming theories, were they ever ſo ingenious, that the true knowledge of *Man* is to be acquired. Now I believe there is no fact in nature, which, to an attentive obſerver, will contradict the ideas I have juſt delivered on the ne-

ceſſity of education to genius. But as all readers are not *obſervers*, nor *attentive*, I ſhall mention one or two things that occur to me, as objections which might be propoſed.

Dr. Young, one may remind me, has ſaid, that "Genius need not go to ſchool." It occurs in ſpeaking of the Florentine Hiſtorian,

"Poor *Macchiavel*, who labour'd hard his plan,
"Forgot that Genius need not go to ſchool," &c.

Where the meaning is, that Macchiavel, who wrote a moſt elaborate ſyſtem of iniquitous policy, might have ſaved himſelf the trouble; for dull men could not put his principles in practice, and men of genius did not need them, being already but too capable of vice, when they were inclined to it. This paſſage has no relation to the queſtion I am treating of.

Mr. Spence, in his Parallel between Magliabecchi and Robert Hill, mentions, among other extraordinary acquiſitions of the latter, that he obtained a wonderful knowledge of the Latin language almoſt without any books, having only ſome *fragments* of a Grammar. This indeed proves that genius, when *excited*, will overcome great difficulties; but ſtill an exciting power was wanted to produce theſe exertions; for if Mr. Hill had not lived amongſt perſons who admired the language of the Romans, and reſpected thoſe who cultivated it, he never would have directed his thoughts to any ſuch ſtudy.

Of the celebrated Magliabecchi ſtrange things are aſſerted; but ſome I think too ſtrange to be exactly true.

true. Thus it is ſaid, that, when quite a young boy, before he had learned to read or write, or knew any thing of letters, he uſed to delight in poring upon the leaves of old books, which his maſter uſed to wrap around things which he ſold. This, in the way it is told, ſeems to me equivalent to aſſerting, that Magliabecchi was divinely inſpired with the love of learning, and had an intuitive or inſtinctive diſcernment of the value of printed paper. In caſes of this kind I muſt refer to the old adage, *Ignoti nulla cupido.* We cannot poſſibly have a deſire for what is totally unknown to us, or I ſhould ſay, with Dr. Johnſon, "Seldom any ſplendid ſtory is *wholly* true."

We ſay of ſome men, who have diſtinguiſhed themſelves in different lines, that they were *ſelf-taught.* This is meant only *comparatively.* A variety of circumſtances, that occur in civilized ſociety, have combined to *excite* their attention to literature; and as many have concurred to *direct* them in the proceſs and object of their ſtudies. By *ſelf-taught* we only mean, that they have not gone through the formal diſcipline of Academies and Univerſities. They have then been *educated*, not by *teachers*, but by *circumſtances*; not in particular ſchools, but in the great ſchool of the world. And this kind of education, if one were ſure of its being properly applied, is of all the beſt and moſt effectual. For when knowledge is impoſed as a *taſk*, it is rarely regarded as a *pleaſure*, and therefore no great exertions are made to acquire it. The mind

purſues nothing *earneſtly*, which it does not find happineſs in. Many univerſities are ſo ill-diſciplined, that, inſtead of ſeminaries of ſcience, they become ſchools of dullneſs and idleneſs;—inſtead of expanding the mind, they contract it; and, in place of great men, produce dwarfs and *ſtarvelings*. And even where this is not the caſe, there is always a danger, that, by immerſing a young man amongſt books and learning, he may contract that nauſea and diſguſt at them, which attend the frequent repetition of any one thing whatever. He who reads becauſe he loves reading, not becauſe he is obliged to do it, who can go but occaſionally to his ſtudies, and has ſeveral little difficulties to encounter in his progreſs, is the man who is likely to do moſt in ſcience. Such a man goes to his books as a lover to his miſtreſs, after having braved the dangers of dark night, of watchful guardians, of creaking doors, &c. &c.

IV.

THOUGHTS

ON THE

ORIGIN OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE,

AND ON

THE ANTIQUITY OF THE WORLD.

" Οι μεν ϑν Θεος (ὅπερ ειπον) ἔτως ἡμιν παρεδοσαν σκοπειν,
" και μανθανειν, και διδασκειν αλληλοις—και οἱ μεν
" παλαιοι, κρειττοντες ἡμων και εγγυτερω Θεων οικϑντες,
" ταυτην φημην παρεδοσαν."

" The GODS gave to us the power of contemplating
" and learning, and alſo of teaching one another
" —the *ancients*, who were better than us, and
" dwelt nearer to the Gods, have tranſmitted to
" US THIS TRADITION." PLATO, Philebus.

TO

EBENEZER MAITLAND, Esq.

MERCHANT OF LONDON;

A SMALL EXPRESSION

OF RESPECT AND ESTEEM

FROM HIS FRIEND

THE AUTHOR.

P 6

THOUGHTS, &c.

THE curious queſtion, relative to the *origin of human knowledge*, deſerves to be more fully inveſtigated than it hath yet been. It is evident, that in the ancient world there was a great ſtock of knowledge, relative to the moſt ſublime ſubjects; and, when we come to enquire into the ſource of this knowledge, we are referred to remoter times, and from them again to periods ſtill more remote. Nor will it be ſufficient to account for this opinion, to ſay, that mankind have always been *laudatores temporis acti*, or magnifiers of the wiſdom of former times. It goes much farther than this will explain, and is attended with circumſtances to which this will not apply. Is it, for inſtance, to be ſuppoſed, that we ſhould find the learned Greeks, referring the origin of their knowledge to *barbarous* nations, for whom they

entertained a vaſt contempt, if they had had the leaſt feaſible claim, to have been the inventors of it themſelves?

The uniform opinion of all antiquity on this ſubject, is admirably expreſſed in the book of Job. On occaſion of ſome queſtion, that had been diſputed amongſt the ſpeakers, one of them ſays, "*Enquire, I "pray thee, of the former age, and prepare "thyſelf to the ſearch of their Fathers; for "we are but of yeſterday, and know nothing,*" &c. * Here the ſtudy of the *ancient doctrines* is pointed out as the true way to knowledge—to be of *modern age*, and to *know nothing*, are, in their writer's opinion, one and the ſame thing.

Indeed, whenever we ſet about to inveſtigate the origin of human knowledge, we are always referred back from age to age, till we come to ſuch an early period of the hiſtory of mankind, that we cannot ſuppoſe men to have been *then*, in any condition to make theſe diſcoveries of themſelves. If

* Job. viii. 8, 9.

we conſider that almoſt all the great diſcoveries, that have been made in arts and ſciences, have reſulted from chance, not from reſearch; and at the ſame time reflect, that nothing relative to the Deity, or the Origin of Nature, could be found out in that way; becauſe theſe things are not, like the others, ſubjected to our ſenſes; I ſay, if we conſider theſe circumſtances duly, I apprehend we ſhall be ſtrongly inclined, to attribute what knowledge of this kind we poſſeſs, to a higher ſource than our own inveſtigations. The concluſion that this ſeems to lead us to, is, that the knowledge which men poſſeſs of the Deity, of the origin of the world, and, perhaps, the principles of knowledge in general, were derived either from *Revelation* or *Tradition*.

A number of theſe fragments of PRIMÆVAL KNOWLEDGE are ſtill preſerved to us in the Greek writers. A few of them which I ſhall now copy in Engliſh will ſerve as a ſpecimen of the ancient opinion on this ſubject.

1. "There

1. "There is an ANCIENT TRADITION,
"handed down to all men from their Fa-
"thers, that of God, and by God, all
"things are made for us."

Ariſtotle de Mundo.

2. "The GODS gave to us the power of
"contemplating and learning, and alſo of
"teaching one another. The ancients, who
"were better than us, and dwelt nearer to
"the Gods, have tranſmitted to us this
"tradition."

Plato, Philebus.

3. "It is not a groundleſs obſervation,
"but agreeable to what was ſaid OF OLD,
"that *mind* always rules the univerſe."

Socrates in Plat. Phileb.

4. "It is not lawful to neglect the
"Gods when the TRADITION concerning
"them is evident, and confirmed by rea-
"ſon."

Plato de Rep.

5. "This moſt ANCIENT OPINION, the
"origin of which cannot be determined,
"has been communicated from theolo-
"gians and law-givers to poets and phi-
"loſophers, &c."

Plutarch de Iſid. et Oſirid.

6. "We

6. "We may ſay that the *firſt names* "were framed by the GODS."

Socrates in Platonis Cratylo.

7. "GOD gave to men theſe two arts "(pottery and weaving), that when reduced "to ſuch ſtraits (by the deluge) they might "ſpring up and multiply again."

Plato in Polit.

8. "Agriculture was not the effect of "art, but of nature by the aſſiſtance of "GOD."

Ib.

9. "I hope that the dead enjoy ſome-"thing, and that, *as it was ſaid of old*, it "will fare better with the good than with "the bad. There is a certain ANCIENT "TRADITION, which we remember, that "they go thither (that is, that ſouls go "into another world)."

Socrates in Plat. Phæd.

10. "We ought always to hearken to the "ANCIENT and SACRED TRADITIONS, which "intimate to us that the ſoul is immortal."

Plato Epiſt. ad Dion. Amicos.

11. "We have the beſt authorities to "confirm that opinion.—In the firſt place

" we have all the ANCIENTS, who, the " nearer they were to the origin of man- " kind, and of the Gods, the more clearly, " perhaps, they diſcerned the truth."

Cicero. Quæſt. lib. 1.

12. " Our opinion (relative to the im- " mortality of the ſoul) is *ſo ancient*, that " nobody knows its commencement, nor " who firſt entertained it; it has prevailed " *from the beginning*." Ariſtotle de Anima.

13. " One ſhould preſerve the rites of " his family and fathers; that is, ſince " antiquity approaches neareſt to the Gods, " a man ſhould maintain religion, becauſe " it is handed down, as it were, from the " Gods." Cicero de leg. lib. 2.

14. " When the Athenians conſulted " Apollo, what rites of religion they ſhould " retain, the anſwer was—theſe obſerved " by your anceſtors. And when they came " a ſecond time, and ſaid, that the manner " of worſhip of their anceſtors had been " often changed; and aſked, which of the " various manners they ſhould copy, the " anſwer was—' the beſt.' And certainly

" we

" we may conclude, that that is moſt an-
" cient and neareſt to God which is beſt."

Ib.

The Egyptians, among whom ſcience is ſaid to be more ancient than among any other people, did not pretend to have invented it themſelves, but owned that they received it by *tradition*. When any one came to them, ſays Mr. Shuckford, to collect knowledge, they never put him upon ſpeculating for himſelf, but they made him ſtudy the ſymbols and language in which the ancient traditions were delivered. This was in their idea the only road to wiſdom. Had the learner either neglected the ancient records, or pretended to ſet up opinions different from them, he would have appeared in their eyes altogether ridiculous. They would have either eſtemed him inſane, or at leaſt ſo contemptibly fooliſh, as not to deſerve any ſerious confutation. Without arguing with him, they would have ſaid at once, WHO ART THOU?—A MAN OF YESTERDAY—THAT DAREST TO PRETEND, BY THY VAIN AND WEAK FANCIES,

TO OPPOSE THAT ETERNAL TRUTH, WHICH IS AS ANCIENT AS THE BEGINNING OF NATURE!

Thus, according to them, AUTHORITY was the fountain of all knowledge. The memorable obſervation of an Egyptian Prieſt to Solon, mentioned by Plato in his Timæus, is well known to every ſtudent of ancient learning. When that great legiſlator travelled into Egypt for inſtruction, and had put ſome queſtions to the Prieſts, one of the oldeſt of them is reported to have ſaid—O, Solon, you Greeks are always children, having amongſt you no knowledge from ANCIENT TRADITION. Ου δεμιαν γαρ εχετε δι αρχαιαν ακοην ωαλαιαν δοξην.

Pythagoras, who had laboured more to underſtand, and to collect the remains of theſe ancient traditions, than almoſt any other perſon, was, for that reaſon, more profoundly learned than all his contemporaries. And when he returned to his own country, he brought with him exactly that ſpirit and theſe ideas, which ſuch a mode of inſtruction

inſtruction muſt neceſſarily have impreſſed. He impoſed a long and profound ſilence on his diſciples, that he might teach them in the moſt ſtriking manner, that the true mode of acquiring knowledge was, not to *ſpeculate* for themſelves, but to *liſten* attentively to the remains of ancient tradition. He perceived, that all who had departed from theſe, and invented ſyſtems of their own, had fallen into monſtrous errors and extravagance. Wherefore, with the trueſt propriety and conſiſtence, he commanded that none ſhould *ſpeak*, but that all ſhould *hear*.

It is only in the ſame way that any rational account can be given of the conduct of his pupils, who, when queſtioned relative to the grounds of their opinions, never aſſigned any other reaſon for them, than the *αυτος εφη*, *The Maſter hath ſaid it*. Pythagoras had received no *reaſons* for his opinions, and therefore gave none to his ſcholars. He taught his doctrines as *facts*; he was not accountable for them—they had exiſted from the beginning of time.

If his ſcholars believed in the veracity of their maſter, they muſt have believed that he *delivered* to them faithfully, what had been ſo *delivered* to himſelf; and therefore it was a ſufficient account of any of their opinions, that their Maſter had aſſerted it. We are not to imagine, that the ſcholars of Pythagoras were weak enough to regard him as a Deity. The notion of his inſpiration was a conceit, invented by writers who lived many ages after; and when the true account of this matter was no longer known. He pretended not to have derived his knowledge from HEAVEN, but owned that he learned it in *Egypt*.

Mr. Shuckford, who was profoundly acquainted with the ancient philoſophy, has ſhewn, in my opinion, very ſatisfactorily, that all thoſe who departed from the ancient traditions, and ſpeculated for themſelves, ſpeculated wrong, and corrupted knowledge in place of advancing it. The origin of falſe religion is by him aſcribed entirely to this ſource. "If we examine," ſays he, "we ſhall ſee, that, from the be-

"ginning

" ginning to the preſent times, it has al-
" ways been a vain philoſophy, and an
" affectation of ſcience, *falſely* ſo called,
" that has corrupted religion *." He proceeds: The firſt men of Egypt had, without doubt, ſome account of the hiſtory of the world, and of its Author, tranſmitted to them; but they relinquiſhed this to indulge their own ſpeculations; and they happened to ſpeculate wrong. Of SYPHIS, one of their ancient kings, who began his reign, A. M. 2164, about 80 years after Abraham came into Egypt, it is ſaid by Syncellus †, περιοπτης εις Θεὸς εγενετο; from which Sir John Marſham ‡ would infer, that he pretended to have *ſeen* God, and converſed with him, as Abraham did; and hence he aſcribes the origin of the Egyptian errors to this king's Θεοπτια, or pretence of having *ſeen* God. But Mr. Shuckford contends, that the phraſe is equivalent to *contemplator in Deos fuit*, he was a ſpeculator on the Gods, and derives

* Connect. I. p. 318.
† P. 56.
‡ Canon Chron. p. 51.

the Egyptian errors from his vain ſpeculations. He conſidered the heavenly bodies, and obſerving their influence on the world, and how they nouriſhed and gave life and vigour to all things, he concluded, that they were great and powerful Deities, and appointed a worſhip for them. Others went farther; till, at length, the entire fabric of ſuperſtition was completed.

"All hiſtory, both ſacred and profane,
"offers various arguments to prove, that
"God revealed to men in the firſt ages
"how he would be worſhipped; but that
"when men, inſtead of adhering to what
"had been revealed, came to lean to their
"own underſtandings, and to ſet up what
"they thought to be right, in the room
"of what God himſelf had directed, they
"loſt and bewildered themſelves in endleſs
"errors. This, I am ſenſible, is a ſubject
"that ſhould be examined to the bottom;
"and I am perſuaded, if it were, the reſult
"of the enquiry would be this, that he
"that thinks to prove, that the *world ever*
"did in fact *by wiſdom know God*, that any

"nation

" nation upon earth, or any ſet of men ever
" did, from the principles of reaſon *only*,
" without any aſſiſtance from Revelation,
" find out the true nature and true wor-
" ſhip of the Deity, muſt find out ſome
" hiſtory of the world entirely different
" from all the accounts which the preſent
" ſacred or profane writers do give us;
" or his opinion muſt appear to be a mere
" gueſs and conjecture of what is barely
" poſſible, but what all hiſtory aſſures us
" never was really done in the world *."

He reſumes the ſubject, vol. II. p. 279. 305 and p. 459, &c. concluding from the whole, that, " the worſhip of falſe Gods
" was founded, not upon ſuperſtition, but
" upon learning and philoſophical ſtudy;
" not upon too great a belief of, and ad-
" herence to, Revelation; but upon a pre-
" tended knowledge of the powers of na-
" ture. Their great and learned men
" erred in theſe points, not for want of
" *free-thinking*, ſuch as they called ſo;

* Vol. I. p. 365.

" but

" but their opinions upon theſe ſubjects " were in direct oppoſition to the true " Revelations which had been made to the " world, and might be called the *Deiſm* of " thoſe ages *," &c.

Theſe obſervations of Mr. Shuckford are certainly in general well founded. I have only to remark, that, in his zeal againſt the Deiſts, he has borne too hard upon the *firſt-thinkers*, for deviating from the primitive traditions. For it ſhould be remembered, that in theſe early periods of the world, when almoſt the whole attention, even of the higher ranks of men, was devoted to the laborious taſk of providing for their ſubſiſtence, many of the primitive traditions would be loſt; for men who, from their ignorance of all the arts of life, were every day expoſed to periſh with hunger and cold, or to be devoured by wild beaſts, would find little leiſure to beſtow on philoſophical or religious ſpeculations. And, beſides, all the means of pre-

* Vol. II. p. 460.

ſerving knowledge were then ſo poor and imperfect, that it may very well be ſuppoſed, that ſuch of theſe traditions as were not totally loſt, would be ſo much disfigured and corrupted, as to command little reverence, and be altogether unſatisfactory to thinking and enquiring minds. If the traditional doctrine concerning the nature and worſhip of the true God, had been completely preſerved among the Egyptians, it is ſcarce to be ſuppoſed, that they would ſo ſoon, and ſo generally, have deviated into the worſhip of the ſun, moon, and ſtars. The arguments for the worſhip of the planets, muſt needs have appeared to them more credible and more ſtriking, than the traditions that remained concerning the true God. For men cannot love error, becauſe it is error; nor is it poſſible for them to chuſe rather to be miſled, deceived, and impoſed on, than to be guided aright.

In ſuch circumſtances, therefore, it is not ſurprizing, that men, when their ſituation allowed them ſome leiſure, leaving theſe traditions, ſhould have tried what they

they could do by their own reaſon. For the Divine Being hath implanted a curioſity and an inquiſitiveneſs in our nature, which leads us to inveſtigate the cauſes of things, and to be reſtleſs, untill we have ſome how accounted to ourſelves for them. And as children, when they firſt attempt to walk, muſt often meet with accidents and falls, ſo it is not to be wondered at, if men, at their firſt eſſays to reaſon, eſpecially on ſuch tranſcendent ſubjects, fell into many miſtakes, and concluded the ſun, or other beings, to be the authors of all things.

And thus, granting all Mr. Shuckford's aſſertions, it is notwithſtanding clear, that the origin of falſe religion, or the loſs of the primitive truths, is only mediately due to *ſpeculation*, but may be traced up to a higher ſource, namely, the weakneſs and *ignorance* of mankind, and the low and rude condition in which they exiſted before the invention of the arts of life.

But to proceed, the queſtion relative to the origin of human knowledge hath been decided by ſome of the profoundeſt enquirers

quirers into antiquity. *F. Socinus* maintains, with great ingenuity, that men were not capable of diſcovering the exiſtence and attributes of God without Revelation. *Leland* and *Shuckford* have eſpouſed the ſame argument; and the laſt has defended it with great learning, in the preface to his Connection of Sacred and Profane Hiſtory. My eſteemed friend, the Rev. *Mr. Paton of Craig*, has written a curious and intereſting pamphlet, which deſerves to be better known, entitled, "*An Attempt to ſhew, that* "*the Knowledge of God has, in all Ages, been* "*derived from Revelation or Tradition not* "*from Nature* *:" in which he has collected the moſt ſtriking paſſages from the ancient philoſophers to confirm his opinion; and commented upon them with equal learning and judgement.

To thoſe who objected St. Paul's aſſertion, that "the inviſible things of God "are clearly ſeen from the creation of the "world, being underſtood by the things

* Glaſgow, 1773, 8vo. p. 131.

"which

" which are made * ;" Mr. Paton replies, that St. Paul explains this himſelf in the preceding verſe, by ſaying, that "God had "ſhewed it to them ;" that is, the Deity himſelf had taught them to diſcern in his works the hand of their author. So that *after* this teaching, but not *before* it, the Heavens declared the glory of God to them, and the firmament ſhewed forth his handy work. And in the ſame way is to be explained the Apoſtle's aſſertion, that " the Gentiles, who have not the law, do " by *nature* the things contained in the " law ;" where the meaning is, not that the indefinite language of nature, would teach the Gentiles to do all that the written Revelation could have taught them ; but only, that the voice of nature, *as it came to them*, that is, explained and illuſtrated by ancient tradition, did teach them as much of their duty, as ſubjected them to moral obligations, though they had read no written law.

* Rom. i. 20.

That nature alone, unexpounded by Revelation or Tradition, ſhould be able to teach men the exiſtence and perfections of God, and their duty towards him, is a fond and ill-grounded idea, totally contradicted by the hiſtory of mankind. There is no proof that any claſs of men ever acquired their knowledge in this way. The glorious ſun, the reſplendent moon, and ſhining ſtars, have indeed, in every age, proclaimed their Creator's praiſe to thoſe who already knew him, and had been taught to conſider theſe as the works of his hands. But to others they have told nothing but *their own brightneſs*. So far were they from being able to teach the exiſtence of God to mankind, that they could not even keep up that knowledge after it had been taught. On the contrary, they became the means of deſtroying it; for in all countries, where there were not *repeated* revelations from the great Source of Wiſdom, which at firſt imparted them, mankind forgot the God whom they had learned to adore, and worſhipped that ſun, and

moon,

moon, and ſtars, in his ſtead. The ſame hath happened to all the other parts of nature. When contemplated *apart* and *alone*, by thoſe who poſſeſſed no higher knowledge, they have continually been the means of leading men away from God. Hence the Philoſophers became Atheiſts; and the vulgar deified the elements, and worſhipped dead men, frail human beings like themſelves, yea, and paid divine adoration to animals, to birds, to plants, and creeping things; ſo that there is ſcarcely a ſingle object in nature which hath not in its turn ſupplanted its Creator! The conſtant tendency of man, in his native ſtate, hath ever been to ſink down from the ſkies, and *gravitate*, if I may ſo expreſs it, to the centre of the earth. Human nature, a feeble and delicate plant, hath always required the frequent interpoſition of him who firſt reared it, to preſerve it from drooping and decay.

The opinion, that man was at firſt *divinely* inſtructed, receives conſiderable ſupport from thoſe arguments of Lord Monboddo,

boddo, which prove the original lowneſs of human nature, and the near approach of man to inferior animals in his natural ſtate: arguments which alarmed the pride of modern times not a little, and excited the oppoſition of philoſophers, while there was room for oppoſition; that is, till the voyages of *Cooke* and others into the Southern Ocean, confirmed them by teſtimonies not to be reſiſted, and evinced at once the veracity of the relations given by the ancient writers, and the extenſive learning of their modern expoſitor [*a*]. *M. de Luc*, in his valuable Lettres ſur l'Hiſtoire de la Terre et de l'Homme, is another illuſtrious evidence on this ſide of the queſtion: *Profeſſor Meiners* of Gottingen has followed in the ſame tract; and in his

[*a*] In a large note at the end of this tract, I have endeavoured to account for the reluctance of philoſophers to ſubmit to theſe humbling views of human nature; and have alſo adduced a few facts, to ſhew how much of our dignity we owe to Philoſophy and Revelation. I hope they may be uſeful to ſome of my readers who are not verſant in ſuch ſubjects.

Hiſtoria doctrinæ de vero Deo, omnium rerum auctore atque rectore, 8vo, *Lemgoviæ*, 1780, throws out many obſervations, which tend to confirm the ideas of Mr. Paton.

The book of *M. Dutens*, to prove that moſt part of the modern diſcoveries were known in the ancient world, ſtill tends to ſtrengthen the proof. Nor will the differences of opinion, in other reſpects, prevent us from drawing arguments out of *M. Bailly's* Lettres à M. de Voltaire, ſur l'origine des Sciences, et ſur celle des Peuples de l'Aſie, or even from the Recherches ſur l'origine du deſpotiſme Orientale of *M. Boulanger*.

The naturaliſts furniſh us with many facts. *Mr. Whitehurſt*, in his theory of the Earth, inquiring how the ancients came to the knowledge of the Chaos, proves, that arts and knowledge had arrived in the old world to a greater length than we at preſent have any conception of.

Some philoſophers have indeed attempted to account for this, by attributing vaſt antiquity to the earth, and ſuppoſing infinite

races

faces of men to have lived on it, and cultivated arts, long before any period of which we have the hiſtory. But their aſſertions on this ſubject ſeem little more than hypotheſes. Where is the memory of theſe primæval times? It no more exiſts than the remembrance of that præ-exiſtent ſtate, which Plato attributed to the human ſoul. And if we ſhould admit that earthquakes, deluges, and other dreadful commotions, had, at a certain time, ſwept away the whole human race, except a few perſons, unqueſtionably thoſe individuals would never have been able to forget ſo awful a ſcene, as the general wreck of nature; it muſt have imprinted itſelf indelibly on their minds [*a*]; they would teach it to their children, and it would now appear amongſt the firmeſt and beſt eſtabliſhed remains of ancient tradition. But we have

[*a*] See this ſtrongly painted in the 4th ſection of M. Boulanger's *Recherches ſur l'origine du Deſpotiſme Orientale*; which treats of the impreſſions, which the calamities of the earth muſt have made on the minds of the firſt men.

nothing of this kind which merits attention, except the account given by the legiſlator of the Jewiſh people, Moses, who rightly aſcribes the general deluge, not to natural cauſes *alone*, but to the interference of him who is the Author and Governor of Nature. For if we believe in that general calamity [*a*], which not Moſes only,

[*a*] Perhaps, however, we may charge the Moſaic hiſtory with more than is neceſſary, when we ſuppoſe it to teach the doctrine of an *univerſal deluge*. The phraſe that the earth was covered with water, may mean no more than that the *inhabited* (which was then a ſmall) part of the earth was ſo covered. The Hon. Mr. Barrington has adduced ſeveral ſtrong arguments in favour of this idea, and endeavoured to ſhew, that the expreſſions in Geneſis do not neceſſarily imply, that the deluge was *univerſal*. The reader may conſult his "Obſervations on the Apa-" mean Medal," publiſhed in the fourth volume of the Archæologia, p. 315. At leaſt I would much rather adopt this expoſition, than admit any *ſolid* objection againſt the authority of Moſes, whoſe hiſtory, were it treated with the ſame candour that is uſed to other ancient writers, I am convinced would be found as accurate as any, and more authentic than all.

but

but innumerable Heathen writers have preſerved the tradition of, I think we muſt acknowledge, that there is not, in the ordinary powers of nature, an energy adequate to produce ſo great a revolution. An earthquake may raiſe an iſland in the ocean; may disjoin a neck of land from a continent; the ſea may overflow a ſmall ſpace of ground; but when they have done this, their power is exhauſted; the ſea is reduced to its level; the force of the earthquake is loſt in the air. Beſides, it is unphiloſophic to ſuppoſe a power in Nature to deſtroy the *entire* ſyſtem of Nature. It is a vulgar idea, that earthquakes and ſimilar phænomena are things out of the courſe of Nature, and adapted only to deſtroy and lay waſte the earth. Philoſophers know, that, for important purpoſes, a vaſt quantity of ſubterraneous fire is lodged in the bowels of the earth, and they conſider volcanoes as *ſpiracles*, or breathing holes, to this fire, by which it diſcharges its ſuperfluity. Hence they conclude, that, although they occaſionally produce partial

evil, they muſt needs tend to promote general good. Nor is it to be doubted, that their operations are as regular, and as much ſubjected to fixed laws, as any thing elſe in nature. Our ignorance of theſe laws does not entitle us to conclude, that they do not exiſt. There was a time when the moon was deemed an erratic or wandering body; but, when we found out the laws of its motions, we were convinced, that not the moon was *irregular*, but that we had not before known its *rule*. We muſt not, therefore, detach earthquakes from the *harmony* of nature, or raſhly conclude, that they "break Heaven's deſign;" but, on the contrary, view them as parts of the great ſyſtem, which are equally controlled by the omnipotent Governor, as thoſe motions which are moſt regular and fixed, and which exhibit, when rightly underſtood, the ſame proofs of *wiſdom*, yea and of *gooaneſs*, that we obſerve in the moſt pleaſing and ſalutary phænomena of the terreſtrial ſyſtem.

The antiquity of the world has alſo been

taken

taken up by *naturaliſts* upon various grounds. Of theſe, ſome are too precarious to prove any thing with certainty; as, for inſtance, the argument founded upon the numerous beds of lava, with each a layer of earth between them, diſcovered in digging pits in Sicily. An eruption of Mount Etna having been traced, by the accuracy of the deſcription, to the times of the ancient Greeks; and the lava being found ſcarcely covered with earth, even at this day, it was concluded, that many thouſand years were requiſite for this purpoſe; and, of conſequence, that when ſo many beds of lava were diſcovered, with ſoil between each of them, it muſt neceſſarily prove an amazing antiquity of the earth. But in anſwer to this, it ſeems to be proved, that no certain concluſion can be formed, as to the time that may be required, to cover a bed of lava with earth; becauſe, in different ſituations, this will be altogether different. So that no dependance can be placed on ſuch a vague and uncertain calculation.

Not leſs precarious is the argument drawn from *petrifaction*. At the requeſt of the late Emperor of Germany, ſome piles of the wood, on which Trajan founded his bridge over the Danube, were taken up; when it was found, that the petrifaction had advanced no farther than $\frac{3}{4}$ of an inch into their ſubſtance during the ſpace of 1500 years. Taking this as a rule, it was calculated, that a large tree, about 40 feet high, and thick in proportion, ſeveral of which have been found petrified, would require about 90,000 years to undergo this change. But what beginner, even in natural hiſtory, is ignorant, that the proceſs of petrifaction is as various as the places where it is carried on. Had Trajan's pile been immerged in certain ſtreams, it probably never would have petrified at all; and if it had been put into the ſtream, that flows from the dropping well at Knareſborough, if I may judge from what I have ſeen there, I ſhould ſuppoſe it might have been completely petrified in a few years.

There are other arguments, however, more ſolid, and which merit much attention. But, before noticing them, I muſt obſerve, that the whole ſubject of enquiry has been generally treated in a confuſed manner by Naturaliſts. They have blended things together, which ſhould have been kept ſeparate; and, in conſequence, when they proved one part of the queſtion, they have concluded the others to be proved alſo. But the ſubject of the antiquity of the world naturally divides itſelf into *three* queſtions.

1ſt. Whether the *matter* only, which compoſes our globe, is to be conſidered as of high antiquity, while the *form* it preſently ſuſtains is really *new*; or, what will in effect be the ſame thing, whether there exiſted a primæval earth before the one we now inhabit; an earth like the preſent, conſiſting of land and water, and which was habitable, while the preſent land was ſubmerged at the bottom of the ocean?

2d. Whether the preſent earth we now inhabit, or that form which now exiſts of

the

the primæval matter, theſe lands and ſeas that we are acquainted with, are alſo to be conſidered as of high antiquity ?

3d. Whether, ſuppoſing theſe to be proved, we have any deciſive proofs of the antiquity of the *human race?* For the matter of the earth may have exiſted long; there may have been primæval earths; the form of the preſent earth may have exiſted long; the productions of the ſea, and even inferior animals, may have lived there, while as yet there were no human beings in exiſtence.

The two firſt queſtions are of ſmall conſequence in the Moſaic Hiſtory. Probably the affirmative of both is the real doctrine of Moſes; ſo that he and the modern naturaliſts differ in appearance only, and not in reality. But though this could not well be made out, Moſes, as has been judiciouſly obſerved, does not write as a *naturaliſt*, nor with a view to explain philoſophically the origin of the earth. Perhaps he would not have mentioned the ſubject at all, had it not been to eſtabliſh

this great truth, already loſt ſight of amongſt men, that the heavens and the earth were not *Gods*, but the *creatures of God*, and that they derived not their exiſtence from themſelves, or from inferior or evil beings, but from JEHOVAH, the one only living and true God, the ſingle Sovereign and Almighty Parent of the univerſe. Having aſſerted this in deciſive terms, he enters into no curious theories, but contenting himſelf with ſtating a few leading *facts*, which have never yet been confuted, and probably never will, he haſtens forward to *man*, who is the proper ſubject of his hiſtory.

But the deciſion of the laſt queſtion is more important. For it ſeems that the Jewiſh hiſtorian is explicit, in aſſerting the *novelty and recent origin of the human race*; and if we ſtop a little to inveſtigate the matter, I apprehend, we ſhall have the ſatisfaction to find this point pretty well ſecured from objections.

Thoſe deep *gullies* in the middle of hard rocks, which a ſmall ſtream, by its running

ning for innumerable ages, is *ſuppoſed* to have hollowed out, what do they prove? The water may have found the fiſſure already made, and have run down by it, as it would have done any where *qua data porta*. Thus the gully would be the occaſion of the ſtream, not the ſtream the cauſe of the gully. But granting the caſe to be reverſed, we have only a proof of the antiquity of the *form of the earth*, which it does not at all embarraſs us to allow.

It ſeems to be proved, that all *calcareous* earth is produced from the *exuviæ* of ſhells, and by the diſſolution of marine animals. Chemical experiments ſhew us, that this kind of earth has the ſame properties with theſe bodies, and there is no other way in which we can give a rational account of its origin, but by aſcribing it to them.

In marle pits, lime quarries, and all other depoſits of calcareous matter, ſhells are found, ſome of them entire, others nearly diſſolved, and ſome in every intermediate ſtage of diſſolution. The opinion that theſe are only *luſus naturæ*, is highly

improbable,

improbable, and cannot now be retained by any perſon who is verſant in natural knowledge. The exact reſemblance they bear to the original productions is ſo great, as almoſt to amount to a demonſtration of their identity. For we find in the foſſils all the little peculiarities that exiſt in the original ſhells. The thin and brittle ſhells are ſeldom found entire; even the hard ones are chaffed, as they muſt have been by toſſing on the ſhore. The ſame ſhell appears of different ſizes, as it is naturally, according to its age; and if there be any peculiarity of colour or ſtructure in the younger ſhell, which is changed as it grows old, the ſame circumſtances occur in the foſſil ſpecimens of it. The ſea-ſnail, and others of the wandering ſhell-fiſh, become ſo burdened by other ſmall ones, ſuch as cockles, lempots, &c. which ſtick to them, that, at length, they are ſcarcely able to drag themſelves along. We find, ſays M. de Luc *, theſe ſame *poor porters* among

* Lettre 53d, where the reader will find more information on this ſubject.

the foſſil-ſhells; ſo that there can be no reaſon to doubt, of their having led this laborious life formerly in the ſea. Where theſe ſhell-fiſh are liable to be marked by the prints of thoſe who have once infeſted them, ſimilar prints are found in the foſſil-ſhells. In ſhort, there can be no doubt that calcareous earth is produced from the remains of ſea animals; and, as ſo great a proportion of the ſubſtance of the earth (the ingenious Dr. Hutton conjectures about a fourth part) is of the calcareous kind, it is concluded, that immenſe ages muſt have paſſed before ſo vaſt a number of marine animals could have been produced, and have gone to decay. Let us admit this; it will only prove a primæval earth, but will not go ſo far as to prove even the antiquity of the form of the *preſent* globe; for moſt of this calcareous ſubſtance, may be ſuppoſed to have been produced during the exiſtence of that primæval earth.

The beds of ſea-ſhells and foſſil-bones of various animals, found in digging at the

the tops of the higheſt mountains, and in places the moſt remote from the ſea, often many feet deep, and extending through whole provinces, prove to us, indeed, that what is now land was once ſea, and *vice verſa*; and alſo, that, in all probability, there was a primæval earth, conſiſting of land and water, and inhabited by inferior animals; but beyond this we cannot advance a ſtep. A world of inferior animals, without men, may ſeem a paradox to many people, and will not readily be allowed by thoſe, who have been accuſtomed to conſider the animal creation as *ſolely* or *primarily* formed for the uſe of man. But if their opinion were juſt, we may aſk them, why there are thouſands of animals placed in the bottom of the ocean, and in regions totally inacceſſible to man—thouſands which his eye never ſaw—thouſands which are conſtantly noxious to him; which can never exiſt in the ſame place with him; with whom he is forced to wage eternal war; and, laſtly, I may add, millions too ſmall to be cognoſcible by any of his ſenſes? The ſub-

ſerviency of the animals to one another, or to man, is doubtleſs only a *ſecondary* object of their creation: the *primary* one is their own happineſs. Such an end is altogether ſuitable to our ideas of that Being, who, from the infinite benevolence of his nature, muſt take pleaſure in the happineſs of a worm, as well as in that of a man or an angel. We exalt ourſelves too high in the ſyſtem of nature. Behold, God is great, and deſpiſeth not any! The ſmalleſt occurrences that happen to his loweſt creatures eſcape not his notice. A ſparrow cannot fall to the ground without him.

Theſe conſiderations appear to me ſufficient to ſhew, that there is nothing abſurd in the notion of a world of animals only; but if any one cannot be reconciled to this opinion, he may, if he chuſe, remedy its defect, by adopting an idea of Mr. Engel of Berne, which I ſhall take notice of in a few pages after this.

It always ſtruck me as a remarkable circumſtance, in peruſing the books of naturaliſts, that, although I ſaw many

things

things adduced in proof of the antiquity of the *world* in general, I perceived no teſtimonies of the antiquity of *men*. At the ſame time, I obſerved, that, in the minds of moſt readers, the two things were connected together, as if the laſt muſt needs be true, when the firſt was ſhewn to be ſo. But there is a material difference between the two propoſitions. Naturaliſts have found, in the loftieſt mountains, beds of ſea-ſhells; but who, amidſt the wrecks of the primitive earth, ever diſcovered any relicts of man? who, amidſt the remains of primæval ſtrata, ever found a human ſcull?

In a late diſſertation on the theory of the earth *, the whole force of the modern diſcoveries in Chemiſtry and Mineralogy are brought to the aid of the ingenious writer. But though he treats his ſubject with the utmoſt freedom that a philoſopher could deſire, and aſſerts that natural hiſtory furniſhes us with many documents, which

* By Dr. Hutton, in the Edin. Tranſactions, vol. I.

prove that inferior animals exiſted long before the period of time of which we have any account; he at the ſame time obſerves, that the Moſaic hiſtory places the beginning of *man* at no great diſtance; and he candidly owns, that " there has not " been found, in natural hiſtory, any docu- " ments, by which a high antiquity might " be attributed to the human race."

M de Luc has ſomewhere obſerved, that nothing but extreme inattention and prejudice could have prevented any naturaliſt, who had compared the accounts invented by men of the origin of nature, with that of Moſes, from giving a decided preference to the latter. I did not aſſent to this aſſertion at firſt hearing it; but, deſirous of inveſtigating whether the thing really was ſo, I ſet about making a large collection of opinions, relative to the origin of the world, and of man, out of the antient writers, compared with modern expoſitors, ſuch as Brucker, Stanley, Hyde, Burnet, the Archæologia, &c books of voyages and travels, and, in ſhort, all other works

where ſuch relations could be found. But after I had proceeded a conſiderable way in this reſearch, finding nothing but abſurdities and contradictions—" No light, " but rather darkneſs viſible," I gave up the purſuit, and returned with redoubled ſatisfaction to the ſublime, ſimple, and deciſive declaration of Moses, " In the be- " ginning God created the heavens and " the earth."

I have obſerved, in the hiſtory of mankind, that almoſt in every age, in proceſs as new diſcoveries were made in natural ſcience, ſomebody appeared, who held forth theſe diſcoveries as repugnant to the Moſaic hiſtory. And I am ready to admit, that this has often been done from good motives; from the love of truth, and a ſincere deſire of better information. But, at the ſame time, I have noted, that there always aroſe ſome other man, who, by carrying theſe diſcoveries a little farther, ſhewed that they did not confute the relation of Moſes. Now, as this proceſs has been ſo often repeated, and has been going

on for ſeveral hundred years, during which time our ſyſtem of natural knowledge has undergone a variety of changes, I may be excuſed if I ſay, that I cannot help putting ſome confidence in it, and thinking that it is very likely it will go on ſome centuries longer, perhaps to the laſt ſcene of nature. So that, if new diſcoveries in ſcience ſhould be made, and theſe apparently as hoſtile to the Moſaic hiſtory, as any we have had before, I ſhould ſtill expect that a new philoſopher would appear, to bring about a new reconciliation, as has formerly happened in ſimilar caſes. The hiſtory recorded in the book of Geneſis is ſomething *permanent*, on which I can fix my mind; while our diſcoveries in chemiſtry and natural hiſtory are partial, imperfect, and ever fluctuating. For theſe reaſons, I confeſs, I am loth to give up the *Great Hiſtorian* of the *Jewiſh People*, until I ſee very ſtrong grounds for doing ſo. And, whenever this is the caſe, I hope I ſhall be able to ſhew, that though *carus Moſes, carior opinio antiqua*; yet *cariſſima veritas*.

While

While I am conſidering this ſubject, I ought to mention a work lately publiſhed by Dr. Toulmin, firſt entitled, "The "*Antiquity*," and next edition, 8vo, Lond. 1785, "The *Eternity* of the World." Something capital might have been expected, from a book publiſhed expreſsly on this ſubject, and where the author appears ſo entirely free from any reſtraint in uttering his opinions, that he has boldly declared in favour of Atheiſm; aſſerted that the Univerſe creates and governs itſelf; and that no one of a ſound mind or underſtanding will believe in *uncauſed exiſtence*. But how ſadly was I diſappointed, when I peruſed this poor, ſuperficial performance; in which, except a few facts borrowed from Dr. Black's chemical lectures at the univerſity of Edinburgh, I could recognize nothing but a farrago of undigeſted and frothy declamation! To depart from ancient and univerſally received opinions, without the ſtrongeſt and moſt ſolid reaſons, is, in my opinion, a ſure proof of a weak and thoughtleſs mind. Had the

author taken for his model any of theſe great men, who have moſt enlightened the world by their diſcoveries in ſcience—had he copied *Newton* in the natural, or *Butler* in the moral world—he would have conducted his work in a perfectly oppoſite manner. Theſe truly reſpectable enquirers, after premiſing the ſtrongeſt facts, deduce from them the moſt modeſt concluſions. Their argument never ſtands in need of ſtrained oratory, or tragical declamation. The reader is convinced before he arrives at the concluſion; he is borne along by the irreſiſtible torrent of evidence which is poured forth in their reaſoning. The laſt mentioned writer is ſo extremely cautious, that he ſcarcely makes a ſingle aſſertion, in the whole of his book, without limiting it by ſome qualifying phraſe, ſuch as, "at "leaſt if,"—"unleſs in caſes where,"—"except ſo and ſo ſhould interfere," &c. ſo much was he afraid of leading his reader into any miſtake by too raſh a deciſion. *This* is the true philoſophic ſpirit, to which Dr. Toulmin ſeems utterly a ſtranger.

ſtranger. His concluſions are every where as precipitate, as his premiſes are looſe and feeble. To the diſguſt ariſing from the weakneſs of his arguments, he adds ſtill more, by conſtantly repeating, that it is impoſſible you ſhould be unconvinced, if your mind is not fettered and perverted by ſuperſtition. He will not allow either reaſon, or love of truth, or virtue, or common ſenſe, to them who differ from him; and he wearies out his readers, with his eternal and feeble ſupplications to believe him.

Ordinary writers think it incumbent on them, to acquaint themſelves with the opinions that have been held, and the books that have been written, on their ſubject, previous to their own publication. But ſuch dull drudgery would have been quite beneath the ſublime genius of Dr. Toulmin. With exalted heroiſm, worthy of ſuch a cauſe, he ſweeps away all the labours of paſt ages, as chaff from before him, and, taking in his hand the book of nature, as his compaſs, launches at once into the ocean of enquiry, and arrives in

an inſtant at the deſired harbour. All the relations of ancient hiſtorians relative to the origin of the world—all the remains of primitive tradition—all the hiſtory of Moſes and the ſacred writers—are by him diſcuſſed in one ſentence of his firſt ſection: "The talk of commenting upon *ridiculous* "*opinions* declined." This is a moſt elegant and *ſpirited* way of apologizing for one's ignorance of ancient learning; and it will no doubt be highly approved by a number of modern wits, who, being equally ignorant, and equally vain, are much gratified at hearing that knowledge ridiculed, which they do not poſſeſs, and have not diligence enough to acquire. But we muſt remind Dr. Toulmin, that, though he may have the applauſe of ſcioliſts and little faſhionable ſceptics, he muſt take other means to obtain that of the learned and wiſe. For "a contempt of the monuments "and wiſdom of antiquity, may juſtly be "reckoned one of the reigning follies of "theſe days, to which pride and *idleneſs* "have equally contributed." JOHNSON.

One

One would have ſuppoſed, that, beſides muſtering up all the forces already levied, to ſupport the eternity of the world, he would have added ſomething of his own, as he undertook the particular defence of the tenet, and as there is ſo much need of ſtrengthening the proof, if it could be accompliſhed. But, in place of this, he does not appear even to have known all that has been already ſaid on the ſubject; and if he had put his book into the hands of a candid and intelligent theiſt, he would have helped him not a little.

He conſtantly falls into the error I have noticed before, of confounding the antiquity of man with the antiquity of the world; and ſcarcely deigns to hint that they may be *two* queſtions. Having adduced the remains of vegetables and animals, as a proof of a primæval earth, he concludes, that "on every ſuch occaſion "the human ſpecies *muſt* have been pre-"ſent," (p. 54) for this convincing reaſon, that the idea, "that the world ſhould have "been thus agitated in *unobſerved confuſion*,

"is

" is the moſt unnatural of all ſuppoſitions." Does he mean that God (or, as he would ſay, *Nature*) could not preſerve order in the world without man to help him? Did the revolutions of nature loſe all their beauty and excellence, becauſe man was not preſent to obſerve them? or, is he ſure that they paſſed unobſerved by ſuperior beings, becauſe man ſaw them not? The exiſtence of angels and ſuperior beings is as probable on the Atheiſtic, as on the Chriſtian ſyſtem. The Atheiſts, indeed, generally agree, in repreſenting man as a poor wretched contradictory being; and ſure they will not argue, that " all-glorious " and magnificent Nature" exhauſted her whole power in producing this degenerate abortion?

In another part (p. 57.) he throws out a caſual aſſertion, that, in every quarter of the world, we meet with the remains of man in a foſſil ſtate. Indeed, it would not be wonderful if we did occaſionally meet with ſome ſuch remains; for Moſes informs us, that the human race exiſted for

ſome

ſome time before the deſtruction of that form of the earth which preceded the preſent. But we have no need to have recourſe to this explanation; for the fact is, that no remains, that can lay claim to any ſuch antiquity, as we ſpeak of, have ever been found. Thoſe that were miſtaken for human bones, Dr. Toulmin ſhould have known, have been ſince referred to animals. He does not ſeem to lay any ſtreſs upon thoſe in the rock of Gibraltar, regarding them as the bones of animals, which I doubt not they are; and if it were otherwiſe, their claim to high antiquity would be doubtful; for the ſtones containing them are full of vacuities, which are never obſerved in ſtratified matter; and therefore Dr. Black concludes, that they are of modern origin, compared to the ſtrata of the primæval earth. Dr. Hutton's aſſertion, that there are no proofs of the high antiquity of man, we have already ſeen; and M. de Luc, whoſe book Dr. Toulmin ſhould have read, and read again, before he wrote on the age of the world, aſſerts directly,

directly, " on ne trouve *aucun* os humain " parmi les foſſiles ; tout ce qu'on nom- " moit autrefois des Antropolites (Hommes " petrifiés) ayant été reconnu pour appar- " tenir à des animaux *. There has not " been found a ſingle human bone amongſt " the foſſils ; all thoſe that were formerly " called Anthropolites (petrified men) " having been now diſcovered to belong to " animals."

Indeed, the whole force of evidence tends to ſhew, that MAN, though now the *Lord* of the earth, is nevertheleſs but a *ſtranger* and an *upſtart* on the face of it. The ſacred hiſtorian repreſents him as the *laſt* of created beings, as the work of the *ſixth* day ; and it is not eaſy to determine what ſpace of time is included in his term *day*. The Pagan traditions confirm the ſame idea. Lucretius deſcribes the formation of plants and trees ; then of birds ; and adds,

* Lettres ſur l'Hiſtoire de la Terre et de l'Homme. Vol. V. p. 644, 8vo, a la Haye, 1779.

" Tum

" Tum tibi terra dedit primum mortalia fæcla."
" Next beafts and thoughtful man received their
" birth." CREECH.

And Ovid, having related the origin of all the inferior tribes, adds,

" Sanctius his animal, mentifque capacius altæ
" Deerat adhuc, et quod dominari in cætera poffet:
" Natus homo eft." METAM. lib. I.

" Amongft thefe there was ftill wanting a
" nobler animal, and one of more capa-
" cious mind, to govern the reft: then
" *Man* was produced."

Lucretius, though he believed in the eternity of matter, and in the formation of the earth from atoms, was fully convinced of the recent origin of man. The *novitas mundi* is a common phrafe with him; and that expreffion, as I have remarked before, is equivalent to the novelty of the human race. In his fifth book, De Natura Rerum, he enquires very properly, why, if the world be eternal, or very ancient, we have no hiftory before the Theban war and the Deftruction of Troy. Macrobius, de fomn. Scipionis, urges a fimilar argument,

and

and ſays, " Quis non hinc exiſtimet mun-
" dum quandoque cepiſſe, nec longam
" retro hujus ætatem, &c. Who will not
" hence conclude, both that the world had
" a beginning, and alſo that it began not
" long ago."

All that we can now collect, relative to the early ſtate of the earth, tends to confirm the ſame idea. For the firſt men found the earth covered with thickets and foreſts, and over-run with wild beaſts. They were obliged to make room for themſelves, by diſlodging the *old* inhabitants; and they carried on a long and ſevere war againſt both the vegetable and animal creation. The *Empire of the Beaſts* is more ancient than the *Aſſyrian* or *Babylonian*; and the firſt heroes were thoſe who made encroachments on this empire. Such was Nimrod, whom Moſes calls a " mighty
" hunter before the Lord *." " He taught
" the people," ſays Mr. Shuckford, " to
" make up companies, and to chaſe and

* Gen. x. 9.

" kill

" kill the wild beaſts, abounding in theſe " parts *." Theſe heroes the primitive men conſidered as their *benefactors* and *deliverers*. " Even in the age of Heſiod and " Homer, the brute creation was not ſo " far ſubdued, in the countries occupied " by the Greeks, but that ſecurity againſt " wild beaſts was an important purpoſe of " human ſociety †." Cicero, impreſſed with theſe ancient ideas, reckons defence againſt wild beaſts, to be an invention greater than even the diſcovery of letters. " They " were great men," ſays he, " who invented " letters; etiam ſuperiores, qui fruges, " qui veſtitum, qui tecta, qui cultum " vitæ, qui *præſidia contra feras* invene- " runt; but ſtill greater who found out " corn, and clothes, and houſes, civiliza- " tion, and *defence againſt wild beaſts* ‡."

In turning over the pages of Gruter's Collection of ancient Inſcriptions, in ſearch of ſomething elſe, I lighted upon one of

* Connect. I. p. 179.

† Mitford's Hiſtory of Greece.

‡ Tuſc. Quæſt. l. 1.

theſe

theſe ancient acknowledgements, for valour of this kind, which I ſhall tranſcribe for the reader.

7 Romæ, in S. Laurentio in Lucina.

HERCULES. ET. PHILOTES
ALCIDES. HOMINUM. VICTOR.
SIC
DOMINATORQUE *. FERARUM.
PHILOTETIS. AMICUS. ADES.
TU. ILLI. AEQUE. AMOR. ES.

E. Mazochio †.

I dare ſay it is not the only one of the kind; but I have not had leiſure to make a farther examination.

Thus it appears, that whatever may be ſaid relative to the high antiquity of the earth, and of inferior animals, there is

* Probably a miſtake for DOMITORQUE. "On "étoit ſi accoûtumé à appeller Hercule *Dominator*, "que l'on voit une Inſcription, dans *Gruter*, où ce "Dieu eſt nommé, quoi que mal à propos, *Hominum* "*victor*, *dominatorque ferarum*." Le Clerc, Remarques ſur quelques medailles en caracteres Pheniciens, Bib. Choiſie II. 104.

† Gruteri Inſcrip. Antiq. Grævii, fol. Amſt. 1707, p. XLVII.

every

every reaſon to think, that the human race is but of *yeſterday*. And as it muſt be evident from what we have ſaid, relative to the ſtate of the globe, when mankind were introduced on it, that their greateſt exertions were requiſite, to render it a comfortable habitation, and to ſecure themſelves againſt the wild beaſts, this conſideration will ſupply a further proof of the truth of the opinion aſſerted at the beginning of this paper, "that men were at "firſt *divinely* inſtructed;" for whilſt they muſt have been conſtantly occupied in ſuch inferior cares, how could they be ſuppoſed to have devoted time to abſtract and theological ſpeculations?

Milton puts into the mouth of Adam, when firſt awakened into exiſtence, an addreſs to the ſun and other objects around him, to tell him whence he derived his being, and how he may adore his Creator:

——Thou Sun, ſaid I, fair light!
And thou enlightened Earth, ſo freſh and gay!
Ye hills and dales, ye rivers, woods, and plains!

And ye that live and move, fair creatures! tell,
Tell (if ye ſaw) how came I thus, how here.——
Not of myſelf——By ſome Great Maker then,
In goodneſs, and in power, pre-eminent.
Tell me, how may I know him, how adore, &c.

Book VIII. l. 273.

But ſurely we cannot miſtake the fictions of the Poet for the truths of philoſophy? Are theſe the objects which firſt attract the attention of unenlightened men——do ſavages make any ſuch enquiries?

If we appealed to reaſon and to facts, we ſhould exhibit a very different view of the early manners and conduct of man. Let us try what concluſions they would lead us to, premiſing, that if any of the features of the picture are unpleaſing, the reader ought to remember, that we do not exhibit it as a view of the real hiſtory of man, but of that which would have been his hiſtory, had not his benign Creator taken him by the hand, and raiſed him from the earth to higher ſcenes, and to purſuits more worthy of the dignity of his nature. I ſhould ſuppoſe that the firſt thing Adam, left to himſelf, would have done when he

opened

opened his eyes in this world, would have been to run into the neareſt hole or cavern to hide himſelf, terrified at the novelty of all the objects around him. For ſuch, I obſerve, is the uniform effect of that inſtinct, which nature has placed in all animals, to provide for their ſafety amidſt new and unknown ſcenes [*a*]. Such, I know, would be my feelings, were I at this moment ſuddenly carried out of the earth, and placed in ſome diſtant planet, where the trees and animals had uncommon ſhapes and colours, where natural appearances were new, and every object wore an unuſual form. I ſhould not ſtop to admire their

[*a*] The reader will obſerve, that this view of the conduct of Man is written in the way of the *argumentum ad hominem*. For, upon my principles, Adam could not have been ſuppoſed even to have any *fear*, becauſe no being is *afraid* which has not been previouſly *hurt*. Indeed, according to my ideas, Adam would have neither poſſeſſed the uſe of his mental faculties, nor even of his *ſenſes*. But, at preſent, I am admitting the opinion of my opponents in a certain degree, and arguing afterwards upon their own ſyſtem.

beauty, but feel myſelf at once ſtruck with a panic at their awful ſtrangeneſs.

By and by our terreſtrial ſtranger would pick up a little courage, and curioſity would prompt him to peep out from the mouth of his retreat. The beauties of nature would invite him forward; the muſic of the birds would charm his ear; the variegated colours of the fields delight his eyes; the odours of the plants and trees gratify his ſmell; he would ſee ſmall animals ſporting about; and perhaps he might venture forth a few paces amongſt them. But, if at this moment the roar of the lion ſhould aſſail his ear, or ſome huge animal ſhould paſs bounding along before him, inſtantaneouſly his terrors would be renewed, he would fly precipitately into his cavern, and ſeek the inmoſt corner of its hiding place. Some hours would elapſe before his palpitating heart could recover its tranquillity; and now, the night coming on, would wrap the face of nature in darkneſs, and, bringing with it the ſcreams of owls and other frightful circumſtances,

deter

deter him from looking abroad. Thus forlorn and ſolitary, he would yield to the influence of ſleep, the ſoother of human cares, the genuine balm, and certain remedy for grief, to man in his original ſtate, until artificial cultivation, carried to an improper extent, has deſtroyed the harmony of his powers, and, by ſeparating mental energy from corporeal faculties, has given him the unhappy power of tormenting himſelf, and of continuing alive to miſery, when he is dead to action and enjoyment.

But now the morning returns, and the chearful ſun diſpels the ſhades of darkneſs, and gilds the face of nature. The calls of hunger begin to operate powerfully on Adam; he feels a ſtrong deſire of ſomething he knows not what; but he perceives it is not there. He *muſt* go forth, and forth he goes with cautious and trembling ſteps. Some fruit attracts his notice; guided by inſtinct, he puts forth his hands, eats, and is ſatisfied.

Refreſhed and comforted by the nouriſhment he has received, he walks about more

freely to ſatisfy his curioſity. One of his own ſpecies appears—a female!——with what aſtoniſhment is he ſtruck, when he beholds his ſecond ſelf! This object attracts him more than all nature beſides.—Whether inſtinct would lead at once to diſtinguiſh ſex, I am at a loſs to determine. It is probably by the olfactory nerves, and not by the *eyes*, however, that animals firſt gain this knowledge. But it is difficult to reaſon on the ſubject; for we have loſt many of our original inſtincts, by having no occaſion to uſe them, as all our powers are liable to become torpid when they are long unemployed. Let us be content then with concluding, that ſimilarity of form and manners would lead to acquaintance, and acquaintance produce affection.

The firſt pair would now be conſtantly together; for, independent of the attractions of love, man is naturally a gregarious animal; he does not belong to that claſs which are ſolitary, but to thoſe that herd together. They would feel their courage increaſed when in each other's company; they

they would eat with more pleaſure when together, drink together, ſport together, and, by and by, hunt together ſuch of the ſmaller animals, as they found they could maſter and uſe as food. For man is naturally carnivorous[a] and an animal of prey. The remains of his original connexion with the tyger and the lion appear but too

[a] Some natural hiſtorians, ſays Mr. Hunter, have attempted to prove, that Man is not a carnivorous animal, becauſe his teeth are not formed like thoſe of the lion; but they might as well have attempted to prove, that he is not a graminivorous animal, becauſe his teeth are not like thoſe of a cow or a horſe. Man being intended to catch and kill his prey, and collect vegetable food, with his *hands*, not with his *teeth*, did not require to have the latter formed, either like the lion's, or like the cow's and horſe's. He is the moſt perfect of all animals, and adapted to exiſt in a greater variety of circumſtances than any of them. "He ought, therefore, to be "conſidered as a compound, fitted equally to live "upon fleſh and upon vegetables." Natural Hiſtory of the Human Teeth, 4to, Lond. 1778, p. 119.—I preſume Mr. Hunter means, that man is adapted to live *on a mixture of both*; for either of them alone, long perſiſted in, appears to be inconſiſtent with a ſtate of vigour, or even of good health.

clearly in his civilized ſtate. For what is *hunting* but the relics of the wild beaſt in man? Horſes and ſheep, though civilized, would not hunt. Nor could any animal derive its joys and happineſs from the anguiſh, anxiety, and death of another, but that which had been originally a beaſt of prey [*a*].

New

[*a*] In La Trobe's Characteriſtic Anecdotes of the late King of Pruſſia, there are ſome curious reflections on hunting, publiſhed from a paper written in the King's own hand, which, I think, deſerve a place here. "The chace is one of the moſt ſenſual "of pleaſures, by which the powers of the body are "ſtrongly exerted, but thoſe of the mind remain "unemployed. It conſiſts in a violent exertion of "deſire in the purſuit, and the indulgence of a cruel "pleaſure in the death of the game. It is an exer-"ciſe which makes the limbs ſtrong, active, and "pliable (in this reſpect it has no ſuperiority over "*humane* exerciſes); but leaves the head without "improvement. I am convinced that Man *is* (I "would ſay *capable of becoming*) more cruel and ſa-"vage than any beaſt of prey; we exerciſe the do-"minion given us over theſe our wretched *fellow-*"*creatures* in the moſt tyrannical manner. If we

"pretend

New cares would now intereſt the firſt pair; their offspring would engage their attention, and redouble their duties. New neceſſities would lead to new expedients; and, in time, that rude ſtate of the arts,

" pretend to any ſuperiority over the beaſts, it ought
" certainly to conſiſt in reaſon; but we commonly
" find, that the moſt paſſionate lovers of the chace
" renounce this privilege, and converſe only with
" their dogs, their horſes, and other irrational ani-
" mals. This renders them wild and unfeeling;
" and it is highly probable that they cannot be very
" merciful to the human ſpecies. And, beſides, can
" the chace be a proper employment for a thinking
" mind?

" A Sovereign may undoubtedly be allowed this
" pleaſure, provided he indulges it with moderation,
" and for the purpoſe of relaxing his mind from the
" many ſerious and often diſagreeable exertions he
" is neceſſarily engaged in. It would be unjuſt to
" deny a Prince every ſpecies of recreation. But
" can a Monarch enjoy a greater pleaſure than that
" ariſing from a wiſe and benevolent government,
" from the proſperity of his dominions, and from
" the encouragement and protection of every uſeful
" art and ſcience? A Monarch, who finds higher
" pleaſures neceſſary to his happineſs, is much to
" be pitied."

which

which we find among uncultivated nations, would take place. Here all further improvements would ſtop—beyond this no advance would be made. For how ſhould more be diſcovered, when nothing more was wanted? The hiſtory of ſavages is unvaried and monotonous. Such as they are now, ſuch they were a thouſand years ago, and ſuch they will be a thouſand years hence. Civilized man is in a perpetual ſtate of fluctuation and progreſs: ſavages remain always the ſame.

Such is the picture that reaſon would exhibit of the unaſſiſted progreſs of Man. And I doubt, if even this could have been attained without the aid of a higher being. For how ſhould the firſt men, when as yet they were few and helpleſs, have ſecured themſelves againſt the rage of the elements, againſt cold and famine, and againſt the depredations of wild beaſts, the firſt poſſeſſors of the earth? Theſe ancient tenants of the globe would have torn to pieces the new-comers, before they had learned the arts of defence. So that it

appears,

appears, man neither could have *improved*, nor even *exiſted*, without the help of his Creator.

Our great Poet indeed, though, in the ſpecimen I lately exhibited, he for a moment indulged his fancy, yet quickly returns to cool and ſober reaſon; for he introduces the Almighty teaching Adam, and reaſoning with him, and ſhewing him how to think, and what to believe of himſelf, and of nature around him. So that Milton, in reality, makes the firſt man θεοδιδακτος (divinely inſtructed) as much as I have done.

To what degree, and in what manner, this divine inſtruction was communicated to man, it is impoſſible for us to determine. Mr. Engel of Berne, in an ingenious eſſay on the queſtion, at what time, and in what manner was America peopled, adopts an idea, that the primæval earth was inhabited by ſuperior beings or angels; and M. de Luc, eſpouſing the ſame theory, repreſents theſe angels as the firſt inſtructors of men.

I have ſtudied carefully, ſays the ingenious

nious naturaliſt *, what philoſophers have written relative to the origin of language and the primitive notions of men; but, as often as they have attempted to deduce them from *nature*, I have found the ſame inconſiſtencies in their arguments, as in the ſpeculations of atheiſts on the origin of *motion*. When I ſee a claſs of things ſucceeding one another, when the ſucceſſion is ſimply a *preſervation* of the kind, my mind cannot be ſatisfied without ſuppoſing, that this claſs had its origin from ſomething different from itſelf. A plant ſprings from a plant, which ſprung from another plant; an animal from a couple of animals, who themſelves ſprung from a prior couple: thence reaſon concludes, that there was a *firſt* plant—a *firſt* pair of animals—which gave origin to theſe ſucceſſions, which only preſerve the kind; and that this origin proceeded from ſomething higher than the univerſe, ſince nothing is ſeen in that univerſe which gives a clear idea of *origination*.

* Diſc. XII. paſſim.

In

In like manner, when I ſee an inſtructed man, I find that he deſcended from inſtructed men, who had themſelves been inſtructed; and I conclude from analogy, that there was a firſt man who was inſtructed by a being higher than man. Man therefore *received* his firſt language, and his firſt notions analogous to that language; and this being admitted, the ſtate of man becomes intelligible to me, juſt as the ſtate of the phyſical world becomes clear, when it is once admitted, that the ſource of its motions aroſe from ſomething different from itſelf. This original communication of knowledge M. de Luc calls, the PRIMITIVE EDUCATION OF MAN.

Who then were the firſt teachers of Man? In the early ages of the world, ſays our author *, we ſee a claſs of beings appear on the earth, who were the interpreters, by whom the Deity revealed himſelf to men, I mean the *angels*, a claſs of beings, about whom many difficulties have

* Hiſt. de la Terre, P. XI. Rem. ſur la Revelat. paſſim.

been

been ſtarted, but whoſe exiſtence has nothing in it repugnant to reaſon and poſſibility.

That theſe beings exiſted before men is evident from the relation of Moſes; and that the earth pre-exiſted alſo, we collect from various facts of natural hiſtory. I am therefore inclined to believe, ſays he, that they inhabited the earth before men: that they lived there in a preparation for another ſtate, into which they have all now retired, and left the earth as a habitation to the human race. Theſe angelic beings, therefore, were the firſt inſtructors of man: we ſee them appear in every thing that concerns his origin—they are the meſſengers of the Great Creator to him.

Such is the ingenious theory of M. de Luc. I ſhall make two obſervations on it. In the firſt place, it has a wonderful affinity to all the ancient traditions of nations, which uniformly hold forth an intercourſe between ſuperior beings and men, as having once exiſted, but which afterwards almoſt entirely, if not altogether, ceaſed.

All

All theſe relations ſpeak of a time when men were *better*, and when the Gods (ſo they called ſuperior beings) dwelt with them *. To theſe ſuperior beings too they aſcribe the origin of knowledge, and the civilization of mankind. Secondly, without admitting ſomething of this kind, I believe it will not be eaſy, to give any rational account of the innumerable relations, reſpecting ſupernatural beings, apparitions, fairies, &c. which have prevailed more or leſs in every age and nation of men. I will readily grant, that nine tenths, or a much larger proportion of theſe ſtories, are fabulous; but I confeſs myſelf unable to account how they originated at all, much leſs how they became univerſally believed, if there never was any thing of the kind true. It is poſſible to conceive the whole gold coin in this kingdom to be adulterated and forged, but I would aſk any one, whether there ever could have been a falſe guinea, if there had not ſometime been a

* See the ſpecimens I have given of the remains of ancient traditions, p. 240.

real

real one? All falſehood pre-ſuppoſes ſome truth, which it feigns and imitates, and takes for its model and exemplar.

But whatever may be decided on this, or in whatever manner we ſuppoſe divine inſtruction to have been communicated to man, it no way affects our main argument. However he was taught, the grand aſſertion remains unſhaken, MAN was not his *own* teacher.

How far, indeed, mankind might have gone in diſcovering truth, had they been always left to themſelves, it is difficult to determine. Lord Monboddo obſerves, I think, with ſingular judgement, that man, unaided by ſome foreign power, would have remained in his natural or animal ſtate, longer than we can conceive, who live in civilized countries, and are accuſtomed to ſee men only in an artificial ſtate. Rouſſeau very properly ridicules thoſe who, becauſe they have been verſant with men in cities and civilized life, imagine, that they are thoroughly acquainted with *human nature*. We are, indeed, ſo changed from

our

our original ſtate, that it is almoſt impoſſible for us to conjecture what it was, or what it was not, capable of. The *matter of fact* is equally difficult to aſcertain; for traditional knowledge hath been ſo widely diffuſed from the earlieſt times, that the traces of it may be found in all parts of the world; and it is very hazardous to affirm, almoſt of *any* truth, that men diſcovered it by their own powers, and without receiving any hint of it from tradition. Give to the human mind the *elements* of knowledge, and it will make great progreſs in enlarging them, by combining, ſeparating, and otherwiſe diverſifying ideas. But *native* and *original truth*, as Mr. Locke obſerves, is not ſo eaſily dug out of the mine.

To diſcover the firſt principles of things, to find out what was not wanted, (for ſavages do not ſpeculate), to diſcover what was not ſought after, becauſe its exiſtence was unknown: this is the difficulty.

If, inſtead of judging of the opinions of the ancient philoſophers from a few ſplendid paſſages, ſelected from their writings, we ſhall conſult the original works

which remain to us, or the writings of ſuch as have given *complete* ſyſtems of their doctrines; *Stanley's Hiſtory of Philoſophy*, *Bruckeri Hiſtoria Critica*, M. *Tiedemann's Vitæ et Placita vetuſtiſſimorum Græciæ Philoſophorum*, *M. Meiners's Hiſtoria Doctrinæ de vero Deo* *, and *Geſchichte des Urſprungs, Fortgans und Verfalls der Wiſſenſchaften in Griechenland und Rom.* &c. we ſhall diſcover, that among ſo many as have rendered their names illuſtrious, by the profeſſion of philoſophy, the number of thoſe who held any kind of rational ſyſtem, may be reduced to two or three. And even with them we ſhall find many errors and imperfections, much childiſhneſs, and much abſurdity. The fallacious reaſonings and deplorable miſtakes of ſuch men, may ſerve to convince us, that, even in the moſt favourable circumſtances, unnumbered ages would have paſſed away, before men, by the exerciſe of their own unaſſiſted powers, would have attained to juſt notions of the Divine Being, or of the nature and expectations of man.

* Vid. Note II. at the end of this tract.

Note

Note I. referred to in p. 257.

A tenderneſs for human character, romantic notions of an original dignity inherent in human nature, independent of its cultivation by *Divine Inſtruction*, by *Philoſophy*, and the *Arts of life*, and the univerſal miſtake, that man in his natural ſtate might be judged of and known, from the artificial beings of civilized ſociety, were the cauſes which led Philoſophers to diſcredit the ancient relations of the miſerable ſtate of ſavage man, to diſpute the exiſtence of *Anthropophagi*, or eaters of human fleſh, though confirmed by the ſtrongeſt teſtimonies; and either to deny, or explain away, the dreadful practice of human ſacrifices, and ſuch other enormities, as ſeemed to diſgrace the dignity of man.

But ſince we have enlarged our acquaintance with thoſe nations, which ſtill remain in that ſtate in which the ancients ſaw the majority of the inhabitants of the earth, ſpeculative men have found it neceſſary to reduce very conſiderably their high ideas of the innate dignity and ſuperiority of human nature. They would indeed have been leſs averſe to admitting the exiſtence of Anthropophagi, if they had inveſtigated the origin of this practice; for then they would have found it highly probable, that it was not at firſt a matter of choice, but a practice which aroſe from the cruel neceſſities of ſavage life. The chace, as M. de Paauw obſerves *, furniſhed

* Recherches Philoſ. ſur les Americains, vol. I. p. 221.

only a precarious ſubſiſtence, familiarized the human heart to carnage, and fomented eternal quarrels. Savages are ignorant of the art of multiplying grain for food; and in the early ages they had not reduced any kind of quadrupeds or birds to domeſtic ſervitude. Of conſequence they muſt often have been put to the greateſt ſtraits for want of food.

It is, I think, a ſtrong practical argument in favour of civilized life, that ſavages, and all half-civilized nations, that is, nations who cultivate the ground, but have no *foreign commerce* (to ſupply the failure of their own crop) are conſtantly expoſed to famine, and often ſuffer dreadfully from its ravages. How conſtantly ſavages have in their minds the *fear of want*, and the *neceſſity of looking out for proviſions*, we have a curious proof in an anecdote that occurs in Cooke's Voyages. At the iſland of O-why-hee, Capt. King was very curious to know, what the natives imagined was the motive that had induced the Engliſh to quit their own country, and viſit that iſland. The reſult of his enquiry was, that they thought they had come from ſome diſtant country, where proviſions were ſcarce, merely to fill their bellies there.

But though the practice of eating human fleſh probably aroſe from neceſſity, it continued amongſt uncultivated men long after that neceſſity had ceaſed, and was introduced into countries where the ſame neceſſity never had exiſted. The Abbé Renaudot publiſhed an ancient account of China, written by Arabians, in which it is affirmed, that there were

Anthro-

Anthropophagi in that country, ſo late as the ninth century; and the Venetian traveller, Marco Polo, in whoſe authority I am inclined to place great confidence, affirms, that it is cuſtomary with the people of the provinces of Xandu and Concha to eat their priſoners.

The continuance of this practice, after the neceſſity of it had ceaſed, is chiefly to be aſcribed to the ſtupidity of ſavages, who go blindly on in the tract of their anceſtors, never reaſoning on their conduct, or changing any thing that has been once eſtabliſhed. Cuſtom, not reaſon, is the law of their manners.

It is to be noticed alſo, that amongſt ſome of the more ferocious nations, it became one of the *modes of expreſſing revenge* againſt an enemy, to tear him in pieces, and devour his fleſh. While others again, imperfectly civilized, and of conſequence beginning to reaſon, but very *irregularly*, as children totter in their firſt attempts to walk, reverſed this plan, and eat the bodies of their relations and friends, as *a way of expreſſing affection*, ſince they thus lodged them as near their heart as poſſible; and indeed, in conſequence of the proceſſes of digeſtion and nutrition, rendered them a part of themſelves. It was on this principle that the Maſſagetæ and Derbices eat their own parents *.

It is likely that thoſe who had once been accuſtomed to eat human fleſh, would become fonder of it

* Vid. Reflections ſuggeſted by the Character of Pamphilus of Cæſarea, p. 177.

than of that of any other animal, becauſe it is much higher fed. The opinion of Europeans, that it is diſguſting, unqueſtionably ariſes either from that ſentiment of horror, which they cannot ſeparate from the action of taſting it, or elſe from a peculiarity in the flavour, which requires ſome time to be accuſtomed to. M. de Paauw * ſays, the Iroquois thought no part of the body ſo fine and tender as the neck, and all that ſurrounded the nape of it; while the Caribbs preferred the calf of the leg, and the fleſhy part of the thigh. He adds, that they never ate women or young girls, "whoſe fleſh per-" haps appeared to them leſs ſavoury, or more diſ-" guſting, if any thing could be diſguſting to ſuch " eaters." This muſt have been ſome local peculiarity; for Jerome † declares, that he himſelf had ſeen barbarous Scotch or Iriſh, in Gaul, eat the fleſhy part of the hips and breaſts of women.

With reſpect to *human ſacrifices*, they furniſh one of the moſt melancholy ſpecimens of the reaſoning (for, ſtrange to tell, the practice was founded on *reaſoning*) of unenlightened men that can poſſibly be produced. That men ſhould ever have imagined they could pleaſe the Deity by deſtroying his creatures, is an idea ſo abſurd to *us*, who live amidſt the lights of Philoſophy and Revelation, that we can ſcarce conceive how it ſhould enter into a human mind. Yet this horrid practice has prevailed in all the rude ages of ſociety, and ſubſiſts in many countries to this day.

* Rech. Phil. ſur les Americ. vol. I. p. 226.

† Adv. Jov. l. 2. c. 6.

" There

" There is no nation," ſays M. de Paauw, " men-
" tioned in hiſtory, whom we cannot reproach with
" having, more than once, made the blood of its
" citizens ſtream forth, in holy and pious ceremo-
" nies, to appeaſe the Divinity when he appeared
" angry, or to move him when he appeared indolent.
" This monſtrous fanaticiſm, elated by its ſucceſs,
" would, in the courſe of ages, have depopulated
" or laid waſte the earth, if the eſtabliſhment and
" progreſs of Chriſtianity had not put a ſtop to it *."

The accounts given us by Acoſta, Gomara, and other Spaniſh writers, of the amazing waſte of the human ſpecies in South America, almoſt exceed the power of belief. The annual ſacrifices of the Mexicans required many *thouſands* of victims; and the numbers ſlain at the dedication of the great temple of VITZILIPULZI, in 1486, are ſo prodigious, that I forbear to mention them, leſt I ſhould bring diſcredit on thoſe parts of the relation, which are unqueſtionably true. The ſculls of the victims were either hung on ſtrings, from tree to tree, round the temples, or built up to form towers, and cemented with lime. In Peru two hundred children were offered at one ſacrifice, for the health of the Ynca. During the war with the Spaniards, the number of victims being neceſſarily increaſed, as defeat and danger were augmented, many of the tribes, wearied out with ſlaughter, ſent meſſages to Cortez, beſeeching him

* Rech. Phil. ſur les Americ. vol. I. p. 211.

to teach them his law; and the *Tlaſcalans*, who uſed to be hunted down for the bloody purpoſe of ſacrifice, at laſt joined the Spaniſh General, with about 200,000 men; and, fired by the moſt inveterate hatred, founded on this extraordinary ſpecies of perſecution, enabled him to make one great ſacrifice of the Mexican nation*.

Their mode of performing theſe dreadful offerings was as follows. Six prieſts laid the victim on an altar, which was very narrow at top, and while five of them bent his body acroſs it, and kept him down, the ſixth cut open his boſom with a ſharp flint, and, taking out his heart, held it up reeking to the SUN, the great object of their worſhip. Mean while the others tumbled the carcaſe down a flight of ſteps near the altar, and immediately proceeded to the next victim.

We learn from *Heliodorus* †, that the Ethiopians ſacrificed boys to the Sun, and Girls to the Moon.

The learned Meiners ‡ remarks, that the more ancient Greeks imagined their Gods to be envious of human felicity; ſo that whenever any great ſucceſs attended them, they were terribly afraid that the Gods would be offended at it, and bring ſome calamity upon them. It is true, indeed, that great good fortune, as it is apt to elate the mind too much, has a tendency to render men thoughtleſs, and ſo lead

* Mickle, Introduction to the Luſiad, p. vi. note.

† Æthiopica, lib. x. p. 465. ed. Commelini, 1696.

‡ Hiſtoria doctrinæ de vero Deo, p. 208.

them into a ſnare. Hence we may ſay with Dr. Young, that *proſperity* is *portentous*; but this, which ariſes from the nature of things, their ſuperſtition aſcribed to the interference of the Deity. And they not only believed the Gods to be envious, but alſo repreſented them as extremely iraſcible and cruel. Wherefore, when any ſudden danger or calamity occurred, or the iſſue of a great battle was dreaded, they ſacrificed human victims, as the only offering which could ſatisfy ſuch implacable Deities. Of many examples which might be given, he ſelects a few. Plutarch, in his Life of Themiſtocles *, relates, that this General, a little before the famous battle of Salamis, was conſtrained, much againſt his inclination, by the order of the prieſts, to ſpill the blood of three young Perſians, of the higheſt rank, at the altar of their cruel Gods. For the ſame reaſon, the Grecian army, at the battle of Platæa, with incredible patience, ſuſtained the diſcharge of the darts of the Perſians, until one of the moſt beautiful of the Greeks was ſacrificed as a victim for the whole Grecian troops, ὡς ὑπερ της ἑλλαδος αποθανουμενος †. Many of the Theban prieſts ſolicited Pelopidas, before the battle of Leuctra, to ſacrifice a young virgin, after the example of Themiſtocles and Leonidas; and it is unqueſtionable, that he would have followed their advice, if a white mare had not by chance been found, who was ſtrangled in place of

* Vol. I. p. 466. ed. Reiſke. † Plut. p. 519.

the

the other. The ſame writer mentions, that a little before, the Bœotian princes had got to ſuch a pitch of madneſs, with reſpect to this inhumanity, that they deſtroyed all the preparations for a ſolemn ſacrifice, inſtituted by Ageſilaus, becauſe the Lacedemonian King meant to offer up a doe, inſtead of a virgin, according to the ancient practice. Laſtly, the Athenians and Maſſilians had a cuſtom of ſacrificing a man every year, after loading him with dreadful curſes, that the wrath of the Gods might fall upon his head, and be turned away from the reſt of the citizens.

Human ſacrifices were not totally diſcontinued among the Romans even in the reign of Trajan; for, at that time, three veſtal virgins having been puniſhed for unchaſtity, the pontiffs conſulted the books of the Sybils, to ſee if a ſufficient atonement had been made to the Deity; and finding that the offended Goddeſs was ſtill incenſed, they ordered two men and two women, Greeks and Gauls, to be buried alive, which was accordingly put in execution.

The Druids entertained ſome ſublime ideas relative to the Deity and the human ſoul. Yet they could not ſave them from this deteſtable practice. They uſed to ſet up a *wicker man*, a great gigantic figure, to which upwards of a hundred victims were led with wicker, and which was then ſet on fire as an offering to the Gods. When there was a deficiency of malefactors, or priſoners of war, the innocent and helpleſs were ſeized on for this horrid oblation.

It

It is ſurprizing how long the practice of offering human ſacrifices continued among the Northern nations. Mr. Thorkelin, whoſe acquaintance with Northern literature hath opened to him many rich and original ſources of information, has mentioned ſome particulars in his *Eſſay on the Slave Trade* *, which deſerve to be noticed here. Ditmarus of Merſeburgh, ſays he, charges the Danes with having put to death, in their great ſacrifices, no fewer than ninety-nine ſlaves at once †. St. Bonifacius ſays, that the newly converted Germans ſold their ſlaves to their infidel neighbours, to be ſacrificed, until the practice was ſtopped by Gregory II. who made it a capital offence. Carloman found it neceſſary, ſo late as the year 743, to make a law, that a man who ſold his ſlave to an infidel ſhould be held infamous, and excommunicated in the ſame way as a *murderer*. This horrid cuſtom proved fatal to perſons of the moſt exquiſite beauty and exalted character; ſuch being deemed the moſt acceptable offerings to the Gods. Adam of Bremen, in his work *De ſitu Daniæ*, mentions, that the inhabitants of the iſland of Eaſtland ſacrificed living men, whom they bought of the merchants, "diligenter omnino probatos, ne ma-

* 8vo. London, 1788. Printed by G. Nicol, a very curious tract.

† Ditmarus Merſeburgenſis in Leibnitii Scriptores Rerum Brunſvigicarum. Tom. I. p. 327. Conf. Step. Joh. Stephanii notas ad Saxon. Grammatici Hiſtor. Danic. p. 92. Soræ 1644-45, fol. and J. Grupens Origines Livoniæ.

" culam in corpore habeant ;" diligently examined every where, leſt they ſhould have any ſpot on their bodies, which might occaſion their being rejected by the Gods. In Sweden, on urgent ocaſions, and particularly in the time of ſcarcity and famine, they ſacrificed Kings and Princes. Nay, adds our Author, the Swedes once boaſted of having ſacrificed five Kings in one day.

Capt. Cooke found that human ſacrifices were very frequent amongſt the iſlanders of the South Seas. " When I deſcribed the *Natche* at Tonga-
" taboo," ſays he, " I mentioned that on the ap-
" proaching ſequel of that feſtival, we had been
" told that ten men were to be ſacrificed. This may
" give us an idea of the extent of this religious
" maſſacre in that iſland. And though we ſhould
" ſuppoſe, that never more than one perſon is ſacri-
" ficed on any ſingle occaſion at Otaheite, it is more
" than probable, that theſe occaſions happen ſo
" frequently, as to make a ſhocking waſte of the
" human race ; for I counted no leſs than 49 ſkulls
" of former victims, lying before the Morai, where
" we ſaw one more added to the number. And as
" none of thoſe ſkulls have as yet ſuffered any con-
" ſiderable change from the weather, it may hence
" be inferred, that no great length of time has
" elapſed, ſince at leaſt this conſiderable number of
" unhappy wretches had been offered upon this altar
" of blood !"

Capt. Cooke has favoured us with an account of

one

one of theſe ſacrifices. *Towha*, one of the chiefs, ſent a meſſage to King *Otoo*, to inform him, that he thought it neceſſary to kill a man, as a ſacrifice to the EATOOA, or Deity, to procure his aid againſt the natives of *Eimeo*, and required his preſence at the ceremony. Capt. Cooke accompanied him, and deſcribes a variety of ſuperſtitions and diſguſting rites, which were performed by the prieſts on the occaſion. While they were engaged in this horrid buſineſs, a kingfiſher making a noiſe in the trees, *Otoo* ſaid to Capt. Cooke, "That is the EATOOA!" He conſidered it as a divine ſignal of approbation!—A curious ſpecimen of the power of ſuperſtition, to convert every thing into its own colour, and to change the moſt common appearances of nature into myſterious and wonderful prodigies.

A collection of *facts*, ſuch as we have now exhibited, relative to man, however it may ſurprize or amuſe the reader for the preſent, is of little value, if it be not accompanied with remarks, in which *effects* are traced to their *cauſes* in the human mind, and with reflections, in which the miſtakes of paſt ages are exhibited, to prevent ſimilar errors at the preſent time. A few ſuch we ſhall endeavour to make.

Whether Sacrifices were of divine origin or not, we ſhall not juſt now enquire. But, however they originated, I think it is not difficult to account for their vaſt prevalence in the early ages of the world. Sacrifices are of two kinds; 1. Expreſſions of gratitude

tude for benefits received, or *thankſgivings*; and, 2. Atonements for offences committed, that is, *peace* or *ſin-offerings*. With reſpect to the firſt, it was very natural for men to ſignify their gratitude to the *Gods*, who gave them all things, by offering them back ſome part of their gifts. This conduct of man in the infancy of the world, exactly reſembled the behaviour of children at this day. For we ſee children, when they are pleaſed, preſent their nurſe or mother with a part of the ſweetmeats they have received from her; imagining, that old people will partake with pleaſure in their enjoyments. Such nearly were the rude ideas of early ages relative to celeſtial beings. It was imagined that the Gods ate and drank in their own way. Nectar and ambroſia muſt not be confined to the Deities of Greece. Even at this day the vulgar in Europe think of God only as a *mighty man*.

But the moſt frequent kind of ſacrifices were *peace-offerings*. Frail man is conſcious of many deviations from rectitude, and the ſenſe of guilt always produces *fear*. Indeed, to unenlightened men, the Deity hath ever been an object of *terror*, rather than of *love*. And wherever he is imperfectly known, his vaſt power muſt make him regarded in this ſuſpicious and awful light. We are accuſtomed to conſider the Deity as the benevolent Parent of the Univerſe, who created us for no other purpoſe but to make us happy, and who, though he is the high and lofty ONE that inhabiteth eternity, condeſcendeth to

regard

regard and to care for the meaneſt inſect he has made. But theſe *refined* ideas never occurred to unenlightened men. To them the Deity always appeared as the *ſtern Sovereign of the Univerſe*; in whoſe eyes human beings were no more than catterpillars; and who, if they even involuntarily ſhould chance to interfere with his plans, was ready to puniſh their unhappy temerity by cruſhing them under his feet.

They believed that God might *literally* be *angry* with his creatures; not reflecting that all *anger* implies *tumult*, and that the Divine Mind is an eternal fountain of undiſturbed *tranquillity*. They thought that the Deity might *really* be *diſpleaſed* at events that happened; not reflecting that *diſpleaſure* implies *weakneſs*, *diſappointment* and *vexation*; none of which can be aſcribed to the Almighty. And farther, that if the Deity had been *diſpleaſed* at any event that happened, he muſt alſo have been diſpleaſed at the *proſpect* of its happening; and as he foreſees all that will happen from eternity, his mind muſt from eternity have been filled with *diſpleaſure*, that is, with *vexation*, *diſguſt*, and *diſcontent*, which is abſolutely abſurd and impoſſible; for he muſt needs be ſuppoſed to be entirely free from ſuch feelings, and through all ages to have been completely and invariably happy.

Unenlightened men adored God becauſe they believed he knew all things, and of courſe that their neglect could not be hid from him: they ſubmitted to him becauſe he could do all things, and therefore no one was able to oppoſe him. Theſe are the great

pillars of their religious ſyſtem. If they had believed Satan to be as *knowing* and as *powerful*, they would have worſhipped him too. In fact, many of them did ſo. The worſhip of the Devil ſtands upon record in the catalogue of the wanderings of the human mind.

It would be eaſy to ſupport theſe opinions by the teſtimony of numerous facts. The *repreſentations* made of the Deity by various people, furniſh a ſtrong proof of the juſtice of them. What did the Indians endeavour to paint in their images of the Deity? Not his goodneſs, his juſtice, his truth; but his amazing *knowledge* and awful *power*. The firſt was repreſented by hundreds of ever-wakeful eyes; the laſt by thouſands of out-ſtretched arms and hands, often filled with ſwords and daggers, bows and arrows, and every other inſtrument of deſtruction. The Gods of Otaheite are all *terrible monſters*, with ſaucer eyes, open mouths, and rows of horrid tuſks, ready to gnaſh in pieces the unhappy offenders. The worſhip of many ancient nations conſiſted in ſuffering and mortification, in cutting the fleſh with knives, and ſcorching the limbs with fire!—dreadful indications of the ſavage nature they aſcribed to the object of their devotion.

Even ſo great a man as Tacitus, untaught by the light of Chriſtianity, has ſomewhere thrown out an opinion, that the Gods never interfere in human affairs but to *puniſh* *. Thus, according to this

* "Non eſſe curæ diis ſecuritatem noſtram, eſſe ultionem."

ſyſtem,

ſyſtem, the human race might be conſidered as a neſt of ants or vermin, exiſting in the grounds of a mighty being, who never heeded their various buſy motions, except when they happened to come in his way, or otherwiſe be troubleſome, when he trampled them under his feet, and cruſhed them without mercy. Thus there is in the world no *Pro*vidence, or goodneſs exerted to preſerve; but there is an *Anti*vidence, or wrath watching an occaſion to deſtroy. And this was all that this profound politician could make of the matter. Sad ſpecimen of *theology merely human!*

We may obſerve, that, in the Old Teſtament, religion is almoſt continually deſcribed, by the appellation of the FEAR OF GOD. This was the only view of it, which was adapted to ſtrike the minds of rude men in early ages of ſociety, and is the prevailing idea with the vulgar to this day. It was reſerved for Chriſtianity to exhibit religion in the amiable view of affection for the Father of Nature—it was the peculiar glory of the favourite diſciple of Jeſus, to declare to mankind, that GOD IS LOVE!

Now as the religion of men in early ages conſiſted thus chiefly of *fear*, it is natural to ſuppoſe, that they would often be led to offer to the Deity the moſt precious poſſeſſions they had, partly to acknowledge their dependance on, and ſubmiſſion to, his will; and partly to conciliate his affection, or regain his favour. Hence the prevalence of *peace* or *ſin-offerings*.

If we believe, with M. Boulanger, that the fre-

quent volcanoes, earthquakes, deluges, and other cataſtrophes of nature, which took place at the beginning of the world, had ſtrongly impreſſed the minds of the firſt men with the awful idea, that the Gods were diſpleaſed with the human race, and ready to execute dreadful vengeance on them, we ſhall have another circumſtance to account for the great prevalence of ſin-offerings. The mournful remembrance of theſe paſt calamities, and the fear of others ſimilar to them, gave, according to this writer, a particular caſt to the genius of their religion, and made it conſiſt chiefly in doleful ceremonies, prayers, tears, and lamentations, faſting, mortification, and ſacrifice.

Theſe preliminary obſervations lead us to the origin of human ſacrifices. Men accuſtomed to offer the *firſt fruits* of all that was produced to them to the Deity, might, in rude ages, come at laſt to extend the idea to their *firſt-born children.* Thoſe who returned a part of all their food to God, where they adopted the practice of eating human fleſh, would give a part of this alſo. Probably, however, the principle of gratitude might be too weak to conquer the reluctance of nature to theſe barbarities; and I am inclined to think, that all human ſacrifices are to be conſidered as ſin-offerings, which it was hoped might appeaſe an offended Deity, when nothing that was leſs precious would have been ſufficient. If M. Boulanger's notion be juſt, that men were generally perſuaded that the Gods were diſpleaſed with the

human race, we may ſuppoſe they hoped that the voluntary ſacrifice of ſome of their guilty ſpecies, would be likely to appeaſe the divine wrath. And we may add to theſe conſiderations another, which is founded on the prevalence of the worſhip of the Devil and evil beings. Men might ſuppoſe, that theſe malignant beings would be gratified by theſe cruelties, and ſo leſs diſpoſed to bring evils on the reſt of mankind. I could adduce ſome facts to ſhew, that they did in fact ſometimes reaſon in this way.

While we contemplate with mingled pity and horror theſe dreadful modes of worſhip, which prevailed amongſt all the nations of the earth, the philoſopher may view with ſurprize, and the friend of Revelation with triumph, the ſingular exception from univerſal depravity, which we find in the Jewiſh people. That people had no pretenſions to ſuperior learning, or genius, or humanity; on the contrary, they were rude, indocile, and barbarous; but in whatever regarded religious truth, and the character of the Deity, they far outſtripped their contemporaries. Their theology was pure and ſublime. It bore upon it the ſtamp of heaven. While the prieſts of Heathen Deities were crying aloud, and cutting themſelves with knives and lances, to attract the attention of their God, the prophet Elijah advances with reverence and dignity to the altar of the Almighty, and addreſſes him as the Father of the Univerſe, and the God of his people. While all the legiſlators of ancient nations either enjoined or per-

mitted human ſacrifices, the leader of the Hebrew people, inſtructed by the Almighty, interdicted them in the ſtrongeſt language. He warned them to take heed not to follow the abominations of the nations, amongſt whom they were going, nor to enquire after the manner in which they ſerved their Gods. "Thou ſhalt not do ſo unto JEHOVAH thy God; "for every abomination to Jehovah, which he hateth, "have they done unto their Gods; for even their "ſons and their daughters have they burnt in the "fire to their Gods *."

As civilization advanced among any people, humanity and reaſon would follow in its train, and the practice of eating human fleſh, and ſacrificing human beings, would be aboliſhed. But as large bodies of men never change their habits quickly, nor all at once, we may expect to find ſome refinements on theſe practices, before they were totally laid aſide—ſome medium plan, that retained the appearance of the old cuſtom, without the barbarity of it. Amongſt inſtances of this kind that might be enumerated, we ſhall only notice the practice of the Peruvians, and of the Northern nations. The firſt, inſtead of putting men to death, now "content themſelves with "drawing, from the frontal vein and from the "noſtrils of infants, a certain quantity of blood, "which they pour upon meal, and form into cakes; "which all the ſubjects of the empire are obliged

* Deut. xii. 31.

"to

" to taſte (in order to ſanctify them, or atone for " their offences), at a grand annual ſolemnity *."

Amongſt the Danes, Swedes, and others, it had been common to ſacrifice vaſt numbers of ſlaves at ſolemn feſtivals; and, in order to bring about the abolition of this practice, the Chriſtian miſſionaries uſed the happy expedient, of directing that the ceremony of emancipating a ſlave (which all the converts were required to do), ſhould reſemble exactly the form of the Heathen ſacrifices, and thus engage, in the ſame way, the imagination both of the Chriſtians and Heathens †. " Thus, happily," ſays Mr. Thorkelin, " did the ſlaves obtain chance of liberty; " thus they were often brought to the church, " placed on the altar, and ſymbolically ſacrificed to " the true God ‡."

And here I muſt cloſe this long note, which I have ſuffered to extend itſelf thus far, to give my readers, who may not be accuſtomed to ſuch ſpeculations, ſome idea of the " original lowneſs of hu- " man nature;" and alſo to exhibit a ſmall ſpecimen of a Hiſtory of Man, founded *entirely* on facts; a work very much wanted, and for which we have now a large ſtock of materials. I was once adventurous enough to think of attempting this; but my leiſure was not adequate to it; and I found alſo, that it was a work requiring veteran abilities, and

* Rech. Phil. ſur les Amer. vol. I. p. 212.

† Acta Sanctorum, Julii, tom. I. p. 439.

‡ Eſſay on the Slave Trade, p. 13.

 totally

totally unfit for a young writer. But I am convinced nothing could be more uſeful. It would furniſh an experimental anſwer to the reveries of philoſophers, relative to the excellence of the ſavage ſtate; and ſhew, in a very ſtriking manner, how much of our dignity and happineſs we owe to Civilization, to Philoſophy, and to Revelation.

I am ſenſible, indeed, that, in oppoſition to the liſt of ſavage errors and enormities, one might form a frightful catalogue of the crimes and miſeries of civilized men. But I am aware, at the ſame time, that the evils of civilized life are *accidental* and *extraneous*; while thoſe of ſavage life are *neceſſary* and *eſſential*. The firſt ariſe from an *abuſe* of the rule; the laſt from the *rule* itſelf. The difference is very material. There are defects in all civilized ſocieties; but moſt of them might be remedied; and even as they are, we may aſſert, that Men in general have it in their own power to be wiſe, virtuous, and happy. If they will not ſet a proper value on theſe advantages, and obſtinately chuſe to be ignorant, vicious, and miſerable, there is no help for it.

Note II. referred to in p. 306.

I intended here to have made ſome remarks on Profeſſor Meiners's Hiſtory of Opinions relative to the true God; but finding them too extenſive for a note, I have made a ſeparate Eſſay of them.

V.

REMARKS

ON THE

HISTORIA DOCTRINÆ DE VERO DEO,

OR,

HISTORY OF OPINIONS RELATIVE TO THE TRUE GOD,

OF PROFESSOR MEINERS, OF GOTTINGEN.

" Cum multæ res in philoſophia nequaquam ſatis adhuc
" explicatæ ſint, tum perdifficilis—et perobſcura queſtio
" eſt de Natura Deorum—de qua tam variæ ſunt doc-
" tiſſimorum hominum, tamque diſcrepantes ſententiæ:
" —plerique—Deos eſſe dixerunt; dubitare ſe Prota-
" goras; nullos eſſe omnino Diagoras Melius et The-
" odorus Cyrenaicus putaverunt. Qui vero Deos eſſe
" dixerunt, tanta ſunt in varietate, ac diſſentione, ut
" eorum moleſtum ſit dinumerare ſententias. Nam et
" de figuris Deorum et de locis atque ſedibus et actione
" vitæ—ſumma philoſophorum diſſentione certatur:—
" Utrum nihil agant—an contra ab his—omnia facta—
" magna diſſenſio eſt, &c.—Amongſt many points in
" philoſophy, which are not yet ſufficiently explained,
" is that moſt difficult and moſt obſcure enquiry rela-
" tive to the nature of the Gods, concerning which
" the opinions of learned men are ſo various and con-
" tradictory. Moſt believe that there are Gods; Pro-
" tagoras doubted, Diagoras Melius and Theodorus of
" Cyrene denied them altogether. Even thoſe who
" believe that there are Gods differ ſo much, that it
" is tedious to enumerate their opinions. For the
" philoſophers diſpute with the greateſt warmth con-
" cerning the figure of the Gods, their habitations,
" and manner of life; and there are great contro-
" verſies, whether they do nothing at all; or, on the
" contrary, whether all things are not done and made
" by them." CICERO de nat. Deorum, cap. 1.

REMARKS, &c.

OF the various works of this learned writer, the only one I have ſeen, is the Hiſtoria Doctrinæ de vero Deo, or the Hiſtory of Opinions relative to the true God, the Author and Governor of the Univerſe, 12m° Lemgoviæ, 1780, a ſmall book, written in elegant Latin; in which the author takes a comprehenſive view of the various ſyſtems entertained in the ancient world relative to this important doctrine. As this performance has ſuch a cloſe connexion with the ſubject of my laſt miſcellany, I have thought that a ſhort account of, and ſome remarks upon it, would not be unintereſting to my readers.

He begins with ſtating the two grand opinions relative to the knowledge of God, that of thoſe who thought it deducible from nature, and that of thoſe who deemed the diſcovery of it far ſuperior to human

power. He does not entirely approve of either of them; although he candidly grants that the laſt comes neareſt the truth: "illam quæ in mentis noſtræ vires paulo "injuſtior eſt, ad veritatem propius acce- "dere, quam alteram iſtam, quæ rudium "nullaque doctrina excultorum animorum "imbecillitati plus juſto tribuit *." Of all the nations that ever appeared on the earth, M. Meiners finds no ſatisfactory evidence, that any one every attained the knowledge of God from nature and reaſoning, except the Greeks alone, and they not until a very late period of their hiſtory, after many errors and the moſt tedious and painful ſteps of inveſtigation. When the caſe is ſo much limited by a writer, who ſets out with giving an expreſs opinion, that the human mind was equal to the diſcovery of God, we may fairly preſume that the evidence is rather weak and precarious. Indeed, from the general tenor and ſpirit of M. Meiners's book, I cannot help confi-

* P. 12.

dering

dering him as of the ſame ſide of the queſtion with myſelf *; he has left ſo little to the oppoſite party to contend for, and ſo ſatisfactorily ſhewn that they have no title to more.

But let us hear our author: The ancient nations, ſays he, were either wholly ignorant of a Deity, or they worſhiped idols, or falſe gods, or dead men. The true God was *totally unknown*, except to the Jews, Chriſtians, and Greeks. The two firſt derived their knowledge from Revelation, the laſt from nature: "præter Græcos "vero nullus unquam fuerit populus, qui "a ſero inchoata, et ſenſim amplificata "naturæ cognitione per gradus quaſi ad "divinum ejus auctorem penetraverit †."

After this introduction he ſhews, in the firſt ſection, that the ancient *Egyptians* had no other Gods than the heavenly bodies, idols, and beaſts. Cudworth and Jablonſki were deceived by truſting to the latter Platoniſts, who deſerve no credit. He

* See Miſc. IV. † P. 20.

takes a general review of the arts, ſciences, and morals of the Egyptians, in order to prove that their reputation has been unreaſonably magnified. There is an admirable paper on the ſame ſubject, by Dr. Woodward, in the fourth volume of the Archæologia. I cannot but very ſeriouſly recommend both theſe pieces, to the attentive conſideration of thoſe, who are diſpoſed to think highly of the acquiſitions of nations unenlightened by *direct* Revelations from heaven.

Sect. II. On the opinions of the *Phœnicians* relative to the Divine nature.—Their ſyſtem, even according to Sanchoniatho's account, was an atheiſtic one, which aſcribed the origin of all things to chaos, and a dark air, without taking in any intelligent or wiſe agent; but the remains of this writer, quoted by Euſebius from Philo Byblus, are a forgery of Philo's own invention.

Sect. III. Of the religion and diſcipline of the *Chaldæans*.—The accounts of the vaſt greatneſs and glory of this people—

the

the immenſe extent of the cities built by Ninus and Semiramis, their walls and hanging gardens, and the infinite armies with which they ſubdued all Aſia, are only ſplendid exaggerations of Cteſias, preſerved by the credulity of Diodorus —The Deity called Abraham out from among this people, that he might not be polluted by their vices and idolatry. The remains of Beroſus, preſerved by Syncellus, Joſephus, and Euſebius, ſhew him to be an abſurd and incredible writer. What is of any value in him is borrowed from Moſes. The Magi, who ſpeculated upon nature, perceived the excellent ſtructure of the univerſe; but they aſcribed it not to one Creator, and they worſhiped the ſtars as their Gods. Laſtly, their pretenſion to foretell future events was a mere impoſture; and we may ſafely ſay, that they were much more diligent in watching the diſpoſitions of their fellow-citizens, and obſerving the defects of them, for their own purpoſes, than in inveſtigating the motions of the planets, or the order of nature: "de omnibus vero

" recte dici poſſe exiſtimo, illos civium
" ſuorum animos eorumque morbos dili-
" gentius, quam cœli motus atque natu-
" ram obſervaſſe atque ſcrutatos eſſe * ;"
an obſervation which will apply with equal truth to all quacks at this day.

Sect. IV. Of the religion and diſcipline of the *Indians* and *Brachmans*.—This enquiry very important, but very difficult, the accounts relating to it being ſo various and contradictory. The remains of Nearchus, Oneſicritus, and Megaſthenes, preſerved by Strabo, contain ſuch abſurd fables as deſtroy all the credit of the writers. For they talk of finding in India horſes with ſtags' heads and horns; men not above three or five ſpans (ſpithamas) high, who fought battles with armies of cranes; others without mouths and noſes, to whom the odours of flowers and fruits ſerved inſtead of food. Philoſtratus contradicts himſelf in his account of the Gymnoſophiſts. Of the modern writers on India,

* P. 88.

Berner and Rogers are the moſt impartial, and moſt to be truſted. Our author is particularly ſevere on Holwell, whom, for fictions and folly, he calls another Megaſthenes. Anquetil and Dow he would rely upon in what they ſaw themſelves; but he thinks they have been too credulous in truſting to the relation of others. He concludes, that before the expedition of Alexander into India, that people had little learning, and no true philoſophy. He finds a ſtriking reſemblance between the opinions of the Indians and thoſe of the Greeks; and, beſides their obligations to the latter, he aſſerts, that they have been much indebted to the Chriſtian refugees, who took ſhelter among them at a very early period, to avoid the cruelty of the Perſian Kings, perhaps to St. Thomas, who is reported to have travelled into India to propagate Chriſtianity; and to thoſe Arabians, who, after the death of Mahomet, ſettled in India, and cultivated the ſciences there. This is a curious chapter, and contains a clearer account of the

religion

religion of Hindoſtan than I have any where met with.

Sect. V. Of the religion of the *Chineſe*, and eſpecially of the diſcipline of Confucius.—No confidence can be placed in the relations of the Jeſuits relative to this people. From their ſacred books it appears plain, that they confounded the Deity with his works. Confucius was ſo far from removing theſe errors, that he confirmed them in them. He collected all the ſacred fables into two books, and fixed and explained the art of divination. By theſe means having obtained the higheſt credit amongſt his ſuperſtitious countrymen, many of the ancient writers on morals aſſumed his name, to give weight to their aſſertions, and a vaſt multitude of maxims and ſayings, he never uttered, were thus aſcribed to him. The Chineſe derived their beſt information from Jews, Chriſtians, and Arabians, who at various periods, according to the teſtimony of authors, went to ſettle among them.

Our author's opinions in general, reſpecting

ſpecting the Indians and Chineſe, obtain my fulleſt approbation. When he urges the improbability of theſe nations having attained juſt ideas of the one true God, from their ſtate of barbarity, from their ignorance relative to all the arts of life, and from a number of abſurd doctrines and opinions, inconſiſtent with that truth which we find among them, I aſſent to his reaſoning, ſo far as it is uſed to prove, that they could not have diſcovered the one true God themſelves in ſuch circumſtances. But becauſe, I believe, that ſome fragments of the original traditions, relative to the Deity, muſt have been tranſmitted to *all* nations; I am therefore inclined to think, that there is ſome truth in the relations of hiſtorians, which almoſt univerſally agree, in repreſenting the religion of theſe countries as *originally* very pure, and becoming afterward corrupt and degenerate. For this is exactly what in ſuch circumſtances was to be expected. The few truths they had among them at theſe early periods, were the remains of ancient tradition;

while

while the monſtrous errors and abſurdities they had coupled with them were inventions of their own, by which they at firſt disfigured, and afterwards almoſt totally overwhelmed the primæval truths.

Sect. VI. Of the religion of the ancient *Greeks*, and the fables of the poets, &c.—The ancient Greeks worſhiped the ſame falſe deities as other nations. Plato ſays they adored the ſun, moon, and ſtars; from whoſe perpetual motions he derives the etymology of Θεος, their term for God; as if from θεω, *to run*. But Herodotus aſſerts it is from θεω, *to place*; becauſe they arranged and governed all things. The Stoics were of opinion, that the fables of the Grecian Mythology were ingenious allegorical perſonifications of the events of nature. Hence they ſet about inveſtigating the hiſtory, and ſhewing the reaſonableneſs of them. In modern times M. Heyne has very ably ſupported this ancient opinion, in a paper publiſhed in the eighth volume of the Gottingen Tranſactions. Our author here gives his reaſons for not approving

ing of this theory. Thoſe whom ſome ſplendid paſſages of Homer and Heſiod induce to believe, that the theology of theſe writers is abſolutely pure, ſhould recollect, that Homer has frequently called *ſleep*, ϖαντων τε Θεων ϖαντων τε ανθρωπων ανακτα, the ſovereign of all, both Gods and Men; and *night*, δμητεραν Θεων, the ſubduer of the Gods; and that Heſiod derives all things, even the Gods themſelves, from chaos. The Orphic fragments he conſiders as ſpurious; and concludes this ſection with a few words on the religion of the Romans.

Vol. II. Sect. I. Of the opinions of the *Ionic* ſect reſpecting the origin of things.—The ancient philoſophers of this ſect believed in one cauſe of all, but they aſcribed not intelligence to it. They called it *Love*, or *Enmity*, (Attraction or Repulſion), or *Neceſſity*, or *Fortune*, or *Chance*, and ſuppoſed that the world derived its origin from many, not from one cauſe. " Poſt hos vero balbutientes magis, " quam recte judicantes philoſophos, tan- " dem exortus eſt Anaxagoras, qui om-

" nium

" nium primus publice dicere ausus est,
" mentem quandam divinam ex æterna,
" sed indigesta materia, hanc rerum uni-
" versitatem exædificasse. Hunc saluber-
" rimæ doctrinæ inventorem omnes poste-
" riores philosophorum familiæ secutæ
" sunt, paucis tantum exceptis, quæ nu-
" men divinum vel plane negarunt, vel a
" mundi saltem opificio et administratione
" removerunt.—But after these blundering,
" rather than discerning, philosophers, at
" last Anaxagoras arose, and first of all
" ventured publicly to declare, that a cer-
" tain divine mind had framed the uni-
" verse from an eternal but rude chaos.
" All the succeeding sects of philosophers
" followed the author of this salutary doc-
" trine, excepting a few, who either re-
" jected entirely the idea of a Deity, or
" at least refused to admit him as the Cre-
" ator of the World *."

A little after, our author quotes from Aristotle † the progress through which

* P. 249. † Met. l. 1. sect. 3.

philo-

philoſophers paſſed, in arriving at this great diſcovery. The ancient thinkers aſſerted one corporeal cauſe of all, either immoveable, or eternally in motion. They were followed by others, who, beſides this corporeal nature, out of which all things proceeded, aſſerted an active power, which operated on it, and produced the objects of nature from it. This they called *Moiſture* or *Dryneſs*, *Cold* or *Heat*, *Equality* or *Inequality*, *Love* or *Enmity*. After theſe material philoſophers, came an extraordinary man, Anaxagoras, who, as it were, conducted by truth herſelf, and taking nature for his guide, DISCOVERED THE PARENT OF THE UNIVERSE.

Here let us pauſe a little, and make a few reflections.

1. No one has ſtated more fully the great difficulty of diſcovering the one true God, by the efforts of reaſon, than our author himſelf. In p. 13 he obſerves, that it is the moſt difficult of *all* truths, and that which the human mind will laſt of all be able to attain. For, ſays he, unleſs a

man had found out the magnitude, order, and motions of the cœleſtial bodies, and the revolutions of time;—unleſs, by the continual ſtudy of nature, he had diſcovered that the forms and qualities of plants, and animals, and men, were all exactly ſuch as they ought to be, ſo that nothing could have been more proper for uſe, or more beautiful and excellent in its kind; —unleſs he clearly perceived that this glorious frame of nature could not exiſt without a cauſe, nor be cauſed by fortune, chance, neceſſity, or the blind efforts of ſome unintelligent nature;—unleſs, in ſhort, he ſaw that there was nothing in the whole univerſe that could, with any reaſon, be cenſured or blamed, and was convinced that all thoſe things which terrify the vulgar, tempeſts, ſnow, hailſtorms, earthquakes, fires, diſeaſes, yea, and the vices of men themſelves, all tended to the perfection of the univerſe, and the good of the whole, ſo that nature could not exiſt without theſe very things, which the ignorant call evils;—unleſs, continues he, human

man nature had attained the knowledge of all theſe high and difficult truths, I do not think it could have diſcovered the one ſupremely excellent mind, the wiſe and good Creator of univerſal nature.

Now, if ſo much be required to prepare the way for the diſcovery of the Deity, with how much reaſon may we aſk our learned author, "Who is ſufficient for all "theſe things?" Can we conceive that any nation, or any philoſopher, by the mere efforts of feeble erring reaſon, ever attained this perfect knowledge of the univerſe—this power of explaining every phænomenon, ſolving every doubt, and anſwering every objection? How little of nature do we yet know—how much leſs knew Anaxagoras? Do not the defects of the natural evidence, and the difficulties which encumber it, operate at this day, to lead thinking men to Revelation, convinced that nature affords only an obſcure explanation of the perfections of the Infinite Being. As nothing is abſolutely perfect but God himſelf, none of his works can give a com-

plete idea of him; and as they are all imperfect in themſelves, ſo they are ſtill more imperfectly comprehended by our narrow minds. The works of nature are indeed a path that leads to God; but what is a path, unleſs there be light from heaven, to ſhew the traveller how to keep it? Without this directing beam, man would never arrive at the end of his journey, but be for ever bewildered amidſt the intricacies of the way, and "find no end, in "wandering mazes loſt."

And thus it would ſeem, that, according to our ingenious author's own ideas of the preliminary knowledge neceſſary to the diſcovery of God, man could not have diſcovered him, becauſe ſuch preliminary knowledge never was attained.

2. Such is the difficulty of diſcovering the one true God by nature, that, according to M. Meiners, no people ever accompliſhed it except the Greeks, and they not until a very late period of their hiſtory, after many errors, and the moſt painful inveſtigation. Solitary facts require ſtrong con-

confirmation. A circumſtance, *unique* in nature, ſtands in need of vaſt evidence to ſupport it; and what we have on the preſent occaſion is very inadequate to the purpoſe. How much more likely is it, that the Greeks are no exception to the general rule; but, like all other nations, had amongſt them many fragments of primæval tradition relative to the Deity, which their ſuperior ſkill in philoſophy enabled them to ſcrutinize, purify, and improve, more than other nations leſs enlightened. They were not the builders of the fair fabric of true theology. It was built without hands, by a divine architect; but they were more diligent than others in clearing away the rubbiſh, which men and ages had accumulated upon it.

3. The difficulty of diſcovering the one true God appears moſt remarkably from this circumſtance, that even the Jews and Chriſtians, to whom he was revealed, and to whom his exiſtence was confirmed, by innumerable miracles and teſtimonies, were not able to retain this high knowledge, but

have been continually deviating into idolatry, and the worſhip of falſe Deities and inferior Gods. What was ſo difficult for men to preſerve, when communicated to them, could ſcarcely have been within their power to find out. If Jehovah be exalted ſo *high* above our feeble graſp, where is the man who will ſay, that he firſt ſtretched his arm to heaven, and brought him down to earth, and comprehended him? Surely we may aſk with an ancient writer, "Canſt "thou by ſearching find out God—canſt "thou find out the Almighty to per-"fection? It is as high as heaven, what "canſt thou do? deeper than hell, what "canſt thou know? The meaſure thereof "is longer than the earth, and broader "than the ſea *."

Hence we may conclude, that Dr. Tillotſon, Cudworth, and others, were not quite accurate, when they aſſerted, that the idea of God was ſo extremely natural to the human mind. That religion of nature,

* Job xi. 7—9.

of

of which they have ſpoken ſo much, was in reality the fragments of a religion of Revelation. If by God be only meant ſome power ſuperior to man, that to be ſure will readily be acknowledged, and firmly retained by all men, becauſe all muſt diſcover operations going on in the univerſe around them, to which human power is not equal. But the vulgar never referred theſe operations to one great Agent. On the contrary, they regarded all moving beings, as like themſelves, moved independently by their own powers. If they ſaw a lion, they conſidered him as a terreſtrial animal, who moved on four legs; and if they ſaw the ſun or ſtars, they conſidered them alſo as *animals* of a particular kind, who moved in the heavens without any legs. Such ideas may appear very ridiculous at this period of time; but it would be eaſy to prove that they are facts, from the moſt authentic teſtimonies; and I mention them to ſhew, that we ought to be truly thankful for that Divine Revelation, which has enlightened our minds to ſuch a

degree, that the follies and abſurdities of dark ages now appear to us almoſt *incredible*. If I ſhould grant Dr. Tillotſon, that the idea of ONE INFINITE ALL-PERFECT BEING is congenial to a few (one of a million) ſuperior minds, and, when revealed to theſe, would be firmly retained ever after, I cannot, however, make any ſuch conceſſion with reſpect to the bulk of mankind. They have in every age been prone to forget and forſake the GREAT JEHOVAH, to worſhip Gods more levelled to their low minds; and have, not without the greateſt difficulty, been prevented from exchanging the CREATOR of ALL for inferior beings, the work of his hands.

4. Not only the Jews and Chriſtians erred after they had received the knowledge of the true God, but the philoſophers alſo fell into many miſtakes, and took up various opinions inconſiſtent with it. In the progreſs of his work, M. Meiners has occaſion to enumerate capital miſtakes, even in the wiſeſt of them. Socrates worſhiped the falſe Deities of his country

with ſincere, but miſtaken piety. He believed in divination and various ſuperſtitions. He held the Divine Nature to be corporeal, diffuſed through all nature, the τὴν ἐν πάντι φρόνησιν, of which inferior minds were *really* a part; and "from "whoſe boſom not the minds of men only, "but alſo innumerable divine natures have "flowed out *." In like manner our author ſhews, that, notwithſtanding the diſcoveries of Anaxagoras, and their confirmation by Socrates, Plato could not preſerve himſelf from many erroneous ſpeculations relative to the Divine Nature; and after him Ariſtotle fell into other miſtakes. Nay Epicurus, who adopted ſuch monſtrous opinions relative to the Divine Being, was neither a weak nor a bad man; but, on the contrary, a perſon of great virtue and profound genius.

All theſe facts tend ſtrongly to confirm me in the opinion, that the knowledge

* P. 391.

of God is *foreign* to the human mind [a]. What men discovered, men would have retained, would have improved, would have freed from every opinion hostile and repugnant to it. But this noble plant is not a native of the human mind, but a fair exotic, transplanted from richer climes, nourished with difficulty in the cold soil of earth, and ever hastening to decay, when it is not recruited by a sun-beam from that country where it received its existence.

5. Though we should admit, that Anax-

[a] Archbishop Tillotson observes, that the sacred writers do not set out with informing us, that there is a God, because this was already sufficiently known by the light of nature. The observation is just, and merits attention; but the reason assigned for it is not so. Moses does not begin with asserting the existence of God, but takes it for granted, not because the light of nature discovers it, but because it had been revealed at the beginning of the world, repeatedly confirmed afterwards, and conveyed down from age to age by tradition. But Moses studiously informs us of another thing, which the light of nature should have been as capable of discovering as the existence of God, namely, that the world was created by God, and not by inferior or evil beings.

agoras, by reaſon alone, arrived at the knowledge of the one true God, we muſt however take notice, that the way was paved for him by thoſe preliminary ſteps which our author points out from Ariſtotle's account of the progreſs of the doctrine. Without theſe Anaxagoras could never have made the diſcovery. Now it appears to me, that we may aſſert of every one of theſe, that they were only diſfigured relics of ancient traditions. And I think it highly probable, that the pure idea of one ſupreme mind, as taught by Anaxagoras, might have been brought into Greece by ſome one who had been in Judæa, or by ſome captive Jew, whom a foreign prince had eſtranged from his country. For though the Jews were a ſeparated and ſingular people, they were not ſo wholly ſet apart, as that nothing of their opinions and rites ever tranſpired to the neighbouring nations. Or this doctrine, though loſt among the learned, might have been preſerved among ſome of the vulgar (who retain ancient opinions, long after they have

ceaſed

ceaſed to exiſt among the higher claſſes), and have been accidentally found out by this philoſopher, who, on conſidering it, was led by his native good judgment to prefer it to all others. And to ſhew the probability of this, I obſerve,

6. That, although our author aſſerts Anaxagoras to have been the firſt diſcoverer of this truth, he corrects himſelf afterwards, by ſaying, that he firſt *publickly profeſſed it*; for Ariſtotle informs us, that he received it from *Hermotimus*, the Clazomenian. If this philoſopher wrote any thing, there are none of his works now remaining; and it does not appear that he ever made himſelf very remarkable, or extended his reputation in the world. Now it is highly improbable, that this obſcure man firſt diſcovered this great truth. As Anaxagoras received it from him, he muſt have received it from ſome other teacher; and that teacher from another; and ſo on, for we can never ſtop, till we arrive at the *firſt tradition*, founded on immediate Revelation.

But,

But, though there is no satisfactory evidence, that Anaxagoras or Hermotimus invented the doctrine of ONE INFINITE ALL-PERFECT MIND, the Creator of all, we are not therefore to deprive them of all merit. They deserve high praise for having *selected* this sublime truth, out of that mass of absurd opinions, amongst which it was confounded; and for the good they did to society, by restoring the knowledge of it in the world. Men had originally been made acquainted with their great Creator; but, through negligence, ignorance, and vice, they had universally lost the knowledge of him. The Pagan world resembled a ship, tossed about in the middle of the trackless ocean, without a compass, and of which the unfortunate passengers, not knowing where they were, nor whither they were going, were every moment in danger of being stranded on sand-banks, or shipwrecked on rocks. At this awful period appeared HERMOTIMUS, as the reco-verer of this greatest of all truths. From him ANAXAGORAS having learned it, by

the

the ſuperiority of his genius, publiſhed it to the whole world, with an authority and eloquence which ſubdued all oppoſition. To them ſucceeded SOCRATES, who eſtabliſhed, upon the foundation of theſe great diſcoveries, the nobleſt principles of morals that ever a *human* teacher delivered. And thus the ſyſtem was completed. I cannot help regarding this as one of the greateſt events that ever occurred in the hiſtory of the Pagan world. And though they could not at this time be fully ſenſible of the importance of it, yet they felt it ſo far, as to regard, with reverence and eſteem, the perſons to whom they owed it. Of Hemotimus little is known; but Anaxagoras was greatly reſpected. The ſublime doctrine which he was ſo inſtrumental in promoting, ſeems to have inſpired his whole ſoul, and influenced the whole character of his actions; ſo that, on account of the purity and exalted nature of his doctrines and life, he was commonly called, by an admiring people, ΝΟΥΣ, or The Mind. Socrates fell a ſacrifice to faction and the

envy

envy of ſome of his contemporaries; but his death was greatly lamented, and his memory univerſally adored. Several of the Chriſtian Fathers were perſuaded, that theſe men were in ſome meaſure *inſpired*; and conſidered them as SAVIOURS to the ancient world, and FORE-RUNNERS of the Great Saviour, Jeſus Chriſt.

M. Meiners purſues his plan in the ſucceeding ſections of this volume, with equal ſucceſs. Sect. II. relates to the opinions of Pythagoras, and his moſt ancient diſciples, concerning the origin and cauſe of things. Sect. III. of thoſe of the Eleatic ſect. Sect. IV. of Heraclitus and Empedocles. Sect. V. of Anaxagoras and Socrates. Sect. VI. of Plato. Sect VII. of Ariſtotle. Sect. VIII. of the Stoics. Sect. IX. and laſt, of Epicurus.

Of theſe it is unneceſſary for me to give any account. I ſhall only notice that which

relate

relates to Pythagoras, as it is extremely curious and intereſting *.

This philoſopher, ſays our author, has ſuffered more than perhaps any other, from the abſurd encomiums of injudicious adherents; who have ſo overwhelmed his real character in fables and falſehoods, that it is almoſt impoſſible to come at the true nature of it, or to reſtore it to its original dignity. The miſtakes of modern writers ariſe from their giving indiſcriminate credit to the ancient, and to the late Pythagoreans; and from their not attending to the revolutions which this philoſophy underwent, and the different appearances it aſſumed in different ages.

According to Dr. Bentley, Pythagoras lived about the LXVIIIth or LXXth Olympiad; and, if ſo, two centuries muſt have elapſed, before any work that now remains relative to him was compoſed. Ariſtotle wrote a book on the opinions of Pythagoras, of which only a few fragments

* P. 266—319.

have

have been preſerved by Diogenes. But in other parts of his works he has mentioned this ſect, and his authority is almoſt the only one that can be relied upon. Diogenes extracted many parts of his account from Hermippus, Ariſtoxenus, Dicæarchus and Heraclides Ponticus, pupils of Ariſtotle, who were all ſuperſtitious, fooliſh, or unfaithful writers, Ariſtoxenus alone excepted, who reſembled his maſter more than his ſcholars. Alexander Polyhiſtor, who wrote long after, agrees pretty much with Ariſtotle, and is therefore deſerving of credit.

From theſe various contradictory writers, Porphyry and Jamblichius, in the early ages of the Chriſtian æra, compiled their lives of Pythagoras, copying from them indiſcriminately, without judgment, ſenſe, or diſtinction. Hence their works are filled with confuſion, repetition, and contradiction; and they deſerve no credit, except when they agree with Ariſtotle and Ariſtoxenus.

According to theſe writers, Pythagoras

was

was the inventor of a new doctrine, and paſſed his whole life in contemplation, refuſing all public offices and buſineſs. He communicated his opinions only to a few, and not to thoſe, till they had undergone the diſcipline of a long ſilence, and many other hardſhips. He required the moſt ſervile ſubmiſſion to his dictates from his ſcholars; aſſigning no other reaſon for what he taught, than his own αυτος εφα (*ipſe dixit*). Theſe fables our author conſiders as borrowed chiefly from Heraclides, whoſe writings remained in obſcurity for many ages, until a ſect aroſe in the time of the Cæſars, who wiſhed to revive the Pythagorean diſcipline, and pitched upon this writer as their guide (probably becauſe he aſcribed the greateſt wonders to their adopted maſter). Of them the moſt famous was Apollonius of Tyana, who was fired with the ambition of appearing as a ſecond Pythagoras. Amongſt the graver expoſitors of the Pythagorean doctrine upon this new plan, were Nicomachus and Moderatus, of whom the one lived in the

reign

reign of Nero, and the other in that of Caracalla.

Leaving theſe, M. Meiners continues to give his own idea of Pythagoras and his doctrines, as founded on authorities which he conſiders as indiſputable.

This great SAGE of antiquity, after travelling long in Egypt, and through various countries in Aſia, returned to Samos, his native iſland; but, finding it ſubjected to arbitrary power under the tyranny of Polycrates, from a hatred of ſlavery, abandoned it, and went a voluntary exile to Crotona [*a*]. In a ſhort time his genius and

[*a*] Very beautiful is the deſcription given by Ovid of ſome of theſe particulars. I have never read them without great pleaſure:

Vir fuit hic ortu Samius: ſed fugerat una
Et Samon et dominos; odioque tyrannidis exul
Sponte erat, iſque, licet cœli regione remotos,
Mente Deos adiit: et quæ natura negabat
Viſibus humanis, oculis ea pectoris hauſit.
Cumque animo, et vigili perſpexerat omnia cura;
In medium diſcenda dabat: cœtumque ſilentum,
Dictaque mirantum, magni primordia mundi,

and virtues acquired him there, and in other cities of Italy, a prodigious influence, and many followers and friends; so that he was called Venator Hominum—a Hunter of Men [*a*]. This uncommon power he applied

Et rerum cauſas, et quid natura, docebat;
Quid Deus: unde nives, quæ fulminis eſſet origo,
&c. METAM. lib. XV. l. 60.

"This man was by birth a Samian; but he had "fled from Samos and its tyrants; and, from "a hatred of tyranny, was an exile of his own "accord. Now he, though diſtant from the regions "of heaven, held intercourſe with the Gods by his "mind; and thoſe things which Nature has denied "to human ſight, he diſcovered by intellectual "viſion. And when, by attention and painful dili-"gence, he had obtained the knowledge of all "things, he delivered them to be learned, in the "midſt of his ſilent diſciples admiring his wiſdom. "He taught the origin of nature, and the cauſes of "things; and what nature and what God does; "whence the ſnows, and the thunder, &c."

[*a*] He was profoundly verſed in the knowledge of inferior nature; but he preferred that more exalted ſcience, the ſtudy of man; and he applied his knowledge of human nature, not to domineer or tyrannize over his fellow-creatures, but, as appears in the

applied to the nobleſt of purpoſes: he reſtored the neighbouring cities to their ancient liberties; drove away the tyrants that had enſlaved them; gave them new laws; reformed the morals of their inhabitants; and diffuſed every where ſuch excellent diſcipline and wiſdom, that the whole country around him flouriſhed in the higheſt proſperity. This illuſtrious ſociety, of which he was at the head, held their aſſemblies at Crotona. No one was admitted into it until his genius, morals, and paſt life, had been diligently ſcrutinized; and if theſe were approved, he was received as a member, and diſtinguiſhed from the reſt of mankind by a peculiar dreſs, regimen, and manner of life. The ſociety had all things in common, and lived in the ſtricteſt habits of friendſhip. To impreſs the minds of the multitude with ſuch a

the ſequel, to reſcue them from tyranny and oppreſſion, and reſtore them to freedom and happineſs. The title given to Pythagoras here, reſembles what our Lord gave to his diſciples, Mark i. 19. "I will "make you *fiſhers of men*."

reverence as ſhould ſecure reſpect and obedience to their commands, they were remarkable for their attention to religious duties, obſerved a ſtricter mode of ſacrificing, were more frequent in luſtrations and waſhings, ſtudied the art of curing diſeaſes, and of foretelling future events by divination. By theſe means they gradually acquired the chief authority in all places; until, at laſt, a dreadful conſpiracy was formed againſt them by a number of powerful men, whom envy and ambition ſtirred up, and almoſt all their ſocieties were deſtroyed and annihilated. This deplorable event was followed with ſuch anarchy and misfortune, that the Greek ſtates univerſally ſent ambaſſadors, to conſult about ſome method of compoſing the diſturbances, occaſioned in the Italian cities by the loſs of theſe excellent men.

Lord Monboddo obſerves, that the firſt *great* revolution in learning and philoſophy was the conqueſt of Egypt, and the conſequent deſtruction of the Egyptian colleges of prieſts. However, adds he,

ſcience

ſcience again raiſed its head, and flouriſhed for ſome time in the Pythagorean colleges in Italy; "for Pythagoras went to Egypt "before the Perſian conqueſts; and, as he "was there no leſs than 22 years, and was "initiated into the prieſtly order, there can "be no doubt but that he brought away "with him a great deal of the Egyptian "learning; at leaſt, much more of it than "any Greek did before or after his time." Vol. III. p. 437 and 438. The deſtruction of the Pythagorean ſchools is a fact, ſays our author in another place, very little known; though it was the greateſt blow that learning ever received, next to the deſtruction of the Egyptian hierarchy: "it "would have gone near to have extinguiſhed learning altogether, if ſome of "them who eſcaped the maſſacre had not "committed their learning to writing, leſt "philoſophy, the beſt gift of the Gods to "men, as Plato ſays, ſhould be totally loſt." Vol. II. p. 262.—"Some planks were "ſaved of this ſhipwreck, and diſperſed "all over Europe; but they were beſt

" collected and preſerved by Plato and " Ariſtotle in Greece, where both arts and " ſciences flouriſhed very much for ſome " time. But Greece, with its liberty and " glory in arms, loſt alſo its taſte for the " ſciences and fine arts; and, as the Hali- " carnaſſian tells us, they were, ſome time " before his age, become almoſt barba- " rous. And this I take to be the third " downfall of learning." Vol. III. p. 439.

Though I cannot entirely agree with his Lordſhip in eſtimating the importance of the Pythagorean ſocieties ſo very high; for he is of opinion that " all the good " philoſophy we have now in Europe, is " little more than the fragments that had " been ſaved out of this ſhipwreck of " learning in Italy." Vol. II. p. 262. Yet I am fully perſuaded, that the deſtruction of them was a prodigious loſs to literature; and is to be reckoned amongſt thoſe calamitous events, which the labours of ages can hardly repair.

This great inſtitution did not laſt even until the death of its founder; and its

members

members gave up all hopes of reſtoring it. However, they did not abandon their ancient regulations and manner of life, but ſtrictly adhered to them, and tranſmitted them to their ſucceſſors for ſeveral ages. Among the latter diſciples of this ſchool were EMPEDOCLES, ARCHYTAS, TIMÆUS, and EUDOXUS; all great men, and employed in high offices of ſtate [*a*].

Thus

[*a*] Nobiliſſima hæc Pythagoreorum ſocietas, quam recte ſummorum virorum altricem, magnæ vero Græciæ emendatricem atque gubernatricem appellare poſſis, ne ad conditoris quidem ſui mortem duravit, ſed paulo ante illum adverſariorum inſidiis exſtincta eſt. Quum enim omnes hujus ordinis primarii viri interfecti eſſent, et civitates quoque nullam Pythagoreos revocandi, eorumque inimicos ulciſcendi voluntatem oſtenderent, (vide Ariſtox. ap. Jamb. 250. 251.) omnes, quotquot nefandæ cladis ſuperſtites erant, ſpes ſuas communibus aliquando conſiliis res publicas adminiſtrandi abjecerunt, neque amplius de recuperanda antiqua dignitate et diſciplinæ forma cogitarunt. Iidem tamen viri, Iſocrate, (in Enc. Baſ.) Platone (de Rep. X. p. 298. Ed. Maſſey) et Ariſtoxeno (l. c.) teſtibus, non ſolum priſtinos mores et conſuetam vivendi rationem, eaque decreta, quibus

 innutriti

Thus there are three claſſes of Pythagoreans: 1. The ancient and genuine ones, the contemporaries of Pythagoras himſelf; 2. Thoſe who, after the deſtruction of the ſociety, ſtill adhered to its inſtitutions; and, 3. Thoſe baſtard philoſophers, as they may be termed, who many ages after aſſumed the name of Pythagoreans from vanity and affectation; and ſet up many doctrines and practices which their predeceſſors never knew.

With reſpect to the ſymbol of the Pythagoreans, M. Meiners is of opinion, that it conſiſted in certain ſecret words and

innutriti erant, retinuerunt, verum etiam ſucceſſoribus ſuis tanto ſtudio tradiderunt, ut Pythagoreorum nomen ad Ariſtoxeni aſque et Heraclidis ætatem floreret, et paulo poſt tandem exſtingueretur. Inter hos ſeriores Pythagoreæ Scholæ alumnos non pauci exſtiterunt, qui magnas civitates vel rexerunt, vel legibus ſuis ordinarunt, uti Empedoclis, Archytæ, Timæi atque Eudoxi exemplis abunde demonſtratur. Poſt Pythagoræ vero mortem nunquam ipſius ſectatores in juſtæ diſciplinæ corpus coaleſcere potuerunt. (Ariſt. ap. Jamb. 251). Meiners, Hiſtoria Doctrinæ de Vero Deo, p. 293, 294.

ſigns,

ſigns, ſuch as are uſed by ſeveral ſocieties at preſent, to diſtinguiſh their members from the reſt of mankind, and to enable them to carry on correſpondence, without diſcovering what they wiſh to keep private.

The ancient Maſonic records, ſays an intelligent brother, inform us, " that Py-
" thagoras was regularly initiated into Ma-
" ſonry *."

In that curious MS. copied by Leland, from the hand-writing of King Henry VI. and publiſhed by Mr. Locke, we find this queſtion, " Howe comede ytt (Maſonry)
" yn Engelonde ?—Anſwer. Peter Gower,
" (that is, a corruption of *Pythagore*, the
" French term for Pythagoras) a Grecian,
" journeyedde ffor kunnynge (knowledge)
" yn Egypt, and yn Syria, and in everyche
" londe, and wynnynge entraunce yn al
" lodges of Maçonnes; he lerned muche,
" and retournedde, and woned (dwelt) yn
" Grecia Magna, wackſynge (waxing) and
" becommynge a myghtye wyſeacre (wiſe-

* Illuſtrations of Maſonry, by William Preſton, p. 152.

" man

" man or philoſopher, from the Saxon
" *weiſager*) and greatlyche renowned; and
" here he framed a grate lodge at Groton
" (Crotona), and maked many Maçonnes;
" ſome whereoffe dyde journeye yn Fraunce,
" and maked many Maçonnes, where-
" fronime, yn proceſſe of tyme, the arte
" paſſed in Engelonde."

M. Meiners does not think that Pythagoras poſſeſſed ſuch ſublime ideas of the Divine Nature, as Plutarch and others have aſcribed to him; becauſe we do not learn that any of his followers, until Hermotimus and Anaxagoras, poſſeſſed the knowledge of the true God. How far the ſudden and almoſt total deſtruction of the Pythagorean ſchools, and ſuppreſſion of their doctrines, may not account for this, I cannot ſay. What if Hermotimus himſelf learned that doctrine from ſome baniſhed Pythagorean? But, however, though we ſhould grant that Pythagoras, amongſt the treaſures he collected in Egypt, had not brought over a complete idea of the one true God, it will ſtill be true, that he had

diſcovered

discovered the proper method of arriving at it, and, indeed, at all sacred knowledge; namely, by collecting the remains of ancient traditions. Thus, if he did not make discoveries himself, by the application of his own rule, he shewed, however, to others, the only way in which they could make them. So, in modern times, Lord Bacon rectified the mode of philosophising; and pointed out the method of induction as the true mode of increasing knowledge. Yet he did not make any capital discovery himself by pursuing this plan; and Mr. Boyle, a man far inferior to him in genius and powers of mind, added much more to the stock of human knowledge than the great Verulam [*a*].

The account which M. Meiners gives of Pythagoras, appears to me extremely judi-

[*a*] The vulgar think, that men who are able to direct others, must needs always be the most capable of acting for themselves. But this is far from being the case. I do not know whether the two talents may not be in some degree incompatible. This matter, like many others in human nature, merits farther investigation.

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cious; and affords an inſtance how much may be done by a diſcerning and philoſophic mind, to ſeparate and diſtinguiſh jarring evidence, and, out of chaos, to produce order and conſiſtency. There is only one circumſtance, which I think he has not taken in, the peculiar effect which his education in Egypt, his long reſidence, and great acquiſitions there, muſt have made on the mind of Pythagoras. This circumſtance will accord excellently well with M. Meiners's ſyſtem in general. It was in conſequence of this that he muſt have become ſenſible, that the only mode of attaining true knowledge, was by attending to the ancient traditions; and therefore it muſt have been a part of his plan, for the reformation of mankind, to become the great reſtorer of them. Hence, in a great meaſure, as I before obſerved, aroſe the ſilence he impoſed on his diſciples—hence the *αυτος εφα*, &c. &c.

Thus it appears, that, except in one or two circumſtances, which he had not particularly conſidered, and of which, on ma-

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ture conſideration, he might perhaps alter his ſentiments, we may reckon M. Meiners as a powerful advocate for our opinion. Even if he ſhould not judge it proper to change his ideas with reſpect to Anaxagoras, the only material point in which he differs from us, yet ſtill he has ſupplied us with ſo many arguments, and is ſo often and ſo decidedly on our ſide, that, upon the whole, we cannot but reckon him as a fellow-labourer in the ſame field.

And now what is to be concluded from all we have diſcovered on this ſubject, but, as St. Paul moſt juſtly obſerved, *that in* (the midſt of proofs of) *the wiſdom of God, the world by* (its own) *wiſdom knew not God.* 1 Cor. i. 21. The Creator of all revealed himſelf to his creatures; otherwiſe they would not have known him, nor perhaps enquired after him; or if they had done ſo, they would have ſuppoſed infinite ſucceſſions of beings, ſuch as they ſaw on earth, producing one another. It is not, therefore, as ſome have ſuppoſed, by REASON; but it is *through* FAITH *we underſtand, that the*

worlds

worlds were framed by the word of God, ſo that things which are ſeen, were not made by things which do appear. Heb. xi. 3. Surely, ſays an ancient writer, " Vain are all men " by nature, who are ignorant of God, and " could not, out of the good things that " are ſeen, know HIM THAT IS: neither " by conſidering the *works*, did they ac- " knowledge the *work-maſter*. But deemed " either fire, or wind, or the ſwift air, or " the circle of the ſtars, or the violent " water, or the lights of heaven, to be the " Gods which govern the world." Wiſdom of Sol. xiii. 1, 2.

The ſacred writers uniformly ſpeak of Man as in his native ſtate ignorant, rude, and fooliſh—*born as a wild aſs's colt*; and when the queſtion is, how he acquired knowledge and wiſdom, they conſtantly reply, that *God gave it unto him*. All wiſdom cometh from Jehovah, ſays the wiſe Son of Sirach, and is with him for ever. —The *word of God* moſt high is the *fountain* of wiſdom—She is with all fleſh according to his gift, &c. Chap. I. paſſim.

There is an enquiry in the book of Job relative to the *ſource of wiſdom*; and the writer appears to have arrived exactly at the ſame concluſions as we have done here. With this curious paſſage we ſhall conclude the preſent Eſſay: "But where ſhall "wiſdom be found? and where is the "place of underſtanding? Man knoweth "not the price thereof; neither is it found "in the land of the living. The depth "ſaith, It is not in me; and the ſea ſaith, "It is not with me. It cannot be gotten "for gold, neither ſhall ſilver be weighed "for the price thereof. It cannot be va-"lued with the gold of Ophir, with the "precious onyx, or the ſapphire. The gold "and the cryſtal cannot equal it: and the "exchange of it ſhall not be for jewels of "fine gold. No mention ſhall be made "of coral, or of pearls: for the price of "wiſdom is above rubies. The topaz of "Ethiopia ſhall not equal it, neither ſhall "it be valued with pure gold. Whence "then cometh wiſdom? and where is the "place of underſtanding; ſeeing it is hid

"from

" from the eyes of all living, and kept
" close from the fowls of the air? De-
" ſtruction and death ſay, We have heard
" the fame thereof with our ears: *God*
" *underſtandeth the way thereof*, and *he*
" *knoweth the place thereof.* For he
" looketh to the ends of the earth, and
" ſeeth under the whole heaven; to make
" the weight for the winds, and he weigh-
" eth the waters by meaſure. When he
" made a decree for the rain, and a way
" for the lightning of the thunder; then
" did he ſee it, and *declare* it, he prepared
" it, yea, and ſearched it out." Job xxviii.
12—27.

VI.

ACCOUNT

OF

DR. ELLIS'S WORK,

RELATIVE TO THE ORIGIN OF

SACRED KNOWLEDGE.

WITH REMARKS.

"Λογον δη και πολυν και καλον εχει, τοτε μεν ὁτε περι
"Θεων ην ανθρωποις διανοηματα πρωτα, ὡς τ'εγενοντο,
"οἱοι τ'εγιγνοντο, και οἱας μετεχειριζοντο πραξεις, μη
"κατα νομον τοις σωφροσι λεγεσθαι, μηδε φιλως."

"This is eſtabliſhed moſt clearly, and on the firmeſt
"grounds, that when men firſt began to think
"concerning the Gods—what they were, and
"how they exiſted and employed themſelves—
"their opinions on theſe ſubjects were not taken
"up from the ideas and reaſoning of learned
"*men*." PLATO, Epinom.

TO THE REVEREND

ALEXANDER GEDDES, LL. D.

FROM

THE AUTHOR.

Amicitiæ ergo.

ACCOUNT, &c.

THIS valuable work appears to be little known; for, though I have attended to every thing that related to this ſubject, I never heard it mentioned until my fourth Miſcellany was finiſhed; and I thought it better to give ſome account of it in a ſeparate paper, than to intermix remarks on it in that Eſſay.

The title, which to many would appear unpromiſing, may probably have prevented ſeveral from looking into it. So much learning and good ſenſe might not perhaps be expected from a title which they might conſider as uncouth, if not fanatical. "The Knowledge of Divine Things from "Revelation, not from Reaſon or Nature, "&c. By the late John Ellis, D. D. Vicar "of St. Catherine's, Dublin." Vol. I. 2d edit. 8vo. Lond. 1771.

Dr. Ellis appears to have formed a very extenſive plan in treating this ſubject; a plan that would entirely anſwer my ideas, if he had taken in knowledge *in general*, as well as ſacred truths. Indeed, it is not eaſy to ſeparate them; nor has the Doctor been able to keep them always diſtinct. For the ancients believed the rudiments of both to have come from heaven. Beſide the volume before us, which contains only the firſt book of the Enquiry, Dr. Ellis propoſed to ſhew, in his ſecond book, that the beſt notions the Heathens were able to conceive of God, of the ſoul, of a future ſtate, &c. were either very imperfect, or altogether falſe—that their religious worſhip was ſuperſtitious, idolatrous, and unworthy of God—and that their morals were ſo defective, that many actions, which they held to be juſt and good, were impious and wicked. In his third book he meant to prove, that philoſophy and reaſon are wholly inſufficient to preſcribe a complete rule of life, or to direct man to the perfection of his being and ultimate happineſs. And

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in his fourth, he deſigned to trace out the method by which the Heathen world did come at thoſe names and notices of Divine truths, which we find amongſt them.

In an advertiſement at the end, it is ſaid, that the Doctor completed his plan before he died; and that the remainder would be publiſhed at a convenient time. But no more of the work has yet appeared; for what reaſon I know not. It is to be regretted, that the three ſubſequent books are not publiſhed, as they contain by far the moſt intereſting part of the enquiry, an appeal to *facts*, and to the *hiſtory of mankind*. Leland and other writers may, indeed, have rendered the ſecond and third leſs neceſſary; but neither they, nor Dr. Winder, have ſuperſeded the fourth, which traces the origin and progreſs of knowledge; and I ſhould be extremely happy, if the account I am now to give of that part of the work which is before the public, ſhould induce thoſe who poſſeſs the MSS. to favour us with the reſt.

The volume before us is chiefly of a metaphyſical and critical nature. The ſtyle is not ſo elegant or perſpicuous, as could have been wiſhed; there are many repetitions, and a general want of order and arrangement, which makes it tedious and heavy. The author appears often to be encumbered with his own learning, ſo that he cannot bring it properly into action and effect. And ſometimes the zeal of the theologian has over powered the judgment of the philoſopher. Yet, notwithſtanding theſe defects, it is on the whole a very valuable work: it contains much good ſenſe and uſeful information; and might furniſh ſome ſkilful artiſt with important materials for erecting a more regular and perfect fabric.

In Chapter I. the author ſtates the enquiry, and anſwers objections. He obſerves, men may have attained the knowledge of God and ſacred truths, either, 1. by innate ideas implanted in their minds; or, 2. by contemplating nature; or, 3. by Revelation, conveyed down by tradition. The

laſt

laſt opinion he eſpouſes, as moſt conformable to ſcripture, reaſon, hiſtory, and truth. He replies to the objection of the novelty of his opinion, by quoting the authority of Grotius, Puffendorf, Barrow, and Tillotſon, who ſeem to have entertained ſomewhat ſimilar ſentiments. Puffendorf ſays, "It is very probable, that the chief heads "of natural law were expreſsly delivered "by God Almighty to the firſt mortals, "and were from thence communicated to "others by cuſtom and education *." The other objections noticed by our author, are, that his opinion weakens the arguments urged againſt infidelity, which he ſhews it does not—that it is an aſſault on the character of thoſe excellent perſons who have defended religion by arguments drawn from reaſon and nature, which he alſo refutes; and obſerves, that theſe very admirable arguments from nature, employed by ſuch perſons, were *ſuggeſted* by the ſacred writings—that it throws an im-

* Leg. Nat. l. 2. c. 3. §. 20.

putation

putation on the wiſer heathens:—he ſays by no means—they did as much as their circumſtances allowed—they candidly confeſſed their own ignorance and doubts; and wiſhed for better information and clearer light.

Near the end of the chapter, our author obſerves very juſtly, that modern infidels are indebted for their clearer ideas of religious and moral truths to the ſacred books, although they diſown their benefactor. Are they, ſays he, wiſer than Socrates or Cicero? is their capacity greater, their ſtudy ſeverer, or their knowledge more extenſive? Whence then ariſes the difference? This circumſtance, he remarks, has not been generally attended to; it has even eſcaped the ingenious author of the Religion of Nature delineated, Mr. Wollaſton, who profeſſes to ſpeak only as nature dictates; and "to ſhew what a hea-"then philoſopher, without any other "help, and almoſt *αυτοδιδακτος*, may be "ſuppoſed to think," while at the ſame time

time he delivers ſuch a ſyſtem, as no philoſopher ever did or could have invented.

Chap. II. Of the inlets to knowledge. Here our author ſhews the abſurdity of ſuppoſing innate ideas; proves that the κοιναι εννοιαι, *common notions* of the heathens, were nothing but *traditional notions*, whoſe origin was too ancient to be inveſtigated, and which therefore men ſuppoſed to be coeval with their being, and implanted in their nature—that ſenſation is the inlet of all knowledge, and *inſtruction* the only method of arriving at the knowledge of God and divine things—that all antiquity agreed in this, of which he brings ſome proofs, which I ſhall cite hereafter, in an addition to my liſt of primitive traditions —laſtly, that this opinion is conformable to the hiſtory of mankind.

"No one," ſays he, "denies that men are, what Plato juſtly calls them φυσει λογικοι, *by Nature capable of Reaſon*, and reaſon, of vaſt attainments in knowledge: but neither one nor the other could be without language, nor language without inſtruction.

inſtruction, nor inſtruction (in the language of divine things at leaſt) but from God. This is the order of nature, the appointment of its Author, from which there is no deviating. As it alone ſolves thoſe otherwiſe unaccountable difficulties, in the ſavageneſs of nations, the ignorance of ages, the horrid errors of philoſophy, the gradual advancement, perfection, or decay of religion, arts, and ſciences; the only difference was according to the opportunity of receiving inſtruction. Greece was a thouſand years without the leaſt tincture of philoſophy, or knowledge of nature; and when it appeared among them, it was not of their own manufacture, but the ſpoils of Egypt and the Eaſt. Their Fathers were as well fitted for improvement as their deſcendants, but had no inſtructors, nor knew where to look for them: and Socrates, in his Apology, tells the Athenians, 'that they will fall into an irreco-'verable ſtate, unleſs God ſhall take care 'of them, and ſend them another inſtruc-'tor.' So the Romans, and every diſtant

nation,

nation, were barbarous for want of intercourſe; and on the ſame account the New Guinea Men are ſavages to this day *."

A little farther on we meet with this eloquent and animated paſſage. "This account of coming at knowledge agrees with all the annals of antiquity and hiſtories in the world. Moſes has recorded the ſettlements of the firſt parents of mankind, where God in a more frequent and immediate manner gave revelations of his will, and commanded them to teach it to their children, and their childrens children. Hence, thoſe firſt colonies of the Eaſt, Phœnicia, Perſia, and Egypt, continued the oracles of learning to the world through all ſucceeding ages. The further men diſperſed from them, the more they became ſunk in barbarity, and diveſted of humanity. Reaſon was like the echo, where neareſt to the voice it was ſtrong, but as it removed gradually ſunk and died away: and what not a little contributed to this

* P. 116.

preſervation of knowledge in the Eaſt, was God's continuing to reveal himſelf to the Jews; ſo that in proceſs of time the little ſpot of Jewry was the only place where the true God was known and taught. And ſome beams of this divine wiſdom could not but ſhine forth from time to time upon the neighbouring people who converſed with them. Accordingly, whenever we find a people begin to revive in Literature, it was owing to one of theſe cauſes; either to ſome tranſmigrators from thoſe parts, coming and ſettling among them, or elſe to their going thither for inſtruction. From theſe fountains they always had it, and at this fire the nations of the world lighted their own. There is no inſtance to be given to the contrary. Hither Athens, and afterwards Rome, came in queſt of knowledge and inſtruction. Theſe were the ſchools and maſters to the world. And though our accounts of Aſia are but ſhort and defective, yet what remains there are, as alſo their traditions even in China, trace their original and oracles weſtward; which is

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the fulleſt confirmation of the Moſaick hiſtory, and of the propagation of knowledge by inſtruction only *."

Chap. III. Conſiderations on Mr. Locke's hypotheſis, that the knowledge of God is attainable by ideas of reflection; wherein is demonſtrated, upon his own principles, that ſuch knowledge is not to be attained. The mind's operations upon its own ideas, by variouſly combining or ſeparating them, produces no new ſimple ideas, therefore could not lead to the diſcovery of God. Mr. Locke admits that ſpirits are only *knowable* by revelation. How then could we any other way attain the knowledge of the Supreme Spirit?

Chap. IV. Of the law of Nature. This is ſpoken of by moſt divines as if its principles were innate, which is a miſtake.—Theſe authors make conceſſions that deſtroy their own principles—no laws purely human could have obligation ſufficient to bind men, becauſe all men are by nature

* P. 122, 123.

equal—

equal—dependence and ſubjection the foundation of all law.

In this chapter there are many things aſſerted which, I think, are not neceſſary to the author's argument, and which I often heſitate to give my aſſent to. Yet his reaſons are weighty, and deſerve much attention.

Chap. V. Texts of Scripture relating to the Natural Law. We ſhall mention ſome of the Author's remarks on theſe important paſſages.

Acts xvii. 30. *And the times of this ignorance God winked at*, &c. This the Doctor thinks affords a ſatisfactory proof that the heathen world could not by the light of nature attain an adequate knowledge of God or their duty; for if they could have done ſo, then God would not have winked at their ignorance; "for in the day of knowledge "there will be no allowance made for im-"penitence or idolatry *."

Rom. i. 18. *For the wrath of God is re-*

* See p. 269; and alſo p. 309.

vealed,

vealed, &c. v. 19. *becauſe that which may be known of God is manifeſt in them*; or, as the margin reads it, *to them*; " not indeed from " nature and reaſon, *for God hath ſhewed it* " *to them*, εφανερωσε, the word expreſsly " denotes a poſitive act of God, who " brought to light, made manifeſt and " evident, that which was dark, obſcure, " and unknown before, by the ſundry ways " he thought proper to reveal and make " himſelf known to us (them)."

V. 20. *For the inviſible things of him from*, " not εκ (out of), but απο, ever ſince, *the* " *creation of the world*, when they were " fully communicated (by revelation) *are* " *clearly ſeen*; becauſe, after a declaration " of his nature and exiſtence, the divine " attributes are plainly evinced, *being un-* " *derſtood*, νοεμενα, explained to the under- " ſtanding, *by the things which are made*, " ποιημασι, by the works of God, or things " which he hath done, not only of *creation*, " but of *providence*, *even his eternal power* " *and godhead*; *ſo that they*, who had ſuch " aids and notices, might, through thoſe

" mediums, have made that diſcernible to " the mind, which was not viſible to the " eye; and known they were the works, " not of viſible cauſes, but an inviſible " agent, which they did not, and therefore " *are without excuſe*, &c. *"

In confirmation of his expoſition of the 18th verſe, Dr. Ellis refers to Origen, contra Celſum, l. 3. p. 140 [*a*]. Rom.

* P. 270.

[*a*] This paſſage, though apparently very plain when taken by itſelf, has occaſioned ſome difficulty to the moſt attentive commentators, who have conſidered it in connexion with the context.

Rom. i. v. 19. Διοτι το γνωστον τυ Θευ φανερον εστιν εν αυτοις· ὁ γαρ Θεος αυτοις εφανερωσε.

V. 20. Τα γαρ αορατα αυτυ απο κτισεως κοσμυ, τοις ποιημασι νουμενα καθοραται, ἠ τε αιδιος αυτυ δυναμις και θειοτης.

Becauſe that which may be known of God is manifeſt in them: for God hath ſhewed it to them.

For the inviſible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly ſeen, being underſtood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and godhead, &c.

REMARKS.

V. 19. —ὁ γαρ Θεος αυτοις εφανερωσε, *for God hath ſhewn it to them.* Theſe words may be underſtood in different

Rom. ii. 14. *For when the Gentiles, who have not the law,* do by nature the things contained

different ways. Epiſcopius, Op. tom. I. p. 20. explains them of the times of the Goſpel, when God exhibited ſuch proofs of his exiſtence and attributes to men, that they were inexcuſable if they did not attend to them. But it is moſt probable, that it refers to the *ancient* heathens, of whom St. Paul continues his diſcourſe in the ſubſequent verſes. Now, how did God ſhew his attributes to the heathens? Mr. Paton appeals to the facts he had previouſly adduced; and replies, *firſt*, by revelation; and, *next*, by the works of nature. The laſt, without the firſt, would have taught them nothing. So Dr. Ellis obſerves, p. 369, that "the memorable words, Pſal. 19. "*The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament* "*ſheweth his handy work,* are undoubtedly true to "David, who was a friend of God, and to every "religious Jew: for this pſalm was directed to the "chief Muſician, to be ſung in the public aſſemblies, "and intended purely for the uſe of the Jewiſh "church." And Socinus, in commenting on the ſame paſſage, had remarked, with his uſual acuteneſs and preciſion, that we are to obſerve "it is taken "for granted in this pſalm, that God created the "heavens; and alſo, that this was believed by thoſe "who looked at them, as was the caſe in that part "of the world where David, the author of the

contained in the law, they, having not the law, are a law unto themſelves, v. 15, which

" pſalm, reſided. And the ſenſe is, that when any " one ſees and contemplates the heavens, which he " knows to have been created by God, he will " diſcover the power and wiſdom of God from " them." Prælect. Theolog. c. II. the ſubject of which is " Quæritur, quid ſit in homine naturaliter, " quod ad religionem attinet?" In Op. Socini Bib. Polon. Frat. tom. I. p. 537. fol. Irenop. 1656.

The only difficulty is, that the following verſe ſeems to contain an explanation of the 19th which precedes it; ſo that St. Paul in it reſtricts God's *ſhewing himſelf* to the ancient world, *ſolely* to his manifeſting his attributes in his works. Therefore moſt commentators have underſtood it ſo. Thus Crellius ſays, God hath ſhewed it to them—quomodo, how? Anſ.—by the things which are made.

Let us conſider this 20th verſe therefore a little:

1. Απο κτισεως κοσμυ, from the creation of the world. Dr. Ellis, we have ſeen, refers this phraſe to *time* entirely; in which caſe, inſtead of the ambiguous word *from*, it would have been better to have uſed the determinate one *ſince*. Mr. Paton obſerves, that by theſe words " the apoſtle evidently means, " not any evidence ariſing from the works made, " but the time only when they were created. This " expreſſion is of the ſame import with theſe fol- " lowing:

which ſhew the work of the law written in their hearts, &c.

" All

" lowing: Mark x. 6. From the beginning of the " creation God made them male and female.—2 Pet. " iii. 4. All things continue as they were from the " beginning of the creation." Socinus and Crellius ſupport the ſame *expoſition*. The *laſt* ſays, " The " words, ' from the creation of the world,' in this " place, do not denote *whence* or *out of what* theſe " things were known, which are ſpoken of, but they " denote the beginning of the time, as others alſo " have remarked. For it is in the Greek, not εκ, " *out of*, but απο, from (or ſince), &c." In Rom. i. 20. Opp. Bib. Pol. tom. III. fol. 79. col. 1. Beza, Piſcator, and De Dieu, adopt the ſame idea. Wolfius, in his Curæ Philolog. tom. III. p. 23, following Luther and Biſhop Pearſon, takes the other ſide. But his remarks only amount to this, that απο is often uſed in the ſenſe of εκ, which nobody will deny.

2. Νοουμενα *being underſtood*, Mr. Paton would connect this word, not with τοις ποιημασι, the things which are made, but with καθορατα, clearly ſeen; and then the ſenſe would be " for the inviſible " things of him, ever ſince the creation of the world, " being thought, meditated upon, or underſtood, are " clearly ſeen by the things which are made." But in this caſe, would not νουμενα have followed κοσμω?

3. Τοις ποιημασι, *the things that are made*. The

 ποιηματα,

" All the ancient commentators under-
" ſtood theſe words—of thoſe who lived
" before

ποιηματα, as Wolfius obſerves, may denote either *men* or *things*. In the firſt ſenſe it is uſed Eph. ii. 10. αυτω γαρ εσμεν ποιημα, κτισθεντες εν Χριστω Ιησυ. For we are his workmanſhip, created in Chriſt Jeſus, &c. If we adopt this tranſlation, the meaning of the paſſage will be entirely changed, and it will run thus; " For the inviſible things of him, from the creation " of the world, are clearly ſeen, being underſtood " by (all) men who are created, &c." Homberg endeavours to ſupport this expoſition; but Wolfius thinks it more agreeable to the common uſe of the word in the New Teſtament, to underſtand it of *things* made.

Socinus explains the *things made or done*; for it may be taken either way, in a ſpiritual ſenſe of the divine tranſactions, and the miracles of Chriſt and the Apoſtles; on which Elſner aſks, with what propriety could St. Paul aſſert, that the power of God had been proved of late by thoſe miracles, when it had been manifeſted, ever ſince the time of Moſes, by miracles as wonderful and great. But if, as Socinus ſuppoſes, St. Paul was now ſpeaking of the infidelity of the men of his own age, not of that of the ancient heathens, it is natural to ſuppoſe, he would refer to thoſe immediate proofs of divine power, which they had ſeen with their own eyes, as

what

" before the law, as Melchiſedec, Job, &c.
" (but who had received divine notices by
" reve-

what ought to have convinced them, rather than to ancient ones, which they received only from hiſtorical tradition.

However, the friends of Socinus ſeem either not to have attended to, or not to have approved his expoſition. Crellius explains the words in the common way, Bib. Pol. tom. III. fol. 78.; though he admits that we have no innate ideas of God; " Naturæ " noſtræ non ſit omnino inſitum credere Deum eſſe, " eſt enim mens noſtra inſtar tabulæ raſæ, cui nihil " inſcriptum eſt, omnia autem inſcribi poſſunt, &c." fol. 80. Slichtingius (Ib. tom. V. p. 164.) adopts the common expoſition alſo, and enters into an eloquent expoſtulation with the Atheiſts, for their inexcuſable blindneſs, in not ſeeing God in the works of nature. That the magnificent univerſe could have been formed by blind chance, is, in his opinion, as abſurd as to ſuppoſe, that, by ſcattering letters in the air, a man might form Virgil's Æneid, or the ſecond Philippic of Cicero; or that, by toſſing about ſtones at random, he might build a ſtupendous palace.

Epiſcopius, by the τα ποιηματα, underſtands neither the works of creation, nor yet the miracles of the Goſpel, but univerſally all the proofs of favour and diſpleaſure, which the Divine Being exhibited in

" revelation or tradition), or who repented
" as the Ninevites, or who had learned the
" worſhip

any period of time; and by νοουμενα, the internal obſervation and judgment of the mind itſelf, on reaſoning upon theſe, as oppoſed to καθοραται, which denotes the clear appearance or manifeſtation to the ſenſes. Probably, therefore, according to his ideas, the words may be thus paraphraſed: " For the in-
" viſible attributes of God being, ſince the begin-
" ning of the world, reflected upon and compre-
" hended from the divine tranſactions, his eternal
" power and godhead do now clearly appear."

Theſe remarks prove, that the paſſage before us is not quite ſo clear as might at firſt be ſuppoſed. It is eaſy to miſunderſtand ſo rapid, free, and, I may ſay, irregular a writer as St. Paul, before the quickneſs of whoſe tranſitions, time, and place, and order, all give way. But if we ſhall adhere entirely to the common tranſlation and expoſition of the paſſage, I do not ſee that it will at all materially affect the queſtion before us. For when St. Paul ſays, that the works of nature manifeſted the power of God to men, he *muſt* be ſuppoſed to take it for granted, that theſe men previouſly knew that the univerſe was created by God. For the ſame Scriptures which ſay that God ſhewed himſelf to man in nature, inform us, that God revealed himſelf to man at the beginning by actual communication. St. Paul,

therefore,

" worſhip of the true God, as Cornelius.
" This was their *νομος αγραφος*, *unwritten*
" *law*; for the heathen world had no
" other." p. 63. This is ſimilar to Whitby's remarks on the paſſage.

" The wiſeſt writers on the law of nature interpret theſe texts as a figurative expreſſion, and implying no more than a clear and certain knowledge treaſured up in the memory, of which the perſons ſpoken of are convicted in their own conſciences, by what means ſoever theſe notions entered their thoughts. And to write in the mind, *εν τη ψυχη γραφειν*, *et ſcribere in animo*, was a phraſe in common uſe with the Greeks and Latins, as well as the holy penmen both of the Old and New Teſtament.—Solomon frequently uſes the expreſſion, Prov. iii. 3. *My ſon, write them upon the table of thy heart.* So again, vii. 1.

therefore, is not ſpeaking of what the works of nature either did, or could have done, *of themſelves*; but he is ſpeaking of what they did, in that ſituation, in which he knew and owned all men to have then exiſted.

and

and Jer. xvii. 1. *The ſin of Judah is written with a pen of iron, and with the point of a diamond, it is graven upon the table of their heart.* Not that ſins were thus originally engraven, but were ſo heinous, that the memory of them could never be oblite-rated. So Ezek. xiv. 3. *They have ſet up their idols in their heart,* to denote their in-ward affection for idolatry.—Thus St. Paul, *Ye are our epiſtle written in our hearts, known and read of all men.* And again, *Ye are the Epiſtle of Chriſt, written not with ink, but the ſpirit of the living God.* And Heb. viii. 10. *I will write them in their hearts.* All which can import no more, than any truth's being made clearly known to them, and the law ſo plainly taught, as to be eaſily perceived by them all, that whenever they tranſgreſſed it, their con-ſciences ſecretly condemned them for it *."

" Therefore, the κοιναι εννοιαι, thoſe *com-mon notions* or principles they had, were only traditional notices of the univerſal (and conſequently moral) law, ſcattered up and down among the Gentiles, but were to

* P. 63—64.

them

them the measure of good and evil; for, by reason of these being fixed in their consciences, they are said to *be a law unto themselves*, as having this inward rule to direct their actions by. These Zeno called καταλήψεις, *comprehensions*, and Epicurus προλήψεις, which Cicero renders *anticipations*, but may be called also *opinion* or *persuasion*. These were, εντολαι αἱ κατα νομον τε και προ τȣ νομȣ, *precepts of law, and before the law*, for ȣτε τȣς προ νομȣ ανομȣς ειναι, *even those before the law, were not without a law* *.— And in this sense the wisest heathens seem to have understood it. Thus Xenophon represents the opinion of Socrates: That as to unwritten laws, received over the whole earth, which it was impossible that all mankind (as being of different languages, and could not be assembled in one place) should make, that these were given us by the Gods; and that no man impunibly violates a law established by the Gods; that the laws of morality are the work of a more excellent legislator than men; and whatever force the laws have,

* Clem. Alex. Strom. 7. p. 704. D.

they

they receive it from the Gods. And this was a maxim which Socrates always maintained, *That virtue was a ſcience*, i. e. *not inbred, but to be learned like any other.*— So Plato defines the unwritten law to be ὃ κατα εθος γινομενος, *that which proceeded from cuſtom*, i. e. actions conformable to the common notions of mankind; and this ſeems to be the true meaning of his το της φημης, *the law of fame or report* *."

"Theſe active internal principles were the law of mankind, not that which is written in books, or engraven on wood, but εμψυχος ων ἑαυτῳ λογος, *the living reaſon in every man's heart*, always alive and watchful together with it, and never ſuffering the mind to be without a director. And from a ſenſe of theſe (which were univerſally extended to ſome more, to others leſs), and the ſelf-reflective acts of the mind, which are called conſcience, proceeded thoſe ſtings and remorſes, on committing what they themſelves condemned †."

* P. 65—66. † P. 66—67.

Dr.

Dr. Ellis treats very largely concerning the altar, which St. Paul found at Athens, dedicated "To the Unknown God." Oecumenius, an ancient writer, ſays, this was but a part of the inſcription, and gives the whole thus:

ΘΕΟΙΣ ΑΣΙΑΣ ΚΑΙ ΕΥΡΩΠΗΣ
ΚΑΙ ΛΙΒΥΗΣ
ΘΕΩ ΑΓΝΩΣΤΩ
ΚΑΙ
ΞΕΝΩ

To the Gods of Aſia and of Europe,
And of Africa;
To the God unknown,
and
Strange (or Foreign).

On which the Doctor remarks, that the mixing the Supreme Deity amongſt ſuch a heap of falſe divinities, proves that they were ignorant of his true nature, "as the "placing him among the ſtrange ones "does, that they had received (the know-"ledge of) him from others, and were not "the authors of the diſcovery *."

* P. 294.

This

This furniſhes our author with an opportunity of bringing forward ſome curious facts, which ſhew the great uncertainty of the ancient heathens relative to the nature of God and his attributes. Amidſt the variety of altars at Athens, ſays he, " there was one to the unknown God, and probably there were many of them: Philoſtratus ſays, at Athens there were altars of unknown Gods or Demons, *αγνωςων δαιμονων βωμοι*, and Pauſanias mentions them in the plural number, *Θεων αγνωςων βωμοι*, altars of the unknown Gods; by which alſo Grotius thinks might be denoted many altars *Θεω αγνωςῳ*; Critias in Lucian ſwears *νη τοι αγνωςον εν Αθηναις*, by the God unknown to the Athenians. Yet Triepho, at the cloſe of the Dialogue, ſays, 'We 'having found out the God unknown at 'Athens, and worſhipped him with hands 'ſtretched up to heaven, will give thanks 'to him as having been thought worthy 'to be made ſubject to his power.' But as it is plain, the former knew not that God; ſo the latter, through the whole

Dialogue,

Dialogue, appears to have been inſtructed in Chriſtianity; or the author, whoever he be, was one, and put theſe words into the mouth of his interlocutor *." The reaſon, continues our author, of erecting ſuch altars (as that to the unknown God), was probably their fear of omitting any God, which, amidſt ſuch a variety of religions, they might eaſily have done: "or it might proceed from their not knowing what God to aſcribe ſome remarkable benefit or deliverance to, and therefore in gratitude erected an altar to the unknown One. Diogenes Laertius gives this account of their riſe: 'That Epimenides ſtaid a 'plague among the Athenians in this man-'ner. He took a black and white ſheep 'to the Areopagus, whence he let them go 'which way they would; commanding 'thoſe that followed them, that where-'ſoever they lay down, they ſhould ſacri-'fice them τῳ προσηκοντι Θεῳ, to ſome fit 'and proper God. The calamity ceaſed,

* P. 293—294.

'and to this very day, ſays Laertius, there 'are altars to be found without name, 'which were then made in memory of this 'expiation *."

"The Athenians ſending to aſk aid from the Lacedemonians, the form of Pan met the ambaſſadors, and complained that they worſhipped other Gods, but neglected him; however, he promiſed his aſſiſtance, if they amended for the future: wherefore, after their victory, not being certain to whom they owed it, they erected an altar to the unknown God †."—"Nor was this cuſtom peculiar to Greece, but obſerved by the Romans alſo, in the immediate erection of altars on any ſudden benefit received; as that to Adoption mentioned by Tacitus, l. 1. and another to Revenge, l. 3. So the ancient Romans, when they felt an earthquake, betook themſelves by publick command to religious obſervances, but did not, as on other occaſions was uſual, name the God, to whom they dedicated ſuch ſo-

* P. 294—295. † P. 296.

lemnities,

lemnities, left by miſtaking one for another, they might oblige the people to a falſe worſhip; and as it was uncertain by what power, or God, earthquakes happened, they offered ſacrifice to an uncertain Deity, in the ancient form, *ſi Deo, ſi Deæ*, which was by the decree of the prieſts, ſays Varro.

"The Latins had alſo many altars, *Diis Deabuſque omnibus; & Dibus Deabuſque omnibus; & Herculi invicto, & cæteris Diis.* And the moſt learned among them, Tully, was under the ſame ignorance and diffidence, when he adviſed his Terentia to return thanks to ſome God or other, that had given her relief in her diſorder, but could not tell who, whether Apollo or Æſculapius. But, *cui quidem tu Deo, quemadmodum ſoles, piè & caſtè ſatisfacias velim.*

"So among the Carthaginians, it was cuſtomary, if they did not proſper by worſhipping the Gods they did know, to ſacrifice to them they did not know. After the defeat of Imilco in Sicily, and their being invaded, they immediately ſet about atoning Ceres and Proſerpine, whom they had

never adored before; and having expoſed all the ſtatues of the Gods, ordered them to be worſhipped after the Grecian manner.

"The ignorance of the Divine Nature made this uncertainty run through the whole of their religion; many were *Dei involuti*, they knew not whom they ſhould adore, therefore to their prayers added *Sive tu Deus es, ſive Dea*; and in their publick devotions, when they doubted the name, the form was, *Diſ. Pater. ve Jovis. Manes. ſive. vos. Quo alio. nomine. fas. eſt. nominare.* As alſo, when the ſex of their Gods was dubious, many of them being *hermaphrodites*, they mentioned both, as Onomacritus, in his hymn to Minerva, thus beſpeaks her, Αρσεν μεν και θηλυς εφυε, or εφυς.

And we meet with this inſcription.

Sive Deo.
Sive Deæ.
C. Ter. Dexter.
Ex voto.

In the ſame manner Ovid,

——*Quiſquis fuit ille Deorum;*

And Virgil,

——*Sequimur*

———*Sequimur te, ſancte Deorum,*
Quiſquis es———

Innumerable paſſages of the ſame kind every where occur; and A. Gellius juſtly tells us who theſe unknown Gods were, viz. They whoſe names were uncertain, or it was not lawful to declare them: nay he whoſe ſex was doubtful, was called an unknown God.

"From which it ſeems very evident, that the Athenians, by their Unknown God, intended ſome Deity, who they ſuppoſed had been propitious to them, yet not being certain of his name, and that no offence might be given, they called him unknown.

"Yet it is perpetually hinted, as if this altar were *peculiar* to Athens, and ſomething might be inferred from its being only in a place, where the ſciences were carried to their higheſt elevation: but this is a great miſtake, ſuch altars and Gods being common all over the world; and were ſo many that Varro wrote a book of the unknown Gods, and another of the

uncertain ones. In the Attick Pagi there were many altars without names. Near the great altar of Jupiter, at Olympus, there was one to the unknown Gods; and the Arcadians worſhiped a ſtatue without a name.

" And both Pauſanias in 1 *Eliac.* and Theagenes in *Lib. de Diis*, mention two cities among the Lydians, in which was a large temple with altars in them, and aſhes thereon quite different from the common ſort, &c. and here the prieſt invoked the unknown God, reciting out of a book ſome barbarous form, in a language utterly unknown to the Greeks; and that, as ſoon as he prayed, a bright flame ſhone round, and conſumed the wood he had laid upon the altar, without any fire being put to it.

" Strabo mentions this cuſtom of the Celtiberians, that upon the full-moon they worſhipped an unknown or nameleſs God, ανωνυμω τινι Θεῳ, by dancing all night before their doors in unſeemly poſtures; the Perſians, Arabians, and other Eaſterns, had their unknown God. The people of Marſeilles,

ſeilles, in Gaul, openly profeſſed their worſhip of unknown Gods, and found that this inſpired them with a greater fear of their deities. They worſhipped them at a diſtance, and did not come near the place where their ſtatues ſtood. The prieſt did not approach them without trembling, and dreaded their appearing to him, that is, dreaded the knowing of them. And at Bourdeaux, amongſt other altars, there was one to an unknown God, which ſtood with the reſt till they were all demoliſhed by the command of Martial Biſhop of Limoſin. And if we paſs into America, we ſhall find the people of Peru and others to have alſo an unknown God, as well as politer nations.

"So that the argument will prove too much: if the Athenians knew the true God, becauſe they had an altar to an unknown one, it will follow, that all others, even the moſt barbarous and ſavage, were for the ſame reaſon acquainted with him: though, if we would ſpeak ſtrictly of theſe devout idolaters, they knew no more of

either, known or unknown Gods, than the ſtatue and the name, all their thoughts and ideas of a divine nature being ſo infinitely diſtant from it [*a*]."

Dr. Ellis concludes, that this unknown God, to whom the altar at Athens was dedicated, was not the one true God, but merely ſome ſubordinate divinity; and that the apoſtle only reſtored to Jehovah that which idolatry had given to inferior deities.

However he does not ſtop here, but labours to ſhew, that the heathen world had no knowledge at all of the one true God, and that *all* their Gods were ſubordinate deities. "Are not many things ſpoken of idols, or Jupiter, as Optimus,

[*a*] P. 296—299. The length of this quotation may ſeem to require an apology; but I flatter myſelf it will be acceptable, on account of the intereſting facts it contains. For it is not filled with ſuch knowledge, as only ſerves to diſplay an author's learning, but it contains *well digeſted* knowledge, and theſe *elaborated* and juſt concluſions, which a thinking man forms, from the long conſideration of, and thorough acquaintance with, a ſubject.

Maximus,

Maximus, &c. which cannot without blaſphemy be attributed to them? The ſame appellations which are given to one properly and piouſly, may be transferred to another improperly and impiouſly; but are they therefore the ſame * ?" And whereas St. Paul quotes Aratus, to prove, that the poets aſſerted that we were the offſpring of God, Dr. Ellis does not therefore ſuppoſe that Aratus meant the true God. "Whoever carefully reads the whole paſſage of Aratus, will, I think, be of opinion, that by Jupiter he means the univerſe, the greateſt God of the ancients; for immediately before he ſays, the villages and ways, the markets, harbours and ſeas, are full of Jupiter; and παντη δε Διος πεχρημεθα παντες, *We all of us make uſe of every part of Jupiter.* And Theon, in his Scholia, interprets that hemiſtich even in a ſecondary meaning, as ſpoken of the air, which he calls τον Δια, or τον Ζηνα τον φυσικον, *the natural Jupiter*, in whom, in an inferior

* P. 300.

ſenſe, we may be ſaid *to live and move, and have our being*; for without air no creature can ſubſiſt, it adminiſtring the moſt immediate matter of life unto them, by feeding and refreſhing their animal ſpirits. And Theon muſt be allowed as competent a judge of the poet's meaning as any modern. Nor is that expreſſion any more than the old Iambick, Ζωμεν δ' εν αυτω, και κινεμεθα, or that of Lucan, *Jupiter eſt quodcunque vides, quocunque moveris*; the ſame as Virg. Ecl. 3. *Jovis omnia plena*. Which I imagine no one was ever ſo void of reaſon, as to interpret of God that made heaven and earth.

" Thus the Apoſtle firſt ſhews the Athenians wherein their guilt of ſuperſtition and idolatry conſiſted. 2dly, He teaches them a new and proper object of their adorations: a God, but confeſſedly unknown to them, as diſtinguiſhed by a more auguſt character than any of their deities had aſſumed, *The Maker of all things*. And, 3dly, That ſome expreſſions of their own writers could be applicable to him only;

only; for, as the Creator of men, we are his offspring; as their preſerver, *in him we live and move, and have our being* *."

I confeſs, however, I heſitate to adopt Dr. Ellis's ideas here. It is very true, the heathen mythology is a maſs of confuſion and contradictions, being, as Jortin very properly terms it, "a rope of ſand—the "dream of a drunken man;" yet I am inclined to think, that amidſt all their aberrations, the heathen world, at leaſt the civilized part of it, ſtill retained ſome remains of the *ancient traditions*, relative to the one true God, the Author of Nature, though ſtrangely disfigured and mixed with many abſurdities and errors. The paſſages of Scripture which Dr. Ellis (p. 304) quotes, to prove that the heathens had no knowledge of the true God, may be underſtood as meant of mankind in general, who certainly did direct all their worſhip to falſe deities and dead men. But to diſcuſs this ſubject would lead into a la-

* P. 302.

byrinth

byrinth of enquiry, and carry me off from the immediate queſtion.

However, his opinion, that the heathens neither knew the true God, nor, from the works of nature, could arrive at the knowledge of him, or of their duty to him, leads our author to ſome concluſions ſo candid and benevolent, that I am perſuaded my readers will be pleaſed to have them quoted. "From theſe proceedings of the Almighty, we may infer ſome not unuſeful obſervations.

"Firſt, That the ſevere and unchariſtable cenſures which many have paſſed upon the Gentile world, of their being unavoidably condemned to everlaſting puniſhment, was founded on the opinion of their enjoying, or what is the ſame thing, of having capacities with the greateſt eaſe to attain an exact knowledge of God and their duty; and upon this ſuppoſition it would be unreaſonable to determine otherwiſe. Such was the vain opinion of the Jews, 'That all Iſrael ſhall have a portion in the

'world

' world to come; but the heathens are to
' be fuel for hell-fire.'

" Secondly, That as God is the Author of mens beings, who created and intended all for happineſs, being of infinite mercy as well as juſtice; he ſurely will require no ſtricter account than according to the talents he himſelf intruſts, and has committed to their charge: ſo that impoſſibilities can never be the terms of duty, nor ſhall a man be condemned for what was not in his power to avoid. But whoever juſtly uſes thoſe helps and abilities he has, in a careful ſearch and obedience of truth, though he miſs of truth, may be charitably hoped not to miſs the reward of it.

" For this reaſon, Socrates, though an idolater, and ſuperſtitious in the article of death, yet, if he was humble, ſought for truth with diligence, and impartially choſe what to him appeared beſt, I ſhall not doubt but his ſoul, and that of every honeſt heathen, is happy, and will be bleſſed with the viſion of God: for if it were a miſery to be born in the times of paganiſm, it was

not

not a fault; and though the light to direct them was never ſo dim, if they followed it with humility and ſincerity, embraced nothing without a due and calm examination, nor acted contrary to the conviction of their judgment, it would certainly direct them to light eternal *."

Dr. Ellis proceeds to ſhew, that the knowledge of God is not to be attained from contemplating his works. If it were, "it is ſomewhat myſterious, that theſe laſt ages, which have ſo vaſtly improved natural philoſophy, ſhould have made no new diſcoveries in the Divine Nature, which is neither more nor leſs than it was before, juſt ſo far as God revealed it."

Having in various parts of this chapter noticed, that the heathens could never agree about who was the Creator of the world, and generally aſcribed it to inferior or evil beings, he obſerves, p. 355, "there "cannot be a greater abſurdity than to "ſay, man can find out God by the works

* P. 311, 312.

"of

" of creation, yet cannot find out that
" creation is the work of God. Which
" was exactly the case of the old heathens,
" who never could determine who formed
" the world, nor when, nor how, nor out
" of what, it was made."

This is a most important observation. It is easy for those to write Astro or Physico-theologies, and demonstrations of God *a posteriori*, who have previously been taught that God is the Creator of nature; but the question is, what men would have concluded, without this previous information; and here, if we appeal to fact, we shall find, that men stumbled so much by the defects and errors, not to say evils, which they thought they perceived in the creation, that some doubted if it were at all the work of a wise or good being, and some ascribed it to the devil.

P. 372 he shews, that the works of God, instead of leading men up to him, had generally the effect of making them idolaters. The sun and moon, the most glorious bodies in nature, became universally

the

the objects of worſhip. Even the Jews could not help falling into the general deluſion.

P. 375 he takes notice of a beautiful idea of PLATO, who having aſſerted, in his *Philebus*, that the knowledge of God was a gift from the Gods themſelves; and, in his *Theages*, that they gave it not indiſcriminately, but only to their friends, that is, the virtuous; proceeds to draw an analogy between the knowledge of God and the light of the ſun. As the eye cannot contemplate the ſun but by his own light, ſo neither can the mind contemplate God, the SUN of the UNIVERSE, without a beam of his own illumination. "What therefore the ſun is in viſible things, though neither the ſight nor eye, yet the cauſe of the eye's ſeeing, the diſcernment of ſenſible things, and of himſelf being viſible: ſo is God in intellectuals, neither the human mind, nor reaſon, nor underſtanding; yet is the immediate ſole cauſe of all ſpiritual knowledge to man; that ineffable light, which only can open his mind to contem-

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plate the invisible glories of the Divine Nature.

" If the Sun could not be perceived but by the light it affords, much less could God (that νοητον γνωσεως φως, και φως αληθινον, και φως τε κοσμε, και φως των ανθρωπων) to whom the glory of the heavenly orbs is no more to be compared than a glow-worm, or spark of fire to them: they enlighten the visible world, but reach not the internal mind; they are material, subject to corruption and vanity, and cannot declare an immaterial incorruptible nature.

" Menander spoke well as an Heathen: ' That we ought to worship the Sun as the ' principal God, because by him we see the ' other Gods.' And certainly that God, which is a Sun to the soul, irradiating the inward recesses and eyes of the mind, opening to it the treasures of knowledge, ought only to be adored *."

P. 381. Man cannot arrive at the knowledge of God from contemplating his own

* P. 376.

frame—

frame—by nature he would not have diſcovered himſelf to be a compound of ſoul and body. Cicero ſays, if you carried among the barbarous Britons a curious machine, like Poſſidonius's ſphere, which ſhewed the revolutions of the heavens, every one of them would ſuppoſe that it was a creature endued with perfect reaſon. If men could ſuppoſe ſuch a machine to poſſeſs reaſon, they might conclude more eaſily that they themſelves were machines.

P. 395. The knowledge of God not to be deduced from the fitneſs of things—the univerſe too vaſt a ſyſtem to be comprehended by unaſſiſted man—the ſtudy of it puzzled the wiſeſt ancients—they generally landed in the belief that the univerſe was an animated being, and itſelf the object of worſhip. Hence Socrates, better informed, conſulted the oracle always to learn the will of the Gods, and diſcouraged the too curious ſtudy of nature, both as above human capacity, and as dangerous to the mind.

Our author proceeds to argue againſt

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the notion of an eternal fitneſs of things independent of the Deity, as ſtated by Cudworth and others; and endeavours to prove the doctrine lately taken up by Mr. Paley, that the foundation of all morality is the will of God.

Chap. VI. God not to be defined or demonſtrated, therefore not diſcoverable by reaſon.—There is no ſcale that will lead us up from created beings to the uncreated Cauſe of all. There is nothing like God in nature, from which we can infer his exiſtence. "A mind that has no knowledge but of ſenſibles, ſees or hears no other objects, can abſtract no ideas from matter, but what are material; and had he mountains of them, his attempt would be as fruitleſs as the giants invading Jupiter; heap matter upon matter, it will never amount to immateriality, nor open to his view the new ſcene of inſenſibles and inviſibles; without an inſtructor to open his eyes, it would not be poſſible to conceive an angelick being, becauſe it can have no reſemblance, no idea of a ſubſtance purely

ſpiritual; yet vaſtly remoter from matter, is an omnipotent Being, comprehending in itſelf all the poſſibilities of things *."

He ſhews, p. 464, that all the wiſe ancients owned their extreme ignorance and uncertainty reſpecting the Deity and his will and laws; and quotes a curious ſimile, which occurs in Plato's Republic, l. VII. p. 514; and ſhews, that that profound philoſopher did not think that the works of nature could, without divine aid, teach men the knowledge of the Great Being. "He feigned a ſubterraneous dwelling or cavern, the entrance of which lies open at a great diſtance, in which there are men from their childhood tied neck and heels together, lying upon the ground, and not being able to turn their heads, can ſee nothing but what is before them. He then would place a fire artificially, betwixt which and the perſons bound, men might walk carrying ſtatues, veſſels, and other things, the ſhadows of which would fall

* P. 460.

upon

upon the oppoſite ſide of the Den. They will undoubtedly, ſays he, think theſe ſhadows to be the very real things themſelves, and the words they hear to be the words of theſe ſhadows. Such is the ſtate of theſe men lying bound in darkneſs. The Den is this world, wherein men lie proſtrate on the ground bound with chains of native ignorance; ſo that we cannot turn our heads about to contemplate the true light τȣ ονΤος, *of being*; but can only ſee the ſhadows of things, which yet we gueſs are the things themſelves, &c. It is not poſſible to repreſent more emphatically the blindneſs and ignorance of human nature, and the impoſſibility for reaſon to diſcern divine truths, or have the leaſt real intuitive apprehenſion of them; for το της ψυχης ομμα κατωρυγμενον εςι εν βαρβαρικῳ αγνοιας βορβορῳ, *the eye of the ſoul is quite immerſt in the barbarous mire and filth of ignorance.* But that if afterwards theſe perſons were brought into the light, firſt beholding the reflexion of things, and then the real ſubſtances, in heaven and earth,

the moon and ſtars, but principally the ſun, as it were directing all things in this viſible world; they would immediately conclude that the ſun was the author of times and ſeaſons, governed all things, and was the cauſe of whatever they beheld.

" So that in Plato's opinion, the moſt glorious works of nature would not lead men to the knowledge of God, but rather ſtop their minds, to conſider the ſun, &c. as the firſt cauſe, which had been the real fact in all ages, till they had a ſtronger light than that of the heavens to direct them to the author of them *."

P. 481. The Doctor cenſures their opinion who think, that Revelation comes in only in *aid* to nature—to *accelerate* diſcoveries which in time might have been made by reaſon. He aſks why the ancient ſages, who exhauſted their lives in the ſearch of wiſdom, remained after all in a ſtate of uncertainty about the moſt important truths, ſuch as related to the Deity,

* P. 468—469.

the origin and end of man, &c. He warns his readers againſt too great a reliance on reaſon, and concludes.

From the various paſſages of ancient writers, ſcattered about in different parts of this work, I ſhall make a ſecond catalogue of *Primitive Traditions*, which may be added to thoſe I gave my readers in p. 240.

15. "The whole voice of antiquity agrees in this, that the knowledge of the το ον is Θεων εις ανθρωπους δοσις*, *a gift of God to men*," p. 108.

16. "So the Jews confeſs, *Surely vain are all men by nature, who are ignorant of God, and could not out of the good things that are ſeen, know him that is; neither by conſidering the works did they acknowledge the workmaſter, but deemed either fire, &c. or the lights of heaven, to be the Gods which govern the world.* Whence we learn the opinion of the Jews to be 1. That the heathens were ignorant, or

* Plat. Phileb. Theæt.

knew nothing of the true God. 2. That the works of Creation never led them to the Creator. 3. That they never could raiſe their minds, in contemplation of a Deity, above the ſphere of viſible things; but concluded them to be truly and eſſentially God, ſince nothing that was not ſo could govern the world." p. 375.

17. "Plato wiſhed for a prophet to reveal the will of God to us, without which we cannot know it. And Socrates, in his Cratylus, 'That good men only are wiſe;' and is every where full of this doctrine, 'That all true knowledge of the Gods is 'from the Gods; and that the mind of 'man ſtands in need of divine illumination 'to underſtand divine things, as much as 'the eye wants the light of the ſun, to 'ſee viſible things." P. 465.

18. "Even Celſus concluded that a divine ſpirit deſcended to acquaint the ancient ſages with thoſe divine truths they taught the world *." P. 109.

* Orig. contra Celſ. l. 7. p. 366.

19. "Both

19. " Both Plato and Cicero ſay, 'That 'philoſophy is the invention and gift of 'the Gods, not men: that it was this firſt 'inſtructed us in the worſhip of them, in 'all ſocial virtues, and greatneſs of ſoul: 'that this diſpelled darkneſs from the 'mind, by which means we diſcern what 'is above us and below us: that God 'is the beginning, middle, and end of 'things.' Thus plainly attributing whatever they knew of the Gods, or divine things, to no principle, but the Gods." P. 465.

20. " Plutarch ſays the ſame: 'That 'the knowledge of the Gods can only be 'had from them.' And it was ſome time a ſettled maxim in the Socratick ſchool, 'That even virtue is not from nature or 'diſcipline, but θεία μοίρα, *by ſome divine* '*infuſion*, and even without the concur-'rence of the mind." P. 465—466.

21. " Plato, treating of the Divine Nature, ſays, 'This doctrine, though 'ſtrange, the Gods (as they ſay) have thus 'delivered to us to learn, and teach it to

'others.' And over and over again, 'That we could not learn these truths 'but from the Gods, or the Sons of the 'Gods; and that we cannot know their 'will without a prophet to reveal it to 'us." P. 119.

22. "Jamblicus saw the force of this truth, and was positive 'That human 'nature can neither speak of God, nor do 'any divine works without God." Ib.

23. "Jamblicus asserts, 'That our weak 'and frail nature possesses nothing of this 'knowledge as natural to it, συμφυτον δε 'θδεν κεκτηκαι *." P. 108—109.

24. "Cicero would go further than his master Plato, in saying, 'That philoso- 'phy (under which he includes the whole 'of religion) was not only the gift, but 'the invention of the Gods.' *Philosophia omnium mater artium, ut Plato ait, donum,* "*ut ego inventum Deorum.*" P. 119.

25. "Christians, till later ages, affirmed θεοσδοτον σοφιαν, that divine wisdom, or

* § 3. c. 18.

the

the knowledge of divine things, was from God: and that learning and knowledge are to be received from what we hear, and not from what we ſee." P. 119.

26. "Virgil makes it (ſuperſtition) to conſiſt in being ignorant of the ANCIENT GODS. *Vana ſuperſtitio, veterumque ignara Deorum.*" P. 292.

27. "Epicharmus affirmed, that the divine reaſon had invented all arts [a], and taught the uſe to be made of them; That men never had invented any, it

[a] There has been much controverſy about the origin of language. "Speech," ſays Dr. Beattie, "very juſtly, if invented at all, muſt have been invented, either by children, who were incapable of "invention, or by men, who (from the rigidity of "their organs) were incapable of ſpeech; (in either "caſe an impoſſibility). And therefore reaſon, as "well as hiſtory, intimates, that mankind, in all "ages, muſt have been ſpeaking animals; the young "having conſtantly acquired this art by imitating "thoſe who were elder; and we may warrantably "ſuppoſe, that our firſt parents muſt have received "it by immediate inſpiration." Theory of Language, 8vo, p. 101.

was the Gods that did it, and the reaſon of men proceeds from that which is divine." P. 235.

28. "Even Heſiod would have the law of man to be from the Gods.

"Τονδε γαρ ανθρωποισι νομον διεταξε Κρονιων."

Ib.

29. "Demoſthenes gives this reaſon why all men ought to obey Law, becauſe it is ευρημα και δωρον Θεϑ, *the invention and the gift of God.*" Ib.

30. "Cicero ſays, *Hanc video ſapientiſſimorum fuiſſe ſententiam*, &c. This, I perceive, was the opinion of the wiſeſt of men, that Law (and he certainly ſpeaks of the natural one) was neither deviſed by the wit of men, nor was any decree of the people, but ſomething eternal, that Wiſdom, which by its commands and prohibitions governs the whole univerſe; therefore they ſay, this principle and ultimate law is the mind of God, commanding or forbidding all things: and he declares, that the obligation of law is not only more ancient than the being of

men,

men, but coeval with God, who governs and preſerves the world; for the Divine Mind cannot be without reaſon, nor Divine Reaſon without the power of enacting what is good and evil. *Quæ vis non modo ſenior eſt, quam ætas populorum & civitatum, ſed æqualis illius, cœlum atque terras tuentis, & regentis Dei. Neque enim eſſe mens divina ſine ratione poteſt, nec ratio divina non hanc vim in rectis praviſque ſanciendis habere.* And a little after, that a thing did not commence to be a law when it was written, but when it firſt aroſe; but it aroſe together with the Mind Divine. Wherefore the true and ſovereign law, fit to command or prohibit, is the right reaſon of the ſovereign Jupiter. So in that famous paſſage, ſo often cited in favour of the law of nature, *Eſt quidem vera lex, recta ratio, naturæ congruens, &c.* he ſums it up in ſaying, *Deus hujus legis inventor, diſceptator, lator*; 'That God was the inventor, the judge, and maker of it;' for

'there

there is but one common Maſter and Lord of all.

" Here it is obſervable, That the law *Naturæ congruens*, congruous, fit, or agreeable to nature, is not ſuppoſed to be the invention of reaſon, or obvious from nature, or conſtituted in the fitneſs or relation of things, but to be wholly the mind and will of God, as both the efficient and declarative cauſe of it. And hence, *Secundum Deum vivere, & Deum ſequi*, are frequently taken for the ſame, as *vivere ſecundum naturam*, and even *ſecundum rationem*, in Cicero, Seneca, Plutarch, and others; and Hierocles, in his comment on the verſes of Pythagoras, ſhewing what it is to obey right reaſon, makes this juſt obſervation, that to obey right reaſon, and to obey God, is the ſame thing; for nature, which is rational, having obtained divine illumination, deſires thoſe things which the divine law determined; and a mind guided by God, does not differ from the will of God, but contemplating

plating the divinity and ſplendour, does what ſhe does: ſo that he makes God, as by declaring his will he commands reaſon, to be the only rule and meaſure of duty, and conſequently of obligation.

"And hence the laws of nature are ſometimes called *common notions*, but moſt frequently τȣς θεȣς νομȣς, *the divine laws*, or given by God: and that reaſon receiving theſe laws, becomes a moſt vigilant judge to itſelf, whereby they ſeem rightly to denote the power of conſcience; namely, that from the authority and declaration of God there is ſuch a relation or conjunction between God and man, whoſe reaſon is thus informed and commanded, as to be conſcious to the Deity of diſcerning the heads of that univerſal law, which perpetually bind, in being thus declared and commanded; as alſo conſequently of the obligation ſuperinduced by an authority ſuperior to any human power, and the puniſhment appointed as a neceſſary attendant on the violation of it; for *conſcius*, in the

'matter

matter of duty, is the ſame as *cum alio ſcius*, as Nonius expreſſes himſelf on this word."——" And from the obſervance of this univerſal or natural law given by the authority of God to our firſt parents, and from them handed down to their poſterity (which preceded the law of Moſes, and was afterwards incorporated with it) it is, that Noah was found juſt, and Abraham became the friend of God. And Origen expreſsly calls the law of nature, that which God ordained to mankind. So on that paſſage in Iſaiah, *They have tranſgreſſed the laws, changed the ordinances, broken the everlaſting covenant*; which appertained to other nations as well as the Jews St. Jerome ſays: 'Let the 'Jews hear this, who boaſt that they 'alone received the law of the Lord; that 'all nations in the world received the law 'of nature, &c.' But they had the written law by Moſes." P. 440—443.

" Theſe teſtimonies may ſuffice to ſhew the opinion of the wiſeſt heathens on this

' head:

head: and why all their legiſlators pretended to deliver nothing but what they had from Heaven, viz. to arm their laws with that divine authority which alone could carry obligation with it, as it was what no human reaſon or power had a claim to. Hence Zoroaſter among the Perſians and Bactrians attributed his laws to Oromazes; Triſmegiſtus of the Egyptians to Mercury; Zamolxis of the Scythians to Veſta; Charondas of the Carthaginians to Saturn; Minos of the Cretans to Jupiter; Draco and Solon of the Athenians to Minerva; Lycurgus of the Spartans to Apollo; Numa of the Romans to Egeria, and Mahomet of the Arabians to Gabriel *."

Here Dr. Ellis does not ſeem to have puſhed the argument ſo far as he ought to have done. For the pretence of having received inſtruction from heaven, was not only neceſſary to the ancient legiſlators to confer *ſufficient* authority on their laws,

* P. 235—236.

but

but in fact, without it they could have had no authority at all. Mankind were ſo accuſtomed to the opinion, that God was the original author of all laws, they were ſo univerſally perſuaded that all wiſdom proceeded from above, that if any one had attempted to deliver a *new ſyſtem*, from his own fancy, and without any divine authority, he would have appeared in their eyes as no better than an abſurd fool, or impious impoſtor.

And here I muſt put an end for the preſent to this enquiry; an enquiry, indeed, little ſuited to a young writer, and in which I have only gone a little way, with a view, if poſſible, to excite ſome of greater experience and more leiſure to inveſtigate it thoroughly. That mankind in general, after all that has been done, are ſtill in a ſtate of deplorable darkneſs, with reſpect to theſe moſt important ſubjects, is a fact that cannot be denied; and that even in the Chriſtian world the majority of men entertain very abſurd and falſe ideas relative to the Supreme Being, his nature

and

and attributes, what he requires of them, and how they may attain his favour, is alſo a fact, that I truſt moſt wiſe men will give their aſſent to. Now whether theſe errors will in time be extirpated by the progreſſive improvement of human reaſon—whether the world be now ſo matured in age, as that it may be left to itſelf, and the hand of its Almighty Parent withdrawn—or whether there be any neceſſity, or ſome reaſon to expect once more the interference of the Great Governor of all—are queſtions which I am utterly incompetent to decide, but which I propoſe to thinking men, as well worthy their attentive conſideration.

One thing is evident from the inveſtigation we have juſt made, and it is a great advantage attending this hypotheſis, that it ſhews Chriſtianity to be no *new* thing in the world, no *uncommon* violation of the ordinary laws of nature; but, on the contrary, a continuation of that ſyſtem which began at the creation of the world, when God *firſt* revealed himſelf to man, and which has continued without interruption,

I do not ſay to the preſent time, but certainly to the birth of Jeſus Chriſt.

I ſhall have attained my object, if the preſent ſketches ſhall engage ſome abler writer in the further proſecution of this enquiry. Undoubtedly none can be more important.

Christie, Thomas

Miscellanies philosophical, medical and moral

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